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

Śrīmad Viṣṇu-Tattva Vinirṇaya

ŚRĪ MADHVĀCĀRYA

ENGLISH TRANSLATION

S. S. RAGHAVACHAR

Viṣṇu-tattva-vinirṇaya of Śrī Madhvācārya is a forceful and illuminating presentation of the philosophy of the Vedas and Upaniṣads from the stand-point of Dvaita. Its constructive thesis, bold and far-reaching, is worked out through methods of relentless dialectics and revolutionary exegesis. By far it is the best outline of Dvaita-Vedānta, embodying as it does the chief elements of its ontology and epistemology.

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FOREWORD

The studies of Advaita and Viśiṣṭādvaita have been accessible to readers in the various English translations of the respective systems. But unfortunately nothing much so far has appeared concerning Indian Pluralism, especially, about the philosophy of Śrī Madhvācārya and his illustrious followers, such as Jayatīrtha and Vyāsatīrtha. The fault is not entirely on the side of the old Anglo-Indian scholarship which failed to appreciate the contribution of Indian Realism in the scheme of Vedānta. The important work of Helmuth von Glasenapp on Mādhva philosophy is a sealed book to many English readers. Thanks to the works of Mr. C. M. Padmanabhacharya, Mr. S. Subba Rao, Dr. R. Nagaraja Sarma and others, the world has come to know something of the bold speculations of Śrī Madhvācārya and his brilliant followers with their perfect logical terminology and dialectical skill.

Although the glimmerings of realism and pluralism in India go back to Vedic times, and powerful critiques of idealism had prepared the ground earlier in the ninth and tenth centuries, pluralism as an organized system cannot be said to have begun until the advent of Śrī Madhva. Śrī Madhva was born (1238 A.D.) in Pājakakṣetra, a village near Udipi in the South Kanara District.

He was named Vāsudeva by his parents. Even as a boy he seems to have been a prodigy of Vedic learning. Inspired with a deep sense of mission in life, he assumed saṁnyāsa like the great ācāryas before him. Acyutaprekṣa (also known as Purusottamatīrtha), who initiated him into saṁnyāsa, named him Pūrṇaprajña or Pūrṇabodha. He however, is known to us as Ānandatirtha in his writings. He wrote valuable commentaries on the important Upaniṣads, the *Bhagavadgītā* and the *Brahmasūtras*. Besides his digest of *Mahābhārata* called *Mahābhāratatātparyanirṇaya* and gloss on the *Bhāgavata*, he wrote independent treatises like *Viṣṇutattvavinirṇaya* which is regarded by many as his greatest prakaraṇa-grantha. The dominant influence on his style seems that of the sūtras. Fortunately, there are lucid glosses on his aphoristic writings which help to elucidate all points.

The chief features of the system are its conception of the Deity who is identified with Viṣṇu, its realism and pluralism. It is realistic in so far as it insists on the existence of things independent of our mind. Śrī Madhva indicates the pluralistic position of his doctrine by the statement, 'Varied and of varied qualities are all the things of the universe'.* Hence not only the individual selves

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*भिन्नाश्च भिन्नधर्माश्च पदार्था निखिला अमी ।

are different from one another and matter, but so too are the material objects.

Another unique characteristic of the system is the notion of 'difference' (bheda). Everything is unlike, unequal or unparallel, and this distinction between two or more objects constitutes the 'difference'. Bheda is fivefold: God and self, the different selves, God and matter, self and matter and different material objects. Here it is necessary to note that difference between things does not mean the *independence* of objects so differentiated, as we find in our experience that one object depends on another, though they are different. Ultimately God alone is absolutely independent with regard to his nature (svarūpa), knowledge (pramiti) and action (pravṛtti), and everything else exists, knows and acts at his will.

The system accepts ten categories: Substance (dravya), attribute (guṇa), action (karma), universals (sāmānya), speciality (viśeṣa), the specified (viśiṣṭa), the whole (aṁśin), potency (śakti), similarity (sādṛśya) and non-existence (abhāva). Of the ten categories, it will suffice to say a few words regarding nature, individual self and God that constitute the most important substances, which are twenty in number.

Nature: All the material products originate from prakṛti or primal matter. Sattva, rajas and tamas, the three guṇas, are its first emanations.

From them evolve other transitional products which are mahat (intellect), ahaṇkāra (egoism), manas (mind), ten senses, and the five great elements. The effect produced is of two kinds: modification (pariṇāma) and manifestion (abhivyakti). The Dvaita conception of causation differs from the well-known views of Advaita and Viśiṣṭādvaita. When a thing actually undergoes modification and produces other things, it is the modificatory effect; for example, the mahat, ahaṅkāra, etc. from prakṛti. In the latter case, no new substance is materially produced; for example, cloth from threads. Further, the effect is considered as neither existent only or non-existent only before its emergence but both existent and non-existent. It exists as the cause, but not as the effect. This is known as sadasatkāryavāda.

Individual self: Numerically the selves are infinite, each being different from others. It is monadic in size, but pervades the body due to its power of intelligence. It is also an agent, though absolutely depending on God. It has attributes like sentience and bliss similar to those of God. It is on this basis of resemblance that some famous Upaniṣad dicta of monistic character are explained. Though the self is blissful by nature, it transmigrates and is subject to suffering on account of its past karma. As already stated the selves

are different from God, from one another and from matter. The selves are of three classes: Those that are eternally free like Lakṣmī, those that have freed themselves from saṁsāra like men and devas, *manes* and sages; and those that are bound; the bound includes those that are competent for release and those that are not. The conception of the last sub-class indicates the persistence of saṁsāra for ever, in the cosmic scheme.

God: Though the conception is personal, the personality of God does not limit his transcendent power and glory. He is the supreme Reality, possessing all excellences like infinite knowledge, bliss, power, compassion, etc. He manifests, maintains and withdraws the universe, controlling it in all aspects. It is because of his grace that the self, matter, etc., exist. In the final analysis there are only two categories, the dependent (asvatantra) and the independent (svatantra). Nature and selves are subordinate to God and depend on him. Nothing except God exists independently. He has nothing to gain by the cosmic functions save affording an opportunity to the aspirants for life divine. Although one without a second, he manifests himself in various forms, incarnates as avatars and is present in the sacred images. He is not the material cause of the universe, but the efficient cause. He is, in short,

the supreme Viṣṇu. As Viṣṇu is infinite, there is no possibility of our finite intellect grasping him completely. But he is not wholly unknowable. He is apprehensible to some extent through the means of the Vedas.

As already stated God is characterized by infinite and eternal attributes. The relation between God and his attributes is governed by a principle called 'viśeṣa' which is one of the ten categories. By viśeṣa is to be understood the principle, by virtue of which a thing is distinguished from its permanent attributes though they are identical in essence. There is no fundamental distinction between God and his attributes. This is a general principle that applies to all entities possessing permanent attributes. Viśeṣa accounts for linguistic differentiation inspite of factual identity. It does not, however, apply in the case of a thing and its provisional attributes, where the relation is that of identity-and-difference.

The epistemological position of the system is indicated by the definition of valid knowledge which is in agreement with the tenor of the system: Valid knowledge is that which corresponds with outside reality. There can be no knowledge which does not invlove relationship between a knower and a known. Knowing subjects and known objects are real. Knowledge always reveals diffe-

rences. The object is apprehended *as it is* in true knowledge. In erroneous knowledge an absolutely non-existing thing is taken for an existing thing and *vice versa.* For example, in a nacre-silver illusion, the falsity of silver is to be ascertained from a later verification, which proves that the non-existent was taken for the existent. Silver, the object of error here, was not present where it appeared, nor elsewhere, for, according to the system, the absolutely non-existent itself is the object or basis of erroneous knowledge. Non-existence (abhāva), it must be remembered, is one of the ten categories. This is how misapprehension is explained. The falsity of object, however, does not necessarily imply the falsity of its knowledge.

The means for the apprehension of an object is called pramāṇa. The system makes a distinction between 'primary means' (kevala-prmāṇa) and 'secondary means' (anu-pramāṇa). Vaild knowledge itself is kevala-pramāṇa as it directly points to the *datum* of experience. The means to valid knowledge is called anu-pramāṇa, since it leads to the object mediately. Hence we have to make a distinction between perceptual knowledge as primary means and perception as a secondary means. Similar is the distinction between inferential knowledge and inference. It is anu-pramāṇa that is divided as perception, inference and verbal

testimony. The sense-organs, manas and sākṣin constitute the instruments of knowledge. The notion of sākṣin as a sense-organ is unique to this system. Being of the nature of sentience it knows some objects directly as also ultimately those presented through the senses. Sākṣi-jñāna is regarded as infallible. While colour etc., are known through sense-organs like eye etc., memory is due to manas. Things like self, avidyā, pain, pleasure, time, space, etc., are directly known. A distinction is made between testimony due to personal origin (pauruṣeya), which is liable to error, and that which has no personal origin (apauruṣeya). The latter constitutes the Vedas whose validity is infallible. The doctrine gives great importance to Vedas as a means for the true knowledge of Reality, as perception and inference are confined to facts of ordinary experience only.

Mokṣa is release from the limitations and afflictions engendered by the ignorance of the true nature of God as well as the self. Scriptural study is recommended as a means for attaining the mediate knowledge of individual self and God. This knowledge subserving bhakti (love of God) becoms direct when, through God's grace, the final release is attained. Direct knowledge of God is the outcome of steady meditation which consists in continuous remembrance of God,

without any distraction. Though knowledge is essential to liberation, bhakti is the ultimate means to attain it. This deep love attracts the grace of God towards oneself. It is through God's grace alone that the self can be redeemed.* All else are only aids to it. In the state of release the selves attain bliss appropriate to their individual worth so that the distinction persists even in that state.

As the learned translator has stated in his Introduction, the *Viṣṇutattvavinirṇaya* is not chiefly devoted to the theological establishment of the supremacy of Viṣṇu as the title is apt to suggest, though such an aim is not altogether excluded in the body of the thesis. It is a striking piece of work on Dvaita in which the fundamental principles are enunciated, developed and defended with intensity. Sri S. S. Raghavachar is already known as the translator of Śrī Rāmānuja's *Vedārthasaṅgraha.* He has produced a useful and excellent rendering of a text not easily available to the readers interested in philosophy. Students of Dvaita in particular and Indian philosophy in general will be grateful to the translator for this careful piece of work. I hope that this important work will be widely read by students of philosophy.

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* मोक्षश्च विष्णुप्रसादेन विना न लभ्यते । (*Viṣṇutattvavinirṇaya.*)

The most important personality who taught harmony of religions and creeds in modern timee was Śrī Rāmakṛṣṇa. It is quite in the fitness of things that the book is released from this centrs which is not far off from Śrī Madhva's place of nativity.

Mangalore
June 3, 1959

Swāmī Ādidevānanda

INTRODUCTION

The opening verse of *Viṣṇutattvavinirṇaya* is of the greatest significance. In the first place it enunciates the main principles that are developed and defended with energy and thoroughness in the work as a whole. The validity of the Vedic scripture is asserted and its central import is affirmed to lie in the transcendent perfection of Nārāyaṇa, the supreme Reality. The second point of significance is the clue it affords to the total outlook of the philosophy championed by the ācārya. It is a verse of adoration to God and that adoration is indicated to be an end in itself; and the philosophical affirmation incorporated in the verse is just an element, a necessary factor, in the practice of devotion. Jñāna subserving bhakti is characteristic of the way of spirituality represented. The supremacy of God and the supremacy of the pathway of devotion to him are the twin foundations of the structure of Vedānta as expounded by Śrī Madhva.

TITLE OF THE WORK

The title of the work is apt to suggest that it is principally devoted to the theological establishment of the superiority of Viṣṇu over other deities of the Hindu Pantheon. While this is undoubtedly a part of the purpose of the treatise, it by no

means constitutes the core of it. The first and the third chapters are purely philosophical in character and the relative evaluation of the deities is dealt with in the second chapter. Even there the superiority of Viṣṇu over other gods is worked out as part of the general argument vindicating the supremacy of Viṣṇu, the supreme Reality, in relation to all other entities inclusive of all other gods. Ṇārāyaṇa, Vāsudeva and Viṣṇu are just alternative appellations of the Supreme usually named Brahman in the Upaniṣads. So it should be admitted that the burden of the work is not theological, though the theology of Vaiṣṇavism glorifyng Viṣṇu over the other deities of Hinduism is assimilated into it as a part of its fundamental contention. Its all-controlling purpose is the articulation of the fundamentals of Vedānta.

THE ARGUMENT

Formally the text is divided into three chapters. The first chapter deals with the validity and eternal nature of the Vedic testimony. It next examines the import of the Vedas and establishes the conclusion that the supreme theme of Vedic testimony is the transcendent pre-eminence of God. The second chapter demonstrates through a series of scriptural passages that the supreme Being is Viṣṇu, surpassing all other entities. The third chapter counters the notion that he is

attributeless and argues that he is free from all imperfections and is full of all auspicious attributes in their absolute perfection. The substantive nature of God and his attributes are identical and a principle explanatory of the linguistic differentiation of substance and attributes is propounded under the name of 'viśeṣa'.

It is clearly discernible that the last two chapters are merely amplifications of principles already enunciated in the first chapter and that the first chapter is the most important from the standpoint of both volume and weight of thought.

It is worthwhile analysing the first chapter and tracing the progress of the argument in it.

It opens with a vindication of Vedic testimony and vigorously champions the idea of its eternal and impersonal existence. Much older Mīmāṁsaka conceptions are taken up into the argument here and the Cārvāka, Buddhist, Jain and even Nyāya systems are subjected to criticism. The Prābhākara view of the Vedas as merely promulgating imperatives is discussed and refuted. As part of the argument the very important doctrine of svataḥ-prāmāṇya is advanced in the style of Pūrva-mīmāṁsā and other schools of Vedānta.

After thus securing the validity of the Vedas and their metaphysical import, the work proceeds to lay down that the principal theme of the Vedic testimony is the supremacy of God. This

second stage of the argument is marked by an attack on the monistic dismissal of the texts in the Upaniṣads that propound the difference between Brahman and jīva as merely a *résumé* of the popular modes of thought. The position is viewed from various angles of thought and is found inconsistent and unsatisfactory.

Incidental to this discussion a comprehensive statement of the nature of the pramāṇas and their relative significance is formulated in the words of an ancient and now unavailable classic named *Brahmatarka*. The epistemological framework of the school is strongly outlined in this section.

The argument against Advaita is continued and the resume-hypothesis concerning the dualistic texts is finally discarded.

The work then formulates the fundamental proposition that the 'mahā-tātparya' (supreme purport) of the scriptures is the 'sarvotkarṣa' (absolute supremacy) of Viṣṇu.

The polemics against Advaita is taken up again in the rather highly technical and metaphysical discussion of the validity of the concept of difference. The traditional 'refutation of the category of difference' is trenchantly considered and the category is re-defined and re-affirmed as an invulnerable metaphysical principle. The next stage of the argument is marked by an attack on

the Advaitic conception of the world as being neither real nor unreal but indefinable. The view is set aside as illogical and unnecessary and a new doctrine of error as 'the apprehension of the non-existent as the existent' is developed. This theory of error, the concept of svataḥ-prāmāṇya and the long passage from *Brahmatarka* constitute what may be called the epistemological contribution of the treatise.

The work plunges then into a full-fledged and vigorous elucidation of the apparently Advaitic texts in the Upaniṣads. The sixth chapter of *Chāndogya*, the Maitreyī-brāhmaṇa of *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, and so many other texts of perennial relevance to the determination of the final essence of Vedānta are fully considered and the conclusion achieved is that there is nothing in the Upaniṣads in support of the hypothesis of identity between the supreme Being and the individual souls. The differences are eternal verities and the difference of Viṣṇu from all else is just the negative aspect of the positive reality of his transcendent majesty.

The two schools of Advaita, ekajīva-vāda and bahujīva-vāda, are then examined respectively and their specific difficulties along with those that are common to both are demonstrated in detail.

The argument is reluctantly brought to a close and the conclusion is urged that the school

repudiated can point to no feature in itself that could distinguish it from pure nihilism.

All the essential and distinguishing elements of the Vedānta according to Śrī Madhva are presented in the treatise like viśeṣa, fivefold difference, the theory of error, the immediate knowledge by the self as sākṣin, the two senses of pramāṇa as instrument and product, the pre-eminence of Viṣṇu among the Vedic gods, his being the efficient cause of the world, mokṣa as the attainment of God and bhakti. Tradition is amply justified in according to this work a high status among the works of the ācārya. It is the greatest of the prakaraṇa-granthas of Śrī Madhva.*

OTHER SCHOOLS REFERRED TO

The understanding of the work presupposes a comprehensive grasp of Advaita as expounded by its principal champions. That is the pūrva-pakṣa for the major part of the work. It also refers to Cārvāka, Buddhist Kṣaṇika-vāda, Yogācāra, Sūnya-vāda, Jainism, and the Nyāya rationalistic proof for the existence of God. The Prābhākara view is also discussed. While discussing the number of pramāṇas reference to Kumārila is also implied. In the conception of sākśi-jñāna, a mode of knowledge is recognised

* I owe this just estimate of the work to Dr. R. Nagaraja Sarma. *Vide* his monumental work, '*The Reign of Realism in Indian Philosophy*'.

in addition to vṛtti-jñāna which certainly puts the school in opposition to Sāṅkhya-Yoga, which admits no pramāṇa that is not vṛtti-jñāna. The conception of viśeṣa is certainly unique but not one unsupported by ancient thought. Śrī Śaṅkara criticises the Pāñcarātra writers for speaking of attributes as if they are substances.* This clearly brings support from an unexpected source to the claim that the doctrine of viśeṣa is an inheritance from the ancient Bhāgavata tradition. This conception separates Dvaita from Viśiṣṭādvaita which upholds the principle of apṛthak-siddhi (inseparability). It is not impossible that while formulating the principle of viśeṣa the treatise alludes implicitly to Viśiṣṭādvaita. The second chapter while adducing textual evidence for the supremacy of Viṣṇu among the deities recognised in Hinduism certainly aims at eliminating all non-Vaiṣṇava formulations of Theism in Hindu thought. Thus the work offers battle as it were to several schools and tendencies of thought, and the biographer of Śrī Madhva is justified in comparing him as the author of this treatise to Arjuna achieving victory unaided over countless mighty warriors.**

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* See Śaṅkara's commentary on the *Brahmasūtras*, II, ii, 45.

** *Sumadhva-vijaya* xv, 80.

STYLE OF THE WORK

The style is energetic, sharp and cryptic and is the despair of those not particularly conversant with the polemical methods of Indian Thought. It suffers, if we may say so, from extreme compression of thought. We may say of it what was said by a reviewer of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason:* 'It would have been shorter if it were not so short.' A certain expansiveness and amplitude of utterance would have added to the intelligibility of its discussions and rendered the dependence on the commentary of Śrī Jayatīrtha a less categorical imperative. But ultimately an acquaintance with the other works of the ācārya and a fair knowledge of the counter-doctrines discussed are bound to bring to the comprehension of a philosophical student the outstanding tenets of the treatise, though for a complete grasp of the fine links of thought, the correct import of unfamiliar modes of expression, the wide range of implications and the subtleties of distinctions, the gloss of Śrī Jayatīrtha is indispensable. The work, as it is, possesses a beauty of its own made up of its very austerity, forcefulness and earnestness of spirit.

AUTHORITIES ADDUCED

An immense number of texts is used in support of the propositions advanced. The sources of

all unfamiliar texts hardly procurable by the average student of Sanskrit literature are usually named, the well-known Vedic and Upaniṣad texts go often unnamed. Quotations from the Gīta are always introduced as the words of the Lord.

THE COMMENTATOR

Śrī Jayatīrtha is our principal guide in the task of comprehension. He certainly alludes to an earlier commentary (page 20).* But his commentary is of the highest rank of excellence. The world of philosophical scholarship cannot be too grateful to him. He is the commentator on Śrī Madhva by divine dispensation as it were. Scholarship, acumen in dialectics, fineness of statement, lucidity of style, penetrating clarity of analysis, resourcefulness in difficult exegesis, the vision of the architectonic of the work, thoroughness in handling all issues and the gift for amplification are all his in abundance. His moving humility and profound reverence to his teacher are an indication of the characteristic spirit of the great Indian commentators. Providence has been fair to Śrī Madhva in harnessing such a genius to the cause of explaining him.

In preparing this edition I have used the text edited by Sri Kaivaram Venkata Rao, B.A., and

* Bangalore Edition.

published by the Ramakrishnappa Dvaita Vedanta Pathasala of Bangalore.

Swami Adidevananda, but for whose inspiring guidance and encouragement I could have brought out nothing, has been the moving force in this venture also. He supervised my work at every stage and advised me in all important matters. He graciously complied with my request to write a Foreword. His learned and lucid Foreword sets forth the essentials of the philosophy of the text in a masterly way in a brief compass and thereby enhances greatly the value of the publication. I tender him my deepest reverence and gratitude.

It is a pleasure for me to record my sense of grateful obligation to Prof. N. A. Nikam, M.A., (Cantab.), Head of the Department of Philosophy and Sociology in the University of Mysore. His abiding devotion to the cause of Indian Philosophy and his keen and kind interest in my research have been responsible for expediting this humble work of mine.

My esteemed friend, Sri Kowlagi Seshachar M.A., Principal, Sanskrit College, Udipi, gave my rendering the benefit of his careful, scholarly and thorough scrutiny. I owe to him many a valuable criticism and improvement. I acknowledge my indebtedness to him.

Sri A. S. Kamath interested himself in the

work as usual and has given it a fine form. I thank him and the staff of the Sharada Press for their courtesy and good work.

Lastly, I deem it a great blessing that my work is going forth under the banner of Bhagavān Śrī Rāmakṛṣṇa, the unique Prophet of harmony and universality, who by his life and message has re-vindicated the one ever-lasting Truth shining through endless names and forms.

University of Mysore
July, 1959

S. S. Raghavachar

PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION

I am glad that a second edition has become necessary and is being brought out. I am thankful to Sri Ramakrishna Ashrama, Mangalore, for bringing out the second edition. The first edition received commendation from no less a Dvaita scholar than the late Dr. R. Nagaraja Sarma. His kind words were, 'It is a remarkably fine and faithful rendering'.

This edition contains no alteration except the correction of a few misprints.

University of Mysore
September 1971

S. S. Raghavachar.

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॥ ॐ ॥

ŚRĪMAD-VIṢṆU-TATTVA-VINIRṆAYA

श्रीमद्विष्णुतत्त्वविनिर्णयः

प्रथमः परिच्छेदः

ॐ ॥ सदागमैकविज्ञेयं समतीतक्षराक्षरम् ।
नारायणं सदा वन्दे निर्दोषाशेषसद्गुणम् ॥ १ ॥

1. I offer adoration always to Nārāyaṇa, who is cognizable in all his uniqueness only through the right scriptures, who wholly transcends the kṣara[1] and the akṣara[2] and who is flawless and abounds in all excellent attributes.

२. विशेषणानि यानीह कथितानि सदुक्तिभिः । साधयिष्यामि तान्येव क्रमात्सज्जनसंविदे ॥

2. With a view to facilitate the comprehension on the part of good men,[3] I will establish the truth of these adjectives[4] (applied to Nārāyaṇa) in the order in which they have been enunciated, through statements of scriptures and arguments corroborative of them.

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[1] Individual selves.

[2] Lakṣmī, his divine consort. His transcendence of both Lakṣmī and the individual selves implies *a fortiori* his transcendence of inanimate nature.

[3] Good men in the highest sense are those who renounce everything else and seek only Nārāyaṇa, the ultimate Deity.

[4] Here three adjectives are enumerated: (a) 'Cognizable in all his uniqueness only through the right scriptures', (b) 'Who wholly transcends the kṣara and akṣara', (c) 'Who is flawless and abounds in all excellent attributes'.

३. ऋगाद्याभारतं चैव पंचरात्रमथाखिलम् । मूलरामायणं चैव पुराणं चैतदात्मकम् ॥ ये चानुयायिनस्त्वेषां सर्वे ते च सदागमाः । दुरागमास्तदन्ये ये तैर्न ज्ञेयो जनार्दनः ॥ ज्ञेय एतैस्सदायुक्तैर्भक्तिमद्भिः सुनिष्ठितैः ॥ न च केवलतर्केण नाक्षजेन न केनचित् । केवलागमविज्ञेयो भक्तैरेव न चान्यथा—इति ब्रह्मांडे ॥

3. The *Brahmāṇḍapurāṇa* states: 'The right scriptures consist of the four Vedas beginning with the *Ṛgveda*, the *Bhārata*, the whole of the *Pāñcarātrāgama*, the original *Rāmāyaṇa*, the Purāṇas corroborating these and all other works that follow these. Texts other than these are bad testimonies and through the latter Janārdana cannot be known. But through right scriptures he can be known, by those who are persistently devoted to their study, who are inspired by loving devotion to him and are well established in that devotion. He cannot be apprehended by mere reasoning or by sensuous perception and not by one devoid of the qualifications specified. He can be apprehended *only* through the scriptures and *only* by devotees. There is no other way.'

४. नावेदविन्मनुतेदं बृहन्तं सर्वानुभूमात्मानं साम्पराये—इति तैत्तिरीयश्रुतिः । नैषा तर्केण मतिरापनेया प्रोक्तान्येनैव सुज्ञानाय प्रेष्ठ—इति कठश्रुतिः । नेन्द्रियाणि नानुमानं वेदा ह्येवैनं वेदयन्ति तस्मादाहुः वेदाः—इति पिप्पलादश्रुतिः ॥

4. The *Taittirīya-śruti* says: 'No one who does not know the Vedas understands this great all-experiencing ātman, understanding of whom is the way to liberation.'

The *Kaṭha-śruti* says: 'This knowledge is neither attainable nor refutable by reasoning. Only when it is imparted by a teacher it leads to direct realisation.'

The *Pippalāda-śruti* says: 'Neither the senses nor inference lead to the knowing of this One. Only the Vedas do so and hence they are called "Vedas".'

५. न चैतेषां वचनानामेवाप्रामाण्यम् । अपौरुषेयत्वाद्वेदस्य इतिहास-पुराणः पंचमो वेदानां वेदः इति तद्गृहीतत्वाच्च ॥

5. The texts quoted cannot themselves be considered untrue, for the Veda is not a personal composition and the other texts are admitted as authoritative by the Veda itself in the statement, 'Itihāsa-purāṇa is the fifth Veda as it forms the fifth in the series of *Ṛk*, *Yajus*, *Sāman* and *Atharvan*'.

६. न चापौरुषेयं वाक्यमेव नास्तीति वाच्यम् तदभावे सर्वसमयाभि-मतधर्माद्यसिद्धेः ॥

6. It cannot be argued that there can be no text which is not a composition by some author, for, in the absence of such an impersonal authority, dharma etc., which are admitted by all schools of philosophy, go unproved.

७. यस्य तौ नाभिमतौ नासौ समयी समयप्रयोजनाभावात् ॥

7. A thinker who does not admit dharma and adharma is not a philosopher, for, his position is devoid of the purpose, which all philosophy should subserve.

८. न च तेन लोकोपकारः धर्माद्यभावज्ञाने परस्परहिंसादिना अपकारस्यैव प्राप्तेः ॥

8. He does not help the world; since he promotes the understanding that there is no dharma or adharma. Mutual violence will come to prevail in the world and thus he only injures the world.

९. न चोपकारेण तस्य प्रयोजनं अदृष्टाभावात् ॥

9. There is nothing for him to gain by helping the world, for he admits no unseen reality (fostering those who do good to the world).

१०. अतो धर्माद्यभावं वदता स्वसमयस्य आनर्थक्यं अङ्गीकृतमेवेति नासौ समयी ॥

10. Thus one who maintains the unreality of dharma etc., himself admits by implication, the futility of his philosophy and therefore he is not a philosopher.

११. न च पौरुषेयेण वाक्येन तत्सिद्धिः अज्ञानविप्रलम्भयोः प्राप्तेः ॥

11. Dharma and adharma cannot be determined by the personal injunctions of someone, for persons (human beings) are liable to ignorance and deceptiveness.

१२. न च तदर्थत्वेन सर्वज्ञः कल्प्येत अन्यत्रादृष्टस्य सर्वज्ञत्वस्य कल्पनं तस्याविप्रलम्भकत्वकल्पनं तस्य तत्कृतत्वकल्पनं चेति कल्पनागौरवप्राप्तेः ॥

12. It would not be sound to postulate an omniscient person to obviate this liability to ignorance and deceptiveness and to make for the possibility of determining dharma and adharma, for, in that case results the flaw of excessive postulation. Omniscience, not a matter of experience, has to be postulated, that the omniscient person is not deceptive is to be postulated and that he is the author of statements about dharma and adharma has to be postulated.

१३. अपौरुषेयवाक्यांगीकारे न किंचित्कल्प्यम् ॥

13. But if the statements are admitted as not the composition of any person, there is nothing to be postulated.

१४. अपौरुषेयत्वं च स्वत एव सिद्धं वेदकर्तुरप्रसिद्धेः ॥

14. That the Vedas are not the compositions of any one is evident by itself, for the author of the Vedas is unascertained.

१५. अप्रसिद्धौ च कर्तुस्तत्कल्पने कल्पनागौरवम् ॥

15. While the author of the Vedas is unascertained, to postulate such an author is a case of unnecessary postulation.

१६. अकल्पने च अकर्तृकत्वं सिद्धमेव ॥

16. And if he is not postulated, that Vedas are authorless follows inevitably.

१७. न च लौकिकवाक्यवत्सकर्तृकत्वं तस्याकर्तृकत्वप्रसिद्ध्यभावात् ॥

17. On the analogy of worldly testimony, we cannot argue that the Vedic testimony also must have some personal source, for in the case of the former there is no prevalent conception that it is authorless (*i. e.*, there is not a single instance to prove its authorlessness).

१८. न च केनचित्कृत्वा वेद इत्युक्तं वेदसमं परंपराभावात् ॥

18. If a statement were to be made by someone and were to be named 'Veda', it does not become equal to the Veda as there is no (continuous) tradition to that effect.

१९. न च स्वयंप्रतिभातवेदैः दृष्टमवेदवाक्यं भवति परंपरासिद्धवेदवाक्यानुसारित्वात् । वेदद्रष्टृणामुक्तगुणवत्त्वाच्च तेषाम् ॥

19. The testimony that is intuited by those to whom the Vedas manifest themselves, cannot be other than 'Veda', for, what they intuit is one in import with the Veda (that portion of the Veda which is undisputed) and they do have the merits that are said to characterize the seers of the Veda.

२०. उक्तं च ब्रह्मांडे विंशल्लक्षणतोऽनूनस्तपस्वी बहुवेदवित् । वेदइत्येव यं पश्येत्स वेदो ज्ञानदर्शनादिति ॥

20. The following is said in the *Brahmāṇḍapurāṇa:* 'If he, who does not have less than twenty out of the thirty-two merits, who is given to penance, and who knows many Vedas, sees, by the power of his intuitive vision, any text as forming part of the Veda, it has to be admitted as such.'

२१. प्रामाण्यं च स्वत एव अन्यथाऽनवस्थानात् ॥

21. The validity of the Veda (as of all other sources of knowledge) is intrinsic. Otherwise the fallacy of infinite regress would result.

२२. न चोक्तयुक्त्यधीनत्वं प्रामाण्यस्य बुद्धिदोषनिरासमात्रकारणत्वाद्युक्तीनाम् ॥

22. The validity cannot be said to depend upon the argument adduced (above), for arguments merely serve to remove the flaws of thought.

२३. अदुष्टबुद्धीनां स्वत एव सिद्धत्वाच्च प्रामाण्यस्य ॥

23. To those whose thought is flawless the validity is self-established.

२४. न चाकांक्षायामेव प्रमाणान्तरापेक्षत्वादनवस्थाभाव इति वाच्यं आकांक्षाया एव बुद्धिदोषात्मकत्वात् ॥

24. It may be argued thus: 'Grounding the validity of a cognition on another cognition does not itself involve infinite regress. Only when there is a need for the ascertainment of the basis of the validity of a cognition we seek the validating cognition. In the absence of such a need, there is no infinite regress to the supporting cognition.' But this search for the validating cognition is itself a flaw. (Thus defective cognition is made known and corrected by other cognitions, while valid cognition is self-validated.)

२५. दुष्टबुद्धीनामेवाप्रामाण्यशंकेति परतोऽप्रामाण्यम् ॥

25. Only those with defects of thought suspect the validity of a given cognition and therefore we urge that invalidity is determinable extrinsically.

२६. प्रामाण्यं च स्वत एव सिद्धम् ॥

26. But validity is self-established.

२७. न चोच्चारणकाल एव वर्णानामुत्पत्तिरिति वाच्यम् ॥

27. It cannot be maintained that letters originate just when they are pronounced.

२८. तदेवेदं वचनमिति प्रत्यभिज्ञाविरोधात् ॥

28. That would contradict the recognition of the form, 'This is the same that was uttered before'.

२९. न च सादृश्यात्प्रत्यभिज्ञा भ्रान्तिरिति वाच्यम् ॥

29. Nor can it be said that the recognition is an illusion engendered by the similarity of letters.

३०. सोऽयं देवदत्त इत्यादेरपि तथात्वप्राप्तेः ॥

30. For, even recognitions of the form, 'This is that Devadatta' would have to be stigmatised illusory.

३१. सर्वक्षणिकत्वं वदता बौद्धेन सेयं दिगित्यादिप्रत्यभिज्ञाया भ्रान्तित्वं न वाच्यं पंचस्कन्धेभ्योऽन्यत्वात् । न च दिश एव भ्रान्तिकल्पिताः विज्ञानशून्ययोरपि साम्यात् । न चादित्योदयादिनैव दिक्कल्पना अन्धकारेऽपि दिङ्मात्रप्रतीतेः । कादाचित्कभ्रान्तिरेवादित्योदयादिदर्शनान्निवार्यते । सा च विज्ञानशून्ययोरपि भवतीति तेषां मतं वादिविप्रतिपत्तेः । अतो दिशस्स्थिरा एवेति सिद्ध्यति शून्यवदेव । अतस्तद्भेदस्यापि स्थैर्यं सिद्धं तदेवेदं वाक्यमिति प्रत्यभिज्ञानात् । न चानुमानादीनामागमं विना प्रामाण्यं धर्मादिषु तदगोचरत्वात् ॥

31. The Buddhist who maintains the momentariness of everything cannot urge that the recognition of the form, 'This is the same space' is illusory; for, space, according to him, is different from the five skandhas[1] (constituent elements of being). It cannot be held that directions in space are all illusory, for even vijñāna and śūnya will have to be similarly treated. It cannot be said that space is imagined owing to factors like the rising of the sun for even in darkness the awareness of space is there. Only accidental illusions concerning directions in space get removed by the observation of rising of the sun etc. Such illusions arise, according to the opinion of the Buddhists, with regard to vijñāna and śūnya

[1] The five skandhas viz., rūpa, saṁjñā, vedanā, saṁskāra and vijñāna constitute personality in aggregation. They are positive and momentary. Space is regarded as other than these skandhas along with two forms of destruction viz. pratisaṅkhyā and apratisaṅkhyā. All these three are non-positive and eternal. The point is that even this extreme temporalism must concede the validity of recognition in certain cases.

also, for, they are disputed by other schools of thought. Thus directions in space are abiding even as śūnya is said to be. Therefore, in the same way, the abiding character of the Veda also is established. We have the recogniton of the form, 'This is the same (Vedic) sentence'. And other sources of knowledge like inference have no validity independent of scripture in matters like dharma, for, the latter are not accessible to them.

३२. अतोऽपौरुषेयवाक्येनैव धर्मादिसिद्धेः सर्ववादिनामपि तदंगीकार्यम् ॥

32. Therefore, as dharma etc. are ascertainable only through statements not due to any personalities, such statements are to be admitted by all philosophers.

३३. तत्प्रामाण्यं च स्वत एव सिद्धम् ॥

33. And the validity of the Vedic testimony is self-established.

३४. अप्रामाण्यस्य च परतस्त्वानङ्गीकारे दुष्टेन्द्रियादेरप्यप्रामाण्यहेतुत्वं न स्यात् । तदनङ्गीकारे चानुभवविरोधः ॥

34. If invalidity is not ascribed to extrinsic causes, factors like defective sense-organs ought not to cause incorrect cognition. If the phenomenon of defective organs causing error is not admitted, experience itself stands contradicted.

३५. अतः प्रामाण्यं स्वतः परतोऽप्रामाण्यमिति सिद्धम् ॥

35. Therefore, it is established that the truth of cognitions is intrinsic to them and their falsity is extrinsic.

३६. वाचा विरूप नित्यया ॥

36. The Śruti says: 'O sage, Virūpa, praise him in eternal words.

३७. नित्ययाऽनित्यया स्तौमि ब्रह्म तत्परमं पदमिति ॥

37. And in words both eternal and non-eternal I praise that Brahman, who is the final goal'.

३८. श्रुतिर्वाव नित्या अनित्या वाव स्मृतयो याश्चान्या वाचः— इति पैङ्गीश्रुतिः ॥

38. The *Paiṅgī-śruti* says: 'The Śrutis are eternal words and the smṛtis and other speech constitute non-eternal words.'

३९. विज्ञेयं परमं ब्रह्म ज्ञापिका परमा श्रुतिः । अनादिनित्या सा तच्च विना तां न स गम्यते — इति कात्यायनश्रुतिः ॥

39. The *Kātyāyana-śruti* says: 'The highest object of knowledge is Brahman and the highest source of knowledge is the Śruti. Śruti is unoriginated and eternal and even so is Brahman. Independent of Śruti he cannot be known.'

४०. सहस्रधा महिमानः सहस्रं यावद्ब्रह्म विष्ठितं तावती वाक् । कश्छन्दसां योगमावेद धीरः को धिष्ण्यां प्रति वाचं पपादेत्यादि च ॥

40. It further says: 'Thousands are the glories of Brahman and they are individually thousandfold. The speech of the Veda is co-extensive with Brahman. What man of intelligence is there who can comprehend the significance of the Vedas and who is there, who comprehending it, can expound it?'

४१. नित्या वेदास्समस्ताश्च शाश्वता विष्णुबुद्धिगाः । सर्गे सर्गेऽमुनैवैत उद्गीर्यन्ते तथैव च । तत्क्रमेणैव तैर्वर्णैस्तैस्स्वरैरेव नान्यथा । अतः श्रुतित्वमेतासां श्रुता एव यतोऽखिलैः । जन्मान्तरे श्रुतास्तास्तु वासुदेवप्रसादतः । मुनीनां प्रतिभास्यन्ति भागेनैव न सर्वशः । यतस्ता हरिणा दृष्टाः श्रुता एवापरैर्जनैः । श्रुतयो दृष्टयश्चेति तेनोच्यन्ते पुरातनैः । तदुत्पत्तिवचश्चैव भवेद्वचक्तिमपेक्ष्य तु । चेतनस्य जनिर्यद्वदुच्यते सर्वलौकिकैः । पुराणानि तदर्थानि सर्गे सर्गेऽन्यथैव तु । क्रियन्तेऽतस्त्वनित्यानि तदर्थाः पूर्वसर्गवत् । वेदानां सृष्टिवाक्यानि भवेयुर्व्यक्त्यपेक्षया । अवान्तराभिमानानां देवानां वा व्यपेक्षया । नानित्यत्वात्कुतस्तेषामनित्यत्वं स्थिरात्मनामिति ब्रह्मांडे ॥

41. The *Brahmāṇḍapurāṇa* says: 'All the Vedas are eternal and in their eternal form they subsist in Viṣṇu's mind. In each creation they are spoken out by him alone in the self-same form, in the same order, with the same letters and modes of utterance and not otherwise. Hence they are Śrutis because they are only *heard* by all. They were heard by the sages in previous lives and through the grace of Vāsudeva they manifest themselves to those sages in the present life in parts and not in their entirety. Since the Vedas were perceived by Hari and were heard by others, they are called *revelation* and *perception* by the ancients, The allusions to their origin are to be interpreted in terms of their manifestation. Just as the creation of the individual soul is figuratively taken, the origination of the Śruti also should be so understood. But the Purāṇas which agree with the Vedas in significance, are brought forth in each creation in new forms. Therefore they are not eternal. Their import, of course, is what it was in the previous epochs. All the passages that speak of the creation of the Vedas merely signify their manifestation or they may be referring to the coming into being of new presiding deities set in secondary authority by Viṣṇu. They do not signify the non-eternality of the Vedas. How can the Vedas of an abiding character, be other than eternal?'

४२. न चानित्यत्वे श्रुतिर्वेद इत्यादि विशेषशब्द उपपद्यते ॥

42. If they were not eternal, their special designation as Śruti and Veda would lose all meaning.

४३. वेदास्ते नित्यविन्नत्वाच्छ्रुतयश्चाखिलैः श्रुतेः। आम्नायोऽनन्यथा-पाठादीशबुद्धिस्थितास्सदेति महावाराहे ॥

43. The *Mahāvārāhapurāṇa* says: 'They are *Vedas* because they eternally are, they are *Śrutis* because they are heard by all, they are *Āmnāya* because they are recited in the self-same order and they subsist always in Hari's mind.'

४४. न च नित्यत्वं विना वेदानां दर्शनव्यवहारो युज्यते ॥

44. If the Vedas were not eternal, speaking of 'seeing' the Vedas as it is done, would be wrong.

४५. न च वर्णपदादीनामनित्यत्वं वक्तुं युक्तम् । सर्वज्ञत्वादीश्वरस्य तद्बुद्धौ सर्वदा प्रतीयमानत्वात् ॥

45. It is not reasonable to think of the letters and words of the Vedas as non-eternal, for, as God is omniscient, they are always being intuited by him.

४६. न च घटादिवत्संस्कारमात्रत्वं वक्तुं युक्तम् ॥

46. It is not tenable to say that they subsist only as impressions of former experience as in the case of transient objects like jars and so on.

४७. प्रत्यभिज्ञाविरोधस्योक्तत्वात् ॥

47. As it is already pointed out, such a supposition would go against the fact of recognition.

४८. पुराणानामप्यन्यथाशब्दरचनमेवानित्यत्वम् ॥

48. Even the Purāṇas are non-eternal only because of the variations in verbal composition.

४९. अत आकाशगुणे शब्दे व्यज्यमाना वर्णादयस्तत्क्रमात्मको वेदश्च नित्य एवेति सिद्धम् ॥

49. Therefore, letters etc. that are manifest in sound which is an attribute of eternal space, and their specific order that constitutes the Vedas are established to be eternal.

५०. न च केवलसिद्धेऽर्थे व्युत्पत्त्यभावादप्रामाण्यम् । सिद्धान्वित एव व्युत्पत्तिगृहीतेः ॥

50. It ought not to be held that the Vedas cannot have any truth on the ground that words never signify any accomplished entity. The significance of words is grasped only in relation to accomplished entities.

५१. इयं माताऽयं पितेत्यादावंगुलिप्रसारणादिपूर्वकनिर्देशेनैव हि तज्जानाति ॥

51. By sentences like 'This is (your) mother', 'This is (your) father', and by a corresponding indication of the respective persons or objects by fingers (by others) a child grasps the significance of words.

५२. कार्यान्वित एव व्युत्पत्तिरिति वदतः कार्यस्य कार्यान्वयाभावात्कल्पनागौरवम् ॥

52. A thinker who maintains that all words signify their respective referents only as related to something to be accomplished is driven to excessive postulation, for the word *Kārya* (something to be accomplished) will have to refer to its referent as related to something else to be accomplished and there is nothing else to be accomplished.

५३. इयं माताऽयं पिता सुरूपोऽसीत्यादौ सिद्धमात्रज्ञापनेन पर्यवसितत्वाद्वाक्यस्य ॥

53. In sentences like 'This is (your) mother', 'This is (your) father', 'You are handsome', the signification of the sentence is completed in conveying information about accomplished facts.

५४. तस्य तत्र प्रामाण्यानुभवाच्च ॥

54. And the truth of the statements about those facts is directly experienced.

५५. न च कुत्रचित्सिद्धज्ञापनादन्यद्वाक्यस्य प्रयोजनं दृष्टम् ॥

55. Nowhere do we see the purpose of a statement in anything other than the information it conveys about accomplished facts.

५६. ज्ञात्वैव हीष्टसाधनतां प्रवर्तते निवर्तते च विपर्ययेण । अतः सिद्ध एव सर्ववाक्यानां प्रामाण्यं सिद्धम् ॥

56. When an accomplished fact is ascertained to be a means to a desired end, one begins to work for the end. If it is found not to be such a means, one desists from all effort in that direction. Therefore, the truth of all statements lies in their signification of accomplished facts,

५७. प्रसिद्धं च व्याकरणनिरुक्तादीनां सिद्धमात्रे प्रामाण्यं सर्ववादिनाम् ॥

57. It is well known in all schools of thought that grammar and etymology have valid significance only in relation to existent entities.

५८. तदनङ्गीकारे च सर्वशाब्दव्यवहारासिद्धिः ॥

58. If grammar and etymology are themselves rejected, there can be no employment of language whatever.

५९. उक्तं च नारदीये । सर्वज्ञं सर्वकर्तारं नारायणमनामयम् । सर्वोत्तमं ज्ञापयन्ति महातात्पर्यमत्र हि । सर्वेषामपि वेदानां इतिहासपुराणयोः । प्रमाणानां च सर्वेषां तदर्थं चान्यदुच्यत इति ॥

59. It has been said in the *Nāradapurāṇa:* 'All the Vedas, itihāsa, purāṇa and all other sources of knowledge, impart knowledge about Nārāyaṇa as omniscient, as the creator of all, as flawless and as surpassing all. They have as their great purport this teaching; whatever else is mentioned in them is subsidiary to this purport'.

६०. न च जीवेश्वराभेद एव तात्पर्यमागमस्य तत्र प्रमाणाभावात् ॥

60. The purport of the scriptures is not the identity of the individual soul and God, for there is no significant passage to that effect.

६१. न च जीवेश्वरभेदः सिद्धः इत्यनुवादकत्वं भेदवाक्यानां आगमं विनेश्वरस्यैवासिद्धेः ॥

61. The passages stating the difference between individual self and God cannot be construed as simply reiterating

what is known otherwise, on the ground that the said difference is established in common experience, for, independent of the scripture, the existence of God is not known.

६२. न चानुमानात्तत्सिद्धिः विपर्ययेणाप्यनुमातुं शक्यत्वात् ॥

62. His existence cannot be proved by inference, because the opposite also can be proved by inference.

६३. विमतं सकर्तृकं कार्यत्वाद्घटवदित्युक्ते विमतं विकर्तृकं अस्मत्संमतकर्तृरहितत्वादात्मवदित्यनुमानविरोधात् ॥

63. If it is argued, 'The world must have had a creator, because it is an effect, even as a jar being an effect was produced by a potter', it is countered by a contradictory inference to this effect, 'Tne world could not have been produced by a creator, for, it is not a created system according to our conception, even as the self was never produced by a creator like a potter'.

६४. अकार्यत्वमुपाधिरित्युक्ते शरीरिजन्यत्वमितरत्राप्युपाधिरित्युत्तरम् ॥

64. If it is argued that the counter-inference is vitiated by the fact that it applies only to entities that are not effects like the self and not to the world as a whole, it can be answered with equal force that the first inference is vitiated by the fact that it applies only to products like a jar manufactured by embodied creatures and not to the world as a whole.

६५. प्रत्यक्षानुमानसिद्धत्वे च भेदस्य तद्विरोधादेवाप्रामाण्यमभेदागमस्य ॥

65. Further, if difference is established by perception and inference, scripture asserting non-difference must be construed as false just on the ground of its contradiction to what is established by these other means of knowledge.

६६. तेनाभेदागमस्य प्रामाण्याभावे नानुवादकत्वं भेदवाक्यानाम् ॥

66. If the scriptural statements of identity are false on this account, statements of difference would not be mere reiterations.

६७. न हि बलवतोऽनुवादकत्वं दार्ढ्यहेतुत्वात् ॥

67. Surely when a stronger source of knowledge reiterates what is established by other sources, it is no mere reiteration. It is a confirmation.

६८. प्रत्यक्षादेरागमस्य प्राबल्येऽपि नोपजीव्यप्रमाणविरोधे प्रामाण्यम् ॥

68. Even if a scripture is stronger than the other means of knowledge like perception, it cannot have validity if it conflicts with the pramāṇa on which it depends and on whose foundation it is itself built up.

६९. विषयाभावे स्वस्यैवाप्रामाण्यप्राप्तेः ॥

69. If it is devoid of subject-matter it becomes false.

७०. तेनैव ह्यनुमानादिनागमस्य विषयः सिद्ध्यति तत्पक्षेऽपि ॥

70. Even according to the school of identity, the subject-matter of scripture is supplied by other pramāṇas like inference.

७१. अनुमानेन ह्यनुवादित्वपक्ष ईश्वरो बोद्धव्यः प्रत्यक्षेण चागमः । अतस्तयोर्विरोधे प्रामाण्यं न स्यात् ॥

71. On the view that holds that passages positing difference between God and individual self are mere restatements, God is established by inference and the individual self[1] is established in perceptual experience.

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[1] The word āgama must be taken as meaning the individual self (*Vide* Jayatīrtha's Ṭikā). If the scripture contradicts those pramāṇas which supply it the very entities it deals with, it loses validity.

७२. अनुमानसिद्धेश्वराच्च भेदोऽनुभवत एव सिद्धो जीवस्य असर्वकर्तृत्वेनानुभवात् । न चानुभवविरोधे आगमस्य प्रामाण्यम् ॥

72. Experience itself establishes the difference between the individual self and God whose existence is supposed to be proved by inference. For it is a matter of everyone's experience that he is not the author of all. The scripture can have no validity if it contradicts experience.

७३. आगमप्रामाण्यानुभवस्याप्यप्रामाण्यप्राप्तेः ॥

73. Otherwise even the experience of the truth of the scripture becomes false.

७४. बहुप्रमाणसंवादश्च दाढर्ढ्यहेतुरेव ॥

74. The concordance of many pramāṇas leads to the strengthening of conviction.

७५. बहूनां वचने तस्यैव दर्शने दाढर्ढ्यस्यैव दृष्टेः ॥

75. It is a matter of experience that what is testified to by many and is also a fact of observation, becomes a strongly established principle.

७६. सर्वाविवादस्थल एव कथंचिदनुवादकत्वम् ॥

76. Only in universally undisputed cases, concordance is mere reiteration (not confirmation).

७७. न चात्र सर्वाविवादः एकत्ववादिनामेव विवाददर्शनात् ॥

77. In this matter, there is no universal absence of disagreement. The theorists of identity themselves dispute the difference between God and the individual self.

७८. बहुप्रमाणविरोधे चैकस्याप्रामाण्यं दृष्टं शुक्तिरजतादौ ॥

78. If one proof (pramāṇa) contradicts many proofs, the solitary proof will have to be discarded as false. This is so in cases like the illusory perception of a conch-shell as a piece of silver.

७९. न च दोषजन्यत्वादेव दुर्बलत्वमिति विरोधः बहुप्रमाणविरुद्धानां दोषजन्यत्वनियमात् ॥

79. It is no contradiction to this conclusion to say that a cognition is weak only if it is produced by defects in the cognitive apparatus. It is the law that whatever cognition comes into conflict with many (proofs) must be construed as originating from defects.

८०. दोषजन्यत्वं च बलवत्प्रमाणविरोधादेव ज्ञायते ॥

80. That a cognition has been produced by defects is understood only when it is contradicted by strong proofs.

८१. अदुष्टमिन्द्रियं त्वक्षं तर्कोऽदुष्टस्तथानुमा । आगमोऽदुष्टवाक्यं च स्वदृक्चानुभवः स्मृतः । बलवत्प्रमाणतश्चैव ज्ञेया दोषा न चान्यथा । द्विविधं बलवत्वं च बहुत्वाच्च स्वभावतः । तयोस्स्वभावो बलवानुपजीव्यादिकश्च सः । याथार्थ्यमेव प्रामाण्यं तन्मुख्यं ज्ञानशब्दयोः । ज्ञानं च द्विविधं बाह्यं तथानुभवरूपकम् । बल्येवानुभवस्तत्र निर्दोषं त्वक्षजादिकम् । अनुप्रमाणतां याति तथाक्षादित्रयं ततः । प्राबल्यमागमस्यैव जात्या तेषु त्रिषु स्मृतम् । उपजीव्यविरोधे तु न प्रामाण्यममुष्य च । यामाहुरनुमां केचित्त्रयाद्यवयवात्मिकाम् । सा व्यर्था नोपपत्त्या हि विना सापि प्रमाणताम् । यात्यतो युक्तिरेवैका प्रमाणमनुमात्मकम् युक्तिः प्रतिज्ञारूपा च हेतुदृष्टान्तरूपिका । तथोपनयरूपा च परा निगमनात्मिका । पृथक्पृथक्प्रमाणत्वं याति युक्तितयैव तु । प्रतिज्ञा हेतुगर्भैव पृथक्प्रामाण्यमेष्यति । सिद्धत्वेन प्रतिज्ञाया हेतुर्मानं पृथग्भवेत् । प्रज्ञावयवत्वात्तु स्वातन्त्र्येणैव मानताम् । दृष्टान्तो यात्युपनयो व्याप्तिमाश्रित्य केवलम् । व्याप्तिस्तु केवलापि स्यात्प्रमाणं नियमाश्रयात् । तथा निगमनं चोपसंहारैकस्वरूपतः । प्रामाण्यं यात्यनुभवो ज्ञापयत्युपपत्तिताम् । विरोधश्च तथाधिक्यं न्यूनताऽसंगतिस्तथा । उपपत्तिदोषा विज्ञेया विरोधश्च स्वतोऽन्यतः । जनकस्यात्ययो जातिः स्वस्य वान्यस्य वा भवेत् । जनकं प्रमाणमुद्दिष्टं स्वस्यार्थस्य प्रकाशनात् । निग्रहा एत एव स्युस्संवादानुक्तिसंयुताः । अर्थतः प्राप्तिरेवार्थापत्तिरित्यभिधीयते । दृष्ट्वा

सदृशमेवान्यं पूर्वदृष्टे तु वस्तुनि । एतत्सदृशताज्ञानमुपमानं प्रकीर्तितम् । अभावस्य परिज्ञानं द्विविधं समुदाहृतम् । एकं तत्रानुभवतो योग्यस्यानुपलब्धितः । द्वितीयमपि विज्ञेयं सुखाद्ये च घटादिके । एकं प्रत्यक्षरूपं स्यात् द्वितीयमनुमात्मकम् । कचिद्धटाद्यभावोऽपि प्रत्यक्षेणावगम्यते । झटित्येव परिज्ञानान्न लिंगोद्भवता मता । अर्थापत्तिश्चोपमा च ह्यनुमाभेद एव तु । आगमो द्विविधो ज्ञेयो नित्योऽनित्यस्तथैव च । प्रत्यक्षं त्रिविधं ज्ञेयं ऐश्वरं यौगिकं तथा । अयौगिकं चेति तथा सर्वमक्षात्मकं मतम् । अक्षाणि च स्वरूपाणि नित्यज्ञानात्मकानि च । विष्णोः श्रियस्तथैवोक्तान्यन्येषां द्विविधानि तु । स्वरूपाणि च भिन्नानि भिन्नानि त्रिविधानि च । दैवासुराणि मध्यानीत्येतत्प्रत्यक्षमीरितम् । विषयान्प्रतिस्थितं ह्यक्षं प्रत्यक्षमिति कीर्तितम् । अक्षयं पुरुषस्याक्षं स्वरूपे मुख्यमेव तु । उपचारस्तदन्यत्र सृष्टावुपचयो यतः । उपपत्तिस्वरूपत्वादनुमा सम्भवादिकम् । प्रत्यक्षागममाहात्म्यादनुमानं प्रमाणताम् । याति नैवान्यथा तस्य नियतत्वं कचिद्भवेत् — इति ब्रह्मतर्के ॥

81. The *Brahmatarka* formulates the following principles: 'The senses free from defects are known as perception. Reasoning free from fallacies is called inference. Testimony free from faults is Scripture. Self-knowledge, *i.e.*, immediate knowledge by the self through itself is experience. The flaws in cognition are knowable through its contradiction with stronger means of knowledge and not otherwise. The strength of a way of knowledge is due to its quantitative superiority and intrinsic nature. Between these two forms of strength, the strength owing to intrinsic nature is higher. *Strength by intrinsic nature* means the superiority of a way of knowing in relation to another way which depends upon it. Truth consists of accordance with facts and it primarily pertains to knowledge and testimony. Knowledge is of two kinds and they are external knowledge and experience. Between the two, experience is stronger. Next to it is knowledge obtained by flawless senses, reasoning and testimony. The means of knowing like the perceiving through the senses, inferring and verbal under-

standing, are proofs in a subsidiary significance. Of these three, generally scriptural testimony is superior to the others. But it is not valid when it stultifies that way of knowing on which it depends. What some regard as inference (for another) eonsisting of three or more propositions is a superfluity. That kind of inference has no status of a means of knowledge independent of reasoning (for oneself). Therefore reasoning (for oneself) is the only inference. Inference (for another), by virtue of being an embodiment of inference for oneself, becomes a means of knowledge through the *thesis*, the *ground*, the *instance*, the *subsumption* and the *conclusion* severally. The *thesis* by incorporating the ground in itself can itself become a means of knowledge. Within the background of the *thesis*, the *ground* itself can become a means of knowledge. By implicitly containing the *thesis*, the *instance* itself can become a means of knowledge. The *subsumption* by simply drawing support from the *general* concomittance can become itself a means of knowledge. The general concomittance (vyāpti) in conjunction with the *thesis* can itself be a means of knowledge, by virtue of the necessary character of the concomittance. In the same way the *conclusion*, since it sums up all the preceding propositions, can itself be a means of knowledge. Simple experience does prove that all these propositions are forms of reasoning. It is to be known that fallacies in reasoning are *contradiction*, *over-conclusion*, *under-conclusion* and *irrelevance*. Contradiction may be with itself or another piece of knowledge. The fallacy called jāti arises when the conclusion supersedes the 'source'. The *source* may be that of the same conclusion or some other conclusion. By a *source* is to be understood the source of knowledge, because it illumines the object of the conclusion. All these (contradiction etc. including jāti) combined with assent and 'non-commitment', constitute 'vulnerable points'. By *arthāpatti* (presumption) is understood the ascertainment of the ground of a

present fact which is otherwise inexplicable. By *analogy* is meant the understanding of the resemblance of an object previously seen to a present object on the ground of the observation of the resemblance of the present object to it. The knowledge of non-existence is of two kinds. It may be obtained by direct observation or through the failure to observe an object when all the conditions necessary for its observation are fulfilled. The former kind is illustrated in the case of the non-existence of pleasure etc., and the latter is illustrated in cases like the non-existence of a jar. The first is a species of perception and the second is a species of inference. Sometimes even the non-existence of objects like jars is apprehended through perception. Since the apprehension is instantaneous, it is opined that the apprehension is not inferentially generated. Knowledge by presumption (arthāpatti) and analogy are merely forms of inference. Scripture is to be understood as of two kinds *i. e.*, eternal and non-eternal. Perception is known to be falling into three kinds *i. e.*, divine perception, mystic (or yogic) perception and ordinary (non-yogic) perception. All these arise through the senses. The senses of Viṣṇu and Śrī constitute their essential nature and are of the character of eternal knowing. The senses of others are of two kinds *i. e.*, those which are constitutive of the nature of selves and those which are external to the selves. Those which are external, are of three kinds, *i. e.*, divine, demoniac, and intermediate. By perception is meant the state in which the sense (akṣa) is in communion with its object (viṣaya). The sense of a self is imperishable and it primarily pertains to the essential nature of the self. The senses that are different from the essential nature of the self are so called in a secondary sense, as they receive augmentation during creation. The sources of knowledge like sambhava (conjecture) are forms of inference. Inference becomes a source of knowing when under the

control of perception and scripture, otherwise it nowhere attains conclusiveness.

८२. अत्र चोपजीव्यत्वेन प्रमाणप्राबल्यात् भेद एव तात्पर्यं युक्तम् ॥

82. In the present instance, since the supporting source of knowledge, namely perception is stronger, it is reasonable to construe that the purport of the scripture lies in the teaching of difference.

८३. कथं चानुवादकत्वं भेदस्य प्रमाणेनासिद्धौ ॥

83. And, how can the texts teaching difference be construed as mere reiterations, if difference is not established by other sources of knowledge?

८४. सिद्धौ च कथमभेदवाक्यस्याबाधः ॥

84. And again, if it has been established how can the text teaching non-difference go unnullified?

८५. न चाप्रमाणसिद्धेन अनुवादकत्वं प्रमाणस्य भवति ॥

85. A valid mode of knowledge cannot be looked upon as a mere reiteration, when what it presents has not been established by any other valid mode of knowledge.

८६. दुर्बलत्वे च भेदप्रमाणस्याभासत्वान्न भेदवाक्यानामनुवादित्वम् ॥

86. If the other modes of knowledge presenting difference are weak just because of their fallacious character, the scriptural passages teaching difference cannot be mere restatements of them.

८७. अतश्च भेदवाक्यानामेव प्राबल्यम् ॥

87. Hence only the texts teaching difference are strong.

८८. सर्वप्रमाणविरुद्धवचनानामेव प्राबल्यांगीकारे इदं वा अग्रे नैव किंचनासीदसतस्सदजायतेत्यादीनामेवाविचारेण प्रतीयमानस्यार्थस्य सर्वप्रमाण-विरुद्धत्वात्तत्र सर्वागमानां महातात्पर्यं प्रसज्येत ॥

88. If it is admitted that only these scriptural passages are to be considered more valid, which contradict all modes of knowledge, then the unscrutinized and superficial import of passages like, 'Nothing of all this existed in the beginning' and, 'From non-being being originated', will have to be considered as constituting the supreme purport of all scriptures, just because that import contradicts all modes of knowledge.

८९. न च तत्र युक्तिविरोध इति वाच्यम् ॥

89. It cannot be said that such an interpretation is contrary to reason.

९०. तस्मिन्पक्षे युक्तिविरुद्धत्वेन अननुवादित्वमिति गुण एव स्यात् ॥

90. On the theory under discussion, as the scripture contrary to reason would not be restating the deliverance of reason, its being contrary to reason would constitute, in fact, an excellence.

९१. युक्तिसिद्धत्वे ह्यनुवादित्वं स्यात् ॥

91. If the import of the scripture stands established by reason, then scripture, on that theory, would be merely a restatement of the deliverance of reason.

९२. अतः प्रमाणसिद्धत्वे तदपलापायुक्तेः अप्रमाणसिद्धत्वे च भेद-प्रमाणस्य अनुवादित्वाभावाच्च न भेदवाक्यानां दौर्बल्यम् ॥

92. Therefore, if difference is established by other means of knowledge, it cannot be validly repudiated, and if it is not so established, the texts teaching difference cannot be construed as mere reiterations. Hence the texts that assert the difference between God and individual self are not less valid (than the identity-texts).

९३. न च प्रमाणबहुत्वे दौर्बल्यम् । दाढर्ढ्यमेव हि बहुवाक्यसंवादे दृष्टम् ॥

93. A conclusion which is supported unanimously by many sources of knowledge cannot be weak on that account;

if many testimonies concur in its favour, we see, that it becomes immensely strengthened.

९४. तथासति अभ्यासादेरप्यप्रामाण्यहेतुत्वं स्यात् ॥

94. Otherwise, repetition in scripture, would be a ground of the falsity of what is thus repeated.

९५. अभ्यासस्य च तात्पर्यलिङ्गत्वं सर्वेषां सिद्धम् ॥

95. All commentators agree that repetition is a clue to the purport of a passage.

९६. तदनङ्गीकारे तत्पक्षेऽपि नवकृत्वस्तत्त्वमसीत्यभ्यासस्यानुवादकत्वेनाप्रामाण्यं स्यात् ॥

96. If this principle is not admitted for the very theory under discussion, the repetition of the dictum, 'That thou art' nine times, would be merely a case of restatement and the dictum would have to be considered in consequence as false.

९७. प्रथमवाक्येनैव यस्यासिद्धं तदर्थमपरमित्युक्ते प्रत्यक्षादिना भेदो येनानिश्चितः तदर्थमपरं वाक्यमित्युत्तरम् । तस्माद्बहुप्रमाणसंवादित्वे प्राबल्यमेव ॥

97. If it be said that the subsequent reiterations are for convincing one to whom the first enunciation of the truth does not carry conviction, we reply that the scriptural affirmation of difference is for convincing one by whom the reality of difference is not conclusively ascertained by other modes of knowledge like perception. Therefore concordance of several modes of knowledge is an enhancement of their evidential strength.

९८. अतः सर्वप्रमाणविरुद्धत्वान्नाभेदे तात्पर्यं वाक्यस्य किंतु विष्णोस्सर्वोत्तमत्व एव महातात्पर्यं सर्वागमानाम् ॥

98. Therefore, as non-difference (between God and the individual self) is contradicted by all the sources of knowledge, it is not the purport of the scriptures. On the contrary, the

supreme purport of all the scriptures is the pre-eminence of Viṣṇu over every other entity.

९९. तथा चोक्तं भगवता द्वाविमौ पुरुषौ लोके क्षरश्चाक्षर एव च । क्षरस्सर्वाणि भूतानि कूटस्थोऽक्षर उच्यते । उत्तमः पुरुषस्त्वन्यः परमात्मेत्युदाहृतः । यो लोकत्रयमाविश्य बिभर्त्यव्यय ईश्वरः । यस्मात्क्षरमतीतोऽहं अक्षरादपि चोत्तमः । अतोऽस्मि लोके वेदे च प्रथितः पुरुषोत्तमः । यो मामेवमसंमूढो जानाति पुरुषोत्तमम् । स सर्वविद्भजति मां सर्वभावेन भारत । इति गुह्यतमं शास्त्रमिदमुक्तं मयानघ । एतद्बुध्वा बुद्धिमान्स्यात्कृतकृत्यश्च भारतेति ॥

99. This truth has been enunciated by the Lord in these words: 'These two alone are the puruṣas in the world, the perishable and imperishable. All the individual creatures are the perishable puruṣas. Mahālakṣmī is the imperishable puruṣa. But the highest puruṣa is other than these two. He is called the supreme ātman. He, it is, who pervading the three worlds sustains them and is eternal and is the overlord. Because I transcend the perishable spirits, and am superior to the imperishable spirit also, I am glorified in the Vedas and secondary scriptures as the highest puruṣa. He who understands me undeluded as the highest puruṣa in this manner, is one who knows all and serves me in all ways. O sinless Arjuna, this most secret śāstra has been imparted by me. O Bhārata, let one apprehend this by intuitive perception and attain liberation.

१००. सर्वोत्कर्षे देवदेवस्य विष्णोर्महातात्पर्यं नैव चान्यत्र सत्यम् । अवान्तरं तत्परत्वं तदन्यत्सर्वागमानां पुरुषार्थस्ततोऽत इति पैङ्गीश्रुतिः ॥

100. The *Paiṅgī-śruti* says: 'All the scriptures have as their supreme purport the greatness of Viṣṇu, tne god of gods, over all else. They have no other theme. All else they may speak about is their secondary import contributory to the main theme. This is so because the ideal of life is realizable

only through this knowledge of the greatness of Viṣṇu over all else. Such is the truth.'

१०१. मुख्यं च सर्ववेदानां तात्पर्यं श्रीपतेः परम् । उत्कर्षे तु तदन्यत्र तात्पर्यं स्यादवान्तरमिति महावराहे ॥

101. The *Mahāvarāhapurāṇa* says: 'The great and primary purport of all the Vedas is the greatness of Śrīpati. Their reference to other matters is secondary.'

१०२. युक्तं च विष्णोः सर्वोत्तमत्व एव महातात्पर्यं सर्वागमानाम् । मोक्षो हि सर्वपुरुषार्थोत्तमः ॥

102. It is reasonable that all scriptures should have as their supreme purport the absolute greatness of Viṣṇu. Liberation is the highest of the ideals of life.

१०३. धर्मार्थिकामास्सर्वेऽपि न नित्या मोक्ष एव हि । नित्यस्तस्मात्तदर्थाय यतेत मतिमान्नर इति भाल्लवेयश्रुतिः ॥

103. The *Bhāllaveya-śruti* says: 'Dharma, artha and kāma are not abiding, only mokṣa is abiding. Therefore an intelligent man must seek to attain that.'

१०४. अनित्यत्वात्सदुःखत्वान्न धर्माद्याः परं सुखम् । मोक्ष एव परानन्दः संसारे परिवर्ततामिति भारते ॥

104. It is said in the *Bhārata* that 'The ends like dharma are transient and freely mixed with sorrow. Therefore, they do not bring about supreme happiness. Only mokṣa is the highest bliss to be aimed at by those who are wandering in saṁsāra (mundane world).'

१०५. मोक्षश्च विष्णुप्रसादेन विना न लभ्यते ॥

105. This liberation is not to be attained except by the grace of Viṣṇu.

१०६. यस्य प्रसादात्परमार्तिरूपादस्मात्संसारान्मुच्यते नापरेण । नारायणोऽसौ परमो विचिंत्यो मुमुक्षुभिः कर्मपाशादमुष्मादिति नारायणश्रुतिः ॥

106. The *Nārāyaṇa-śruti* says: 'He, by whose grace alone a person is released from this saṁsāra which is of the nature of the deepest affliction, is this Nārāyaṇa, who is to be contemplated as the supreme by all those who seek release from this shackle of karma.'

१०७. नायमात्मा प्रवचनेन लभ्यो न मेधया न बहुना श्रुतेन । यमेवैष वृणुते तेन लभ्यः तस्यैष आत्मा विवृणुते तनूं स्वां इति कठश्रुतिः ॥

107. The *Kaṭha-śruti* says: 'This ātman is not attainable by teaching, by intelligence and by excessive learning; only by him whom he chooses is he attained. To him this ātman reveals his from.'

१०८. तेषामहं समुद्धर्ता मृत्युसंसारसागरात् । भवामि न चिरात्पार्थ मय्यावेशितचेतसामिति भगवद्वचनम् ॥

108. The declaration of the Lord in the Gīta is, 'I rescue them speedily from this ocean of death and transmigration whose hearts have taken possession of me.'

१०९. उत्पत्तिस्थितिसंहारा नियतिर्ज्ञानमावृतिः । बन्धमोक्षौ च पुरुषाद्यस्मात्स हरिरेकराडिति स्कान्दे ॥

109. 'That spirit, from whom proceed the creation, maintenance, destruction, regulation, knowledge, concealment bondage and liberation is the sole sovereign.' Thus says the *Skāndapurāṇa.*

११०. अज्ञानां ज्ञानदो विष्णुः ज्ञानिनां मोक्षदश्च सः । आनन्ददश्च मुक्तानां स एवैको जनार्दन इति च ॥

110. It also says, 'Viṣṇu grants knowledge to the ignorant and he grants liberation to men of knowledge. The same Janārdana grants happiness to the liberated selves.'

१११. बन्धको भवपाशेन भवपाशाच्च मोचकः । कैवल्यदः परं ब्रह्म विष्णुरेव न संशय इति च ॥

111. It also says, 'Viṣṇu alone binds through the fetters of transmigration and he alone is the liberator. He alone is the giver of freedom. Viṣṇu alone is the supreme Brahman. There is no doubt about that.'

११२. प्रीतिश्च गुणोत्कर्षज्ञानादेव विशेषतो दृष्टा नाभेदज्ञानात् ॥

112. Love is particularly seen to arise towards an individual who acknowledges the superiority in qualities in one and it is not seen to arise in response to the affirmation of identity.

११३. अभेदज्ञानादप्रीतिरेवोत्तमानां भवति ॥

113. In fact those who excel, develop the opposite of love towards their inferiors, if the latter assert identity with them.

११४. घातयन्ति हि राजानो राजाहमिति वदन्तम् । ददति च सर्वमभिप्रेतं गुणोत्कर्षं वदतः ॥

114. Kings put down a subject if he claims, 'I am the king'. If, on the other hand he praises the superior qualities of the kings, the kings grant him all his objects of desire.

११५. न तादृशी प्रीतिरीड्यस्य विष्णोर्गुणोत्कर्षज्ञातरी यादृशी स्यात् तत्प्रीणनान्मोक्षमाप्नोति सर्वस्ततो वेदास्तत्पराः सर्व एव – इति सौपर्णश्रुतिः ॥

115. The *Sauparṇa-śruti* says: 'There is no love equal to that of Viṣṇu, the adorable one, towards a devotee who recognises his surpassing excellences. By thus pleasing him all the devotees attain liberation. Therefore all the Vedas aim at glorifying the surpassing excellences of Viṣṇu'.

११६. यो मामेवमसंमूढो जानाति पुरुषोत्तमम् । स सर्वविद्भजति मां सर्वभावेन भारतेति गुणोत्कर्षज्ञानादेव परमा प्रीतिर्भगवता स्वयमेवाभिहिता ॥

116. The Lord himself has indicated that he develops overflowing love towards one who acknowledges his surpassing excellences, in the passage, 'He who understands me

undeluded as the highest puruṣa in this manner, is one who knows all and he serves me in all ways'.

११७. अतो विष्णोर्गुणोत्कर्षे एव सर्वश्रुतिस्मृतीनां महातात्पर्यम् ॥

117. Therefore all smṛtis and Śrutis have their supreme purport in the surpassing excellence of the attributes of Viṣṇu.

११८. न चाभेदे तात्पर्यमित्यत्र किंचिन्मानम् ॥

118. There is no proof for the hypothesis that their purport is the identity of the supreme Being and the individual selves.

११९. न च विशेषणविशेष्यतया भेदसिद्धिः । विशेषणविशेष्यभावश्च भेदापेक्षः । धर्मिप्रतियोग्यपेक्षया भेदसिद्धिः । भेदापेक्षं च धर्मिप्रतियोगित्वमित्यन्योन्याश्रयतया भेदस्यायुक्तिः पदार्थस्वरूपत्वाद्भेदस्य ॥

119. The argument, 'Difference is apprehended as either the substantive or the adjectival factor and the apprehension of the substantive and adjectival factors (as mutually different) presupposes the grasp of difference. Similarly, the apprehension of difference presupposes the apprehension of the entity that differs and the entity from which it differs and the apprehension of these entities in such mutual exclusiveness presupposes the apprehension of thier difference. Thus in both ways the fallacy of mutual dependence is inevitable' is unsound, because difference is the very substantive essence or svarūpa of entities.

१२०. न च धर्मिप्रतियोग्यपेक्षया भेदस्यास्वरूपत्वं ऐक्यवत् स्वरूपस्यैव तथात्वात् ॥

120. Just because difference implies the entity and counter-entity, it does not cease to be the svarūpa of the entity, even as unity, which also implies the entity 'which is one with' and the entity 'with which it is one' does not cease to be the very svarūpa of the entity in question. In both cases the svarūpa is itself of such a character.

१२१. स्वरूपसिद्धावपि तदसिद्धिश्च जीवेश्वरैक्यं वदतः सिद्धैव ॥

121. Those who posit the identity of Iśvara and Jīva, themselves hold that the svarūpa is evident; but still the identity is not evident.

१२२. भेदस्तु स्वरूपदर्शन एव सिद्धः । प्रायः सर्वतो विलक्षणं हि पदार्थस्वरूपं दृश्यते ॥

122. Difference is apprehended when the svarūpa is apprehended. The essential nature of an entity as generally unique and different from all else is apprhended.

१२३. अस्य भेद इति तु पदार्थस्य स्वरूपमितिवत् ॥

123. The expression, 'The difference of this' (suggesting that difference is other than 'this') is similar to the expression, 'The svarūpa of this entity' (where also we speak as if there is a difference between the svarūpa and the entity while there is none).

१२४. यदि न स्वरूपं भेदस्तदा पदार्थे दृष्टे प्रायः सर्वतो वैलक्षण्यं तस्य न ज्ञायेत ॥

124. If the svarūpa is not itself the difference, thc general difference of an entity from all others would not be grasped when it is grasped.

१२५. अज्ञाते च वैलक्षण्ये आत्मनि घट इत्यपि संशयः स्यात् ॥

125. If such general difference is not apprehended, it must be possible to doubt whether one's self is not a jar.

१२६. न हि कश्चित्तथा संशयं करोति ॥

126. No one entertains such an absurd doubt.

१२७. ज्ञात्वैव प्रायः सर्वतो वैलक्षण्यं कस्मिंश्चिदेव सदृशे संशयं करोति ॥

127. Having apprehended such general difference from all else, one comes to doubt whether it is not the same as some particular entity which is like it.[1]

१२८. न ह्यात्मन्यहं देवदत्तो न वेति कस्यचित् संशयो भवति ॥

128. No one entertains doubts about himsclf in such ways as, 'Am I Devadatta or not?'

१२९. सामान्यतः सर्ववैलक्षण्ये ज्ञात एव घटत्वादिज्ञानम् ॥

129. The apprehension of the special characteristics like jarness arises only after a grasp of the uniqueness of an object in general.

१३०. अतो नान्योन्याश्रयता ॥

130. Therefore there is no mutual dependence.

१३१. न च युगपज्ज्ञानानुत्पत्तिर्दोषः । यथा युगपदेव दीपसहस्रदर्शने सामान्यतः सर्वे ज्ञायन्त एव तथा स्यात् ॥

131. It cannot be urged that a simultaneous apprehension of the difference of an entity from all else is not possible. Just as a thousand lamps burning together in a place can be perceived instantaneously in a general way, (though the detailed perception of them one after another is a prolonged process) even so the uniqueness of an entity in general can be grasped in a flash as it were.

१३२. एकस्मिन्नेव वस्तुनि विशेषस्तैरप्यङ्गीकृत एव ॥

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[1] The position is this: In the initial apprehension of an entity its uniqueness is grasped in a general way. When some other entities similar to it are noticed doubts arise which serve to suspend provisionally the uniqueness in relation to those similars. After a clear investigation the doubt may disappear, thus re-affirming the uniqueness. Thus individual discriminations merely serve to remove confusions that check the awareness of uniqueness initially apprehended. The account is justified by the phenomenon of the restriction of the range of possible confusions and mis-identifications.

132. The thinkers under discussion have surely admitted the category of 'viśeṣa' within the one and solitary being accepted by them.

१३३. नेति नेतीत्यत्र सर्ववैलक्षण्याङ्गीकारात् । विशेषानङ्गीकारे च पुनरुक्तेः ॥

133, In the text, 'Not so, not so', the difference of Brahman from all else is asserted and if the category of 'viśeṣa' is not admitted the subsequent negation simply repeats the first negation.

१३४. न च घटाद्वैलक्षण्यमेव पटाद्वैलक्षण्यं अनुभवविरोधात् ॥

134. Surely the difference from jars is not the same as the difference from cloth. Such a position would violate the verdict of experience.

१३५. तस्माद्भेददर्शनं युक्तमेव ॥

135. Therefore the apprehension of difference is logically explicable.

१३६. यच्च प्रमाणदृष्टानामपि पदार्थानां मिथ्यात्वकल्पनं तच्च प्रमाण-विरुद्धत्वादेव प्रकाशतस्करत्वम् ॥

136. The supposition of the falsity of entities cognised through valid modes of knowledge is merely a case of robbing the world of philosophic light, for, it contradicts all valid modes of knowledge.

१३७. न हि प्रमाणदृष्टस्य तर्कबाध्यत्वं प्रत्यक्षादिविरुद्धानां तर्काभासत्वनियमात् ॥

137. In reality what has been cognised through valid modes of knowledge cannot be refuted by mere logic, for it is the universal principle that logic which runs against valid modes of knowledge is fallacious.

१३८. शुक्त्यादेः रजतत्वादिप्रतीतेरपि बलवत्प्रत्यक्षविरुद्धत्वादेव भ्रमत्वं न तर्कमात्रात् ॥

138. The perception of things like a piece of shell as silver is determined to be an illusion only because it contradicts very strong perceptual evidence and not by mere logic.

१३९. तर्कमात्रतः प्रत्यक्षबाधने भूतचतुष्टयस्याबादेः पृथिवीत्वादृष्टेः पृथिव्या अपि पृथिवीत्वं न स्यात् ॥

139. If mere logic could refute perception, as the other four elements like water do not have the characteristics of earth, it would be arguable that even earth does not have them, which is absurd.

१४०. अतो न तर्कमात्रत एव दृष्टस्य भ्रान्तित्वं कल्प्यम् ॥

140. Therefore. on the strength of mere logical quibbles, facts of observation cannot be explained away as illussious.

१४१. अतः सर्वभेदनिरासकतर्कस्य सर्वश्रुतिस्मृतिप्रत्यक्षानुमानविरुद्धत्वात् नितरां आभासत्वम् ॥

141. Therefore, the logic that seeks to dismiss all difference is absolutely fallacious as it is diametrically opposed to all śrutis, smṛtis, perception and inference.

१४२. न च परमार्थतो भेदाभावो व्यावहारिकः सोऽस्तीति वाच्यम् ॥

142. It ought not to be said that in reality there is no difference but in the practical and empirical world there is difference.

१४३. सदसद्वैलक्षण्ये प्रमाणाभावात् ॥

143. There is no proof for positing anything which is neither existent nor non-existent.

१४४. असतः ख्यात्ययोगादिति वदतः ख्यातिरभून्न वा । यदि नाभूत् न तत्ख्यातिनिराकरणम् । यद्यभूत्तथापि ॥

144. One who says that 'What is non-existent does not present itself to consciousness' must be questioned whether while framing his principle he was conscious of the non-existent or not. If he was not conscious of it, he could not

even deny its presentation to consciouseness (for denial presupposes the awareness of what is denied). If he was conscious of it, then also its presentation to consciousness could not be denied.

१४५. न चासतो वैलक्षण्यं तत्प्रतीतिं विना ज्ञायते ॥

145. And the difference of anything from the non-existent cannot be apprehended if there is no awareness of the non-existent.

१४६. न च शुक्ते रजतत्वं सदसद्विलक्षणम् ॥

146. The silverness apprehended (in an illusion) in a piece of shell is not something neither existent nor non-existent.

१४७. असदेव रजतं प्रत्यभादित्यनुभवात् ॥

147. The (correcting) experience is of the form, 'Silver which was non-existent appeared to be there.'

१४८. न च प्रतीतत्वादसत्त्वाभावः ॥

148. Because it is experienced, it cannot be urged that it is not non-existent.

१४९. असतः सत्त्वप्रतीतिः सतोऽसत्त्वप्रतीतिरित्यन्यथाप्रतीतेरेव भ्रान्तित्वात् ॥

149. In fact by illusion we mean precisely this *misperception of the non-existent as existent and of the existent as non-existent.*

१५०. न च असतो भ्रान्तावपि प्रतीतिर्नास्तीति वाच्यम् ॥

150. It cannot be maintained that the experience of the non-existent does not take place even in illusions.

१५१. अनिर्वचनीयपरमार्थत्वस्यासत एव दृष्टत्वङ्गीकारात् ॥

151. The theory under discussion does admit that the *identity of the illusory silver* (prātibhāsika) *with real silver* (vyāvahārika), *which identity is clearly non-existent, is apprehended in illusion.*

१५२. न च तदप्यनिर्वाच्यं अनवस्थितेः ॥

152. Even that identity cannot be pronounced to be different from the existent as well as the non-existent, for in that case, we are in for infinite regress[1].

१५३. प्रथमानिर्वचनीयासिद्धया सर्वानिर्वचनीयासिद्धिरिति मूलक्षतिः ॥

153. As the first case of inexplicability (as other than both non-existent and existent) is not established, all other cases of inexplicabilities remain unestablished and the very bottom of the hypothesis is annihilated.

१५४. अनिर्वचनीयत्वे रजतस्यानिर्वचनीयमिदं रजतमिति बाधकज्ञान-मुत्पद्येत ॥

154. If the silver apprehended in illusion is inexplicable (either as existent or as non-existent) the sublating judgment ought to arise in the form, 'This silver is inexplicable'. (But it arises in the form, 'There is no silver.')

१५५. मिथ्याशब्दस्त्वभाववाची ॥

155. The term 'unreal' signifies non-existence.

१५६. न च सदसद्वैलक्षण्यं नामास्तीत्यत्र किंचिन्मानम् ॥

156. There is no proof to show that there is anything like inexplicability.

१५७. अनुभवविरोधश्च तत्पक्षे ॥

157. And the view under consideration contradicts experience.

१५८. सदसतोर्द्वयोरेव सर्वैरनुभूयमानत्वात् ॥

158. For, only 'what is' and 'what is not' are being experienced by all. (All judgment is either affirmation or negation.)

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[1] The content of the erroneous cognition may be admitted for the sake of the argument to be other than non-existent. But it is cognised in illusion, just because it is illusion, as existent. This identity of the apparent with the real posited in illusion is clearly non-existent. Hence in illusion the non-existent is cognised.

१५९. अतोऽनिर्वचनीयाभावादसतः प्रतीत्यनङ्गीकारात् प्रतीयमानत्वाच्च भेदस्य सत्त्वप्राप्तेर्नाद्वितीयत्वं युज्यते ॥

159. Therefore (1) as there is nothing inexplicable (as either being or non-being), (2) as the non-existent is considered to be uncognisable, and (3) as difference is a matter of experience, difference becomes real and thus the non-duality of the ultimate reality is impossible.[1]

१६०. कथं च श्रुतिसिद्धो जीवपरमात्मभेदो निराक्रियते ॥

160. How can the difference between the individual self and the supreme Being established by Śruti be negated?

१६१. मिथ्यावादित्वे च श्रुतेः कथमैक्यस्य सत्यत्वम् ॥

161. If the Śruti propounds what is false, how can unity propounded by the Śruti be real?

१६२. कथं चैवंवादिनां वेदवादित्वम् ॥

162. How, again, can the thinkers of this line of thought be the followers of the Veda?

१६३. वेदोक्तस्य मिथ्यात्वाङ्गीकारादेव हि अवेदवादित्वं बौद्धादीनामपि ॥

163. In fact the thinkers like the Buddhists are not the followers of the Veda, only for the reason that they admit the falsity of what the Veda affirms.

१६४. अतो विष्णोस्सर्वोत्तमत्व एव महातात्पर्यं सर्वागमानाम् ॥

164. Hence the supreme purport of all the scriptures is the transcendent greatness of Viṣṇu over every other entity.

१६५. कथं च जीवपरमात्मैक्ये सर्वश्रुतीनां तात्पर्यं युज्यते । सर्वप्रमाणविरुद्धत्वात् ॥

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[1] Difference is a matter of experience for both our theory and Advaita. We have shown that it is not inexplicable as maintained by the Advaitin. It is not non-existent, for that which is not existent is not an object of experience for Advaita. The only remaining alternative is that difference must be conceded as ultimately real.

165. How can the theme of all Śrutis be the unity of the individual self and the supreme Spirit when such a theme flagrantly contradicts all modes of valid knowledge?

१६६. तथा ह्यनुभवविरोधः । न ह्यहं सर्वज्ञः सर्वेश्वरो निर्दुःखो निर्दोष इति वा कस्यचिदनुभवः । अस्ति च तद्विपर्ययेणानुभवः ॥

166. To explain: It would contradict experience. No one experiences, 'I am omniscient', 'I am the Lord af all', 'I am without any sorrow or pain', 'I am faultless'; indeed there is the experience of the contrary.

१६७. न च मिथ्यानुभवोऽयम् तद्विपरीतप्रमाणाभावात् ॥

167. This experience is not illusory for there is no proof to the contrary.

१६८. न चाभेदे कश्चिदागमः । सन्ति च भेदे सर्वागमाः ॥

168. There is no scriptural passage in support of the said unity. All the scriptures vindicate difference.

१६९. तथा ह्यतत्त्वमसीति नवकृत्वोपदेशः सदृष्टान्तकः ॥

169. To Explain: There is the teaching, 'That thou art not' enunciated nine times with illustrations.

१७०. न चायं अभेदोपदेशः ॥

170. And this is not a teaching of non-difference.

१७१. स यथा शकुनिः सूत्रेण प्रबद्धो दिशं दिशं पतित्वा अन्यत्रायतनं अलब्ध्वा बन्धनमेवोपाश्रयते । सन्मूलाः सोम्येमाः सर्वाः प्रजाः सदायतनाः सत्प्रतिष्ठाः ॥ १ ॥

171. 'Just as a bird bound by a rope, flies in every direction, and then not finding it possible to rest anywhere else finally comes back to the spot to which it is bound, even so all these creatures, my dear, originate in Being, abide in Being and are established in Being.'

१७२. यथा सोम्य मधु मधुकृतो निस्तिष्ठन्ति नानात्ययानां वृक्षाणां रसानां समवहारमेकतां गमयन्ति ते यथा तत्र न विवेकं लभन्तेऽमुष्याहं

वृक्षस्य रसोऽस्म्यमुष्याहं वृक्षस्य रसोऽस्मीत्येवमेव खलु सोम्येमाः सर्वाः प्रजाः सति संपद्य न विदुः सति संपतस्यामह इति । त इह व्याघ्रो वा सिंहो वा वृको वा वराहो वा कीटो वा पतंगो वा वंशो वा मशको वा यद्यद्भवन्ति तत्तदा भवन्ति ॥ २ ॥

172. 'My dear, just as the bees make honey, by bringing together the juices of many trees, and the juices of the several trees do not distinguish among themselves each saying, "I am the juice of this tree," "I am the juice of the other tree," even so all these creatures commingling with Being do not realize, "We are commingling with Being". Whatever each creature is, be it a tiger, a lion, a wolf, a boar, a worm, a moth, a gnat or a mosquito, it continues to be that.'

१७३. इमाः सोम्य नद्यः पुरस्तात्प्राच्यः स्यन्दन्ते पश्चातप्रतीच्यस्तास्समुद्रात् समुद्रमेवापियन्ति । समुद्र एव भवति । ता यथा तत्र न विदुरियमहमस्मीयमहमस्मीति । एवमेव खलु सोम्येमाः सर्वाः प्रजाः सत आगम्य न विदुः सत आगच्छामह इति । त इह व्याघ्रो वा सिंहो वा वृको वा वराहो वा कीटो वा पतंगो वा वंशो वा मशको वा यद्यद्भवन्ति तत्तदा भवन्ति ॥ ३ ॥

173. 'These rivers, my dear, the eastern flow towards east, the western towards west and they all emanate from the sea and reach the sea. The sea remains the sea. Just as these rives do not understand, "I am this river," "I am the other river," even so, all these creatures coming from Being do not realize, 'We come from Being'; whatever each creature is, be it a tiger, a lion, a wolf, a boar, a worm, a moth, a gnat, or a mosquito, it continues to be that.'

१७४. स एष जीवेनात्मनानुप्रभूतः पेपीयमानो मोदमानस्तिष्ठति । अस्य यदैकां शाखां जीवो जहात्यथ सा शुष्यति ॥ ४ ॥

174. 'This living tree filled with the ātman called the jīva drinks plentifully, enjoys itself and flourishes. When

this jīva abandons a branch of this tree, that branch withers away forthwith.'

१७५. न्यग्रोधफलमत आहरेतीदं भगव इति भिन्धीति भिन्नं भगव इति किमत्र पश्यसीति अण्व्य इवेमा धाना भगव इत्यासामङ्गैकां भिन्धीति भिन्ना भगव इति किमत्र पश्यसीति न किञ्चन भगव इति । तं होवाच यं वै सोम्यैतमणिमानं न निभालयसे अस्य सोम्यैषोऽणिम्न एवं महान्न्यग्रोधस्तिष्ठति ॥ ५ ॥

175. Uddālaka: 'Bring a fig hither.'
Śvetaketu: 'Here it is, Sir.'
Uddālaka: 'Break it.'
Śvetaketu: 'It is broken, Sir.'
Uddālaka: 'What do you see there?'
Śvetaketu: 'These seeds, Sir, which are like fine atoms.'
Uddālaka: 'Of these, please break one.'
Śvetaketu: 'It is broken, Sir.'
Uddālaka: 'What do you see there?'
Śvetaketu: 'Nothing at all, Sir.'
Then he said to him, 'Verily, my dear, that finest (atomic) essence which you do not perceive—verily, my dear, through the power of that finest essence, this huge fig tree stands.'

१७६. लवणमेतदुदकेऽवधायाथ मा प्रातरुपसीदथा इति तद्ध तथा चकार तं होवाच यद्दोषा लवणमेतदुदकेऽवधा अंग तदाहरेति तद्धावमश्य न विवेद यथा विलीनमेवांग अस्यांतादाचामेति कथमिति लवणमिति मध्यादाचामेति कथमिति लवणमिति अंत्यादाचामेति कथमिति लवणमिति अभिप्रास्यैतदथ मोपसीदथा इति तद्ध तथा चकार तच्छश्वत्संवर्तते । तं होवाच अत्र वाव किल सत्सोम्य न निभालयसेऽत्रैव किलेति ॥ ६ ॥

176. 'Place this salt in the water. In the morning come unto me.' Then he did so. Then he said to him, 'That salt you placed in the water last evening—please bring it hither'. Then he grasped for it; but he did not find it, as it was completely dissolved.

Uddālaka: 'Please take a sip of it from this end,' said he, 'How is it?'

Śvetaketu: 'It is salt.'

Uddālaka: 'Take a sip from the middle,' said he, 'How is it?'

Śvetaketu: 'Salt.'

Uddālaka: 'Take a sip from that end,' said he, 'How is it?'

Śvetaketu: 'Salt.'

Uddālaka: 'Set it aside. Then come unto me.'

He did so. 'That always remains,' he said, 'Being which you do not perceive here, is verily here alone.'

१७७. यथा सोम्य पुरुषं गन्धारेभ्योऽभिनद्धाक्षमानीय तं ततोऽतिजने विसृजेत् ॥ ७ ॥

177. 'Even as, my dear, they bring a man from the Gāndhāra country blindfolded and leave him in an uninhabited place....'

१७८. अथ यदास्य वाङ्मनसि संपद्यते मनः प्राणे प्राणस्तेजसि तेजः परस्यां देवतायां तावन्न जानाति ॥ ८ ॥

178. 'Then as long as his speech does not merge in mind, mind in the life-breath, the life-breath in the fire and the fire in the supreme deity, so long he recognises.'

१७९. पुरुषं सोम्योत हस्तगृहीतमानयन्त्यपहार्षीत्स्तेयमकार्षीत्परशुमस्मै तपतेति स यदि तस्य कर्ता भवति तत एवानृतमात्मानं कुरुते सोऽनृताभिसन्धोऽनृतेनात्मानमंतर्धाय परशुं तप्तं प्रतिगृह्णाति स दह्यतेऽथ हन्यते अथ स यदि तस्याकर्ता भवति तत एव सत्यमात्मानं कुरुते स सत्याभिसन्धः सत्येनात्मानमन्तर्धाय परशुं तप्तं प्रतिगृह्णाति स न दह्यतेऽथ मुच्यते ॥ ९ ॥

179. 'My dear, they apprehend a man, lead him and accuse "He stole and robbed" and say, "Let the axe be heated for him". If he is the doer thereof, and then makes

himself false, intends falsehood and covers himself with falsehood, and takes hold of the heated axe, he gets burnt. Then he is slain. If he is not the doer thereof and then makes himself true, intendes truth, and covers himself with truth, and takes hold of the heated axe, he does not get burnt. Then he is released.'

१८०. एवमेव खलु सोम्याचार्यवान्पुरुषो वेदेति स्थाननवकेऽपि भेद एव दृष्टान्ताभिधानात् ॥

180. 'Thus, my dear, only he who has a preceptor understands.' Thus in all the nine sections, illustrations are offered in support of difference.

१८१. न हि शकुनिसूत्रयोर्नानावृक्षरसानां नदीसमुद्रयोर्जीववृक्षयोरणिमधानयोर्लवणोदकयोर्गन्धारपुरुषयोरज्ञप्राणादिनियामकयोः स्तेनापहार्ययोश्चैक्यम् ॥

181. Surely there is no identity between the bird and the rope, no identity among the juices of many trees, between the rivers and the sea, the jīva and the tree, the finest essence and the seed, the salt and the water, the Gāndhāra country and the man, the ignorant man and the controller of the life-breath etc., and the thief and the stolen property (and its lawful owner).

१८२. सति संपद्य न विदुः सति संपत्स्यामह इति त इह व्याघ्रो वा सिंहो वेति सत आगम्य न विदुः सत आगच्छामह इति त इह व्याघ्रो वा सिंहो वेति भेदापरिज्ञानेनार्थवचनाच्च ॥

182. And in fact evil is said to result from the ignorance of difference in the passage, 'These creatures commingling with Being, do not realise, "We are commingling with Being"; whatever each creature is, be it a tiger, a lion, it continues to be that'. 'These creatures coming from Being, do not realise, "We come from Being"; whatever each creature is, be it a tiger, a lion, it continues to be that.'

१८३. न हि गृहादागतस्य गृहे प्रविष्टस्य च तदैक्यम् ॥

183. Indeed there is no identity between a house and a man who comes from it, and between a house and a man who enters it.

१८४. तास्समुद्रात्समुद्रमेवापियन्ति स समुद्र एव भवतीत्यत्रापि भेद एवोच्यते । अन्यथा तास्समुद्र एव भवन्तीति प्यपदेशस्स्यात् ॥

184. The words, 'They emanate from the sea and reach only the sea. The sea remains the sea', also affirm only difference. Otherwise the statement would have been, 'The rivers beome the sea itself.'

१८५. अतो नद्यः समुद्रादागच्छन्ति तं प्रविशन्ति च समुद्रस्तु स एव नैतासां समुद्रत्वं भवतीत्यर्थः ॥

185. Therefore the meaning is that the rivers come from the sea and enter the sea; but the sea remains itself; and these rivers do not become the sea.

१८६. न हि भिन्नानां नदीजलपरमाणूनां समुद्राणुभिः ऐक्यं युज्यते ॥

186. It is impossible that the different atoms composing the waters of the rivers become one with the atoms of the water of the sea.

१८७. तथा सति महाजनसमितौ प्रविष्टानां द्वित्राणां तदैक्यं स्यात् ॥

187. Otherwise, if two or three individuals enter a great assembly of people, they must wholly lose themselves in the members already there. (The absurdity of this supposition lies evidently in the fact that entry of new members should cause no increase, if the supposition were true.)

१८८. न च तद्युज्यते भेदेनानुभवात् ॥

188. That is Impossible, for the new members are observed to be different from the members who were previously there in the assembly.

१८९. स्वं ह्यपीतो भवतीत्यत्रापि स्व इति परमात्मनोऽभिधानम् । स्वात्मना चोत्तरयोरिति सूत्रात् ॥

189. In the text, *svam hyapīto bhavati*, the term *sva* signifies the supreme Self. This is established in the *Sūtra* (II, 3), 'Through the ātman, on account of the (two) points mentioned later'.

१९०. स्वातन्त्र्यात्स्व इति प्रोक्त आत्मायं चाततत्वतः । ब्रह्मायं गुणपूर्णत्वाद्भगवान् विष्णुरव्यय इति परमोपनिषदि ॥

190. The *Paramopaniṣad* says: 'The eternal Bhagavān Viṣṇu is called 'sva' because he is self-dependent, 'ātman' because he is all-pervading, and 'Brahman' because he abounds in auspicious qualities.'

१९१. अपीत इत्यपि प्रवेशमात्रम् स्वमिति द्वितीयानिर्देशात् ।

191. 'Apīta' means mere entering, because the word 'svam' has the objective case-termination.

१९२. एकीभावविवक्षायां स्वेनेति निर्देशस्स्यात् ॥

192. If its meaning were 'becoming one' the word 'sva' would have to be in the instrumental case *i. e.*, svena (one with).[1]

१९३. स्वं कुलायं यथापीतः पक्षी स्यादेवमीश्वरम् । अप्येति जीवः प्रस्वापे मुक्तौ चान्योऽपि सन् सदेति च ॥

193. 'Just as a bird enters its nest (at night), even so does the individual self enter the Lord during deep sleep and release, even though it is different from him always.'

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[1] 'Svam hyapīto bhavati' is the text. Its *prima facie* rendering would be 'He becomes one with his own self'. Two difficulties are pointed out in this rendering. (a) 'Svam' does not mean one's own self but the Lord. (b) It is in the objective case not agreeing with the verb 'to become one with'. So the sentence means, 'He enters into the Lord'.

१९४. एवमेव खलु सोम्येतन्मनो दिशं दिशं पतित्वान्यत्र आयतनमलब्ध्वा प्राणमेवोपाश्रयत इत्यत्रापि मन इति जीवः प्राण इति परमात्मा । यत्रायं पुरुषः स्वपिति नामेति तयोरेव प्रस्तुतत्वात् ॥

194. 'Even so, my dear, this manas (mind) flying hither and thither and not finding a resting-place anywhere else resorts to prāṇa.' In this passage also 'manas' means the individual self and 'prāṇa' means 'the supreme Spirit for, the section deals with them as evidenced by the opening 'Where this puruṣa sleeps?....'

१९५. मननान्मन उद्दिष्टः पुद्गलो निरयं गिरन् कर्मानुशयनाच्चैव संसार्यनुशयी स्मृत इति च । प्राणः प्रणयनादेष साधुत्वात्सन्हरिः स्मृत इति च ॥

195. It is said further, 'The transmigrating individual is known as 'manas' because he thinks; as 'pudgala' because he undergoes retribution; and as 'anuśayī' because he falls into transmigration following his own deeds'. Further it is also said, 'Hari is known as prāṇa because he activates the universe and as sat because he is fautlessly perfect'.

१९६. सन्मूलाः सोम्येमाः सर्वाः प्रजाः सदायतनाः सत्प्रतिष्ठा इत्यत्रापि भेद एव प्रतीयते ॥

196. In the passage, 'My dear, all these creatures originate in Being, abide in Being, and are established in Being', difference alone is brought out.

१९७. स्रष्टृत्वादाश्रयत्वाच्च मुक्तानां च प्रति प्रति । स्थापनाच्च विभुर्विष्णुरन्यः संसारिणो मत इति च ॥

197. It is also said, 'The all-pervading Viṣṇu is intimated to be different from the transmigrating individual self, because he is the ereator, he is the supporter and it is he who establishes each liberated self'.

१९८. अनेन जीवेनात्मनानुप्रविष्य नामरूपे व्याकरवाणीति स एष जीवेनात्मनानुप्रभूतः पेपीयमानो मोदमानस्तिष्ठतीत्यत्रापि जीवशब्देन परमात्माभिहितः ॥

198. In the texts, 'I will enter these (three deities) as the ātman, in the form of the jīva and differentiate names and forms' and 'This (living tree) filled with jīva, drinks plentifully enjoys itself and flourishes', by the term jīva, only the supreme ātman is denoted.

१९९. जीव इति भगवतोऽनिरुद्धस्याख्येति श्रुतेः ॥

199. The Śruti lays down that the term jīva stands for Bhagavān Aniruddha.[1]

२००. विष्णुर्जीव इति प्रोक्तः सततं प्राणधारणात् । स प्रविश्य शरीरं च स्थावरं जङ्गमं तथा । महाभूतानि च विभुस्त्रिवृत्करणपूर्वकम् । संसारिणं भ्रामयति सदैवान्यत्वलक्षणम् । तेनायं मोदते नित्यं वृक्षावस्थां गतोऽपि सन्निति च ॥

200. Viṣṇu is said to be jīva because he sustains always the senses (in the body). He, the all-pervading one, enters the great elements, after mixing the three elements, enters the bodies, both unmoving and moving and sets in motion from state to state the transmigrating indivdual self, who is defined by his everlasting difference from him. It is by the presence of Vṣṇu that the individual becomes glad even if he were to get into the condition of a tree.

२०१. तत्तेज ऐक्षत ता आप ऐक्षन्त इमास्तिस्रो देवता इति पूर्वमेव चेतनत्वसिद्धेः अनेन जीवेनात्मनेति संसारिणः पुनः प्रवेशो न युक्तः ॥

201. In the sentence, 'I will enter as this ātman in the form of the jīva', it is wrong to read a further entry of the individual self into the elements, because the presence of individual consciousness in the elements prior to the entry in question is already made evident in the sentences, 'That fire resolved', 'Those waters resolved' and by the words 'These three deities'.

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[1] Aniruddha is one of the four principal cosmic manifestations of Śrī Viṣṇu, described in the Vaiṣṇava scriptures.

२०२. अतस्तत्र जीवशब्देन परमात्मैवाभिहितः ॥

202. Therefore in that passage only the supreme Spirit is signified by the term jīva.

२०३. जीवेनात्मनानुप्रभूतः पेपीयमानो मोदमानस्तिष्ठतीत्यत्रापि जीवशब्दोदितः पर एव । पेपीयमानो मोदमानस्तु संसारी ॥

203 Even in the text, 'Filled by the jīva, the tree drinks plentifully and enjoys itself and flourishes,' only the highest Self is named by the term jīva. He who drinks plentifully and enjoys himself is the individual self.

२०४. नहि चेतनादन्यस्य मोदभोगादिकं युज्यते ॥

204. Surely no unconscious entity can rejoice and enjoy.

२०५. सुखस्य चाप्यायतनं शरीरं दुःखस्य चाप्यायतनं शरीरम् । अचेतनं प्राकृतमेतदाहुः भोक्ता तयोश्चेतनकः शरीरीति भारते ।

205. It is said in the *Bhārata:* 'The body is the seat of pleasure. The body is the seat of pain. It is insentient and physical. The one who enjoys and suffers is the embodied individual self.'

२०६. जीवापेतं वाव किलेदं म्रियते न जीवो म्रियते इत्यत्रापि जीवशब्दः परे ॥

206. The term jīva is used in the sense of the highest Self in the other passage also which says, 'This verily dies if deserted by the jīva, the jīva does not die'.

२०७. न हि संसारिणो मुख्यतः प्राणधारकत्वं युज्यते ॥

207. The individual self cannot be the ultimate sustainer of life.

२०८. ब्रह्मणा त्यक्तदेहस्तु मृत इत्युच्यते नर इति च ॥

208. It is also said, 'The man is said to be dead whose body is deserted by Brahman'.

२०९. यं वै सोम्यैतमणिमानं न निभालयसेऽस्य सोम्यैषोऽणिम्न एवं महान्न्यग्रोधस्तिठतीत्यत्रापि अणिमशब्देन पर एवाभिहितः ॥

209. 'My dear, this finest essence which you do not perceive, through the power of that finest essence this huge fig tree stands.' In this statement also only the supreme Being is signified by the term 'The finest essence'

२१०. स एषोऽणिमैतदात्म्यमिदं सर्वं तत्सत्यं स आतमातत्त्वमसि श्वेतकेतो इत्युक्तत्वाच्च ॥

210. It is so because of the text stating, 'All this is ensouled by him, this finest essence, that is real; he is the ātman, that thou, Śvetaketu, art not'.

२११. धानासु त्वण्व्य इवेमा धाना इति स्त्रीलिङ्गप्रयोगादिवशब्द-प्रयोगाच्च नाणिमत्वम् ॥

211. In reference to the seeds, the feminine gender is used and they are compared to the finest essence. So they are not the same as the finest essence.[1]

२१२. न च ता न निभालयसे ॥

212. With reference to them it cannot be said. 'You do not perceive them'. (Because they are actually perceived.)

२१३. ऐतदात्म्यमित्येतदीयम् ॥

213. The meaning of 'ensouled by him' is 'belongs to him'.

२१४. स आत्मेत्यात्मशब्दस्तु पर एव ॥

214. 'He is the ātman.' In this sentence also the word ātman denotes the supreme Being.

२१५. द्युभ्वाद्यायतनं स्वशब्दात् । नानुमानमतच्छब्दात् । प्राणभृच्चेत्यत्र तमेवैकं जानथ आत्मानमिति स्वशब्दपर्यायात्मशब्दान्न प्रकृतिजीवावभिधीयेते किन्तु पर एवेति भगवता व्यासेनाभिहितम् ॥

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[1] The word aṇimā meaning the finest essence is not in the feminine gender and cannot be compared to itself,

215. Bhagavān Vyāsa lays down in the aphorisms, 'The abode of the sky etc., (is Brahman only) because of the word *sva* used' (I. 3, 1), 'Not the entity that is merely a matter of inference' (I, 3, 3), 'Not also the bearer of the prāṇa' (I, 3, 4), that in the śruti text, 'Know only him, the ātman'. as the term 'ātman' synonymous with '*sva*' is used, prakṛti and jīva are not signified by it, but only the highest Self.

२१६. अत आत्मशब्दस्तस्मिन्नेव मुख्यः ॥

216. Therefore the term ātman primarily denotes the highest Self.

२१७. आततत्वाच्च मातृत्वादात्मेति परमो हरिः । आत्माभासास्तदन्ये ये न ह्येतेषां तता गुणा इति परमोपनिषदि ॥

217. The *Paramopaniṣad* says: 'Hari is primarily the ātman because he is infinite (in time, space and perfections) and because he is the knower (omniscient) and creator. All other selves are merely the apparent ātmans. Their attributes are limited.

२१८. तेजः परस्यां देवतायां तावन्न जानातीत्यत्र च यदास्य प्राणादीन् परो ग्रसति तदा न जानाति यदा ददाति तदा जानातीति तद्वशत्वमेवोक्तम् ॥

218. In the passage. 'As long as the fire does not merge in the highest Deity, so long he recognises' it is pointed out that the individual self does not understand anything when the highest Self draws into itself his senses and life-breath and when he grants them, he understands. Thus the subordination of the individual self to the highest Deity is brought out.

२१९. यदा प्राणान् ददातीशस्तदा चेतनकोऽखिलम् । जानाति ग्रस्तकरणस्तेन वेत्ति न किञ्चनेति च ॥

219. It is also said, when the Lord grants the senses and life-breath all the sentient beings know and when their

senses and life-breath are withdrawn by him, they can know nothing.

२२०. अपहार्षीत्स्तेयमकार्षीदित्यत्र च अन्याभिमतस्यैव वस्तुनोऽपहार्यत्वात् भेद एवायं दृष्टान्तः ॥

220. The text, 'He robbed, he stole', offers only illustration of difference, for that can be stolen which belongs to another.

२२१. अन्यं संतं परमात्मानं स्वयमिति मन्यमानः स्तेन एवेति ॥

221. He is indeed a thief who imagines himself to be the supreme ātman, who is really different from him.

२२२. न हि स्वकीयं परित्यजन् स्तेनो भवति ॥

222. He is no theif who simply renounces what legitimately belongs to himself.

२२३. ऐकात्म्यं नाम यदिदं केचिद्ब्रूयुरनैपुणाः । शास्त्रतत्त्वमविज्ञाय तथा वादबलाज्जनाः । कामक्रोधाभिभूतत्वादहंकारवशं गताः । याथातथ्यमविज्ञाय शास्त्राणां शास्त्रदस्यवः । ब्रह्मस्तेना निरानन्दा अपक्वमनसोऽशिवाः । वैगुण्यमेव पश्यन्ति न गुणानि नियुञ्जते । तेषां तमश्शरीराणां तम एव परायणम् । यतस्स्वरूपतश्चान्यो जातितः श्रुतितोऽर्थतः । कथमस्मि स इत्येव सम्बन्धः स्यादसंहित इति मोक्षधर्मे ॥

223. The *Mokṣadharma* says: 'Those dull persons who propound this unity of ātman, do so because they do not comprehend the truth of the śāstras and are fooled by skill in argumentation and are dominated by egotism because they are overpowered by lust and anger. As they do not comprehend the import of the śāstras, they become robbers of the śāstras. They steal Brahman, are bereft of all ānanda and their minds are unripe. They perceive only attributelessness and do not ascribe excellences to Brahman. The destiny of these persons who are formed of darkness is darkness itself. How can the relation of identity with the

Superme in the form, "I am he" be tenable, when the Supreme is different in essential nature and in genus, according to all Śrutis and from the standpoint of value.'

२२४. यथा पक्षी च सूत्रं च नानावृक्षरसा यथा । यथा नद्यस्समुद्रश्च शुद्धोदलवणे यथा । यथा चोरापहार्यौ च यथा पुंविषयावपि । तथा जीवेश्वरौ भिन्नौ सर्वदैव विलक्षणौ । तथापि सूक्ष्मरूपत्वान्न जीवात्परमो हरिः । भेदेन मन्ददृष्टीनां दृश्यते प्रेरकोऽपि सन् । वैलक्षण्यं तयोर्ज्ञात्वा मुच्यते बध्यतेऽन्यथेति च परमोपनिषदि ॥

224. The *Paramopaniṣad* says: 'Just as the bird and the rope are different, the juices of the many trees are different, the rivers and the sea are different, the thief and the property stolen are different, the man and the (Gāndhāra) country are different, the jīva and Īśvara are different and are distinguished always by differences of essential nature. Even then, as they are subtle in their nature, Hari, the supreme Being does not appear as different from the jīva to the dullwitted, even though he is the power actuating all. He who understands their natural distinctness gets liberated while he, who does not, gets chained to saṁsāra.'

२२५. प्रेरकस्सर्वजीवानां प्राणधीचोदिता च सः । विष्णुस्संसारिणोऽन्यो यस्तमविज्ञाय मूढधीः । देहेन्द्रियप्राणबुद्धिनेतृत्वं मन्यते आत्मनः । अतस्संसार-पदवीं याति जीवेशयोस्सदा । वैलक्षण्यं परं ज्ञात्वा मुच्यते बध्यतेऽन्यथेति च ।

225. It is also further said, 'He is the actuator of all jīvas and he goads to activity prāṇa and manas. Viṣṇu is different from the transmigrating individual self. That fool who does not know him and thinks of himself as the master of his body, senses, life and intellect, inherits the cursed state, saṁsāra. By comprehending the absolute difference in nature between Īśvara and the jīvas, he gets emancipated. Otherwise he gets fettered'.

२२६. सर्वान्वेदानधीत्य महामना अनूचानमानी स्तब्ध एयायेत्यात्मनोऽन्यमनूचानत्वादिगुणप्रदं परमविज्ञाय स्तब्धस्य पराधीनत्वज्ञापनेन स्तब्धतां निरस्य तन्निष्ठा ह्यत्रोपदिश्यते ॥

226. The discourse opening with, 'Having learnt all the Vedas, thinking himself great, Śvetaketu, came puffed up with pride', first of all destroys the pride of the disciple by convincing him of his utter dependence on God—the pride which was due to his not understanding God, different from himself, who is the giver of all merits like learning—and then inculcates devotion to God.

२२७. तद्धैक आहुरसदेवेदमग्र आसीदित्यादि वादिप्रसिद्धमपि निराक्रियते ॥

227. Even a point of view quite familiar in some schools of thought is repudiated as in the passage, 'Some say that in the beginning only Non-being existed'.[1]

२२८. इष्टापूर्तं मन्यमाना वरिष्ठं नान्यच्छ्रेयो वेदयन्ते प्रमूढा इत्यादिवत् श्रुतितात्पर्यापरिज्ञानप्राप्तं च ॥

228. In passages like, 'Great fools imagine that iṣṭa (rituals) and pūrta (charitable deeds) are the highest and recognise no higher ideal', there is negation of the errors that result from the misunderstanding of the purport of Śruti. The present negation is similar to it.

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[1] The idea is that 'That thou art not' is a negative teaching and requires the prior presentation of what is negated. Is there such a prior presentation of identity between jīva and Īśvara? In answer three points are set forth: (1) The pride of Śvetaketu implies the assumption of such identity. (2) In the Śruti views familiar in current schools of thought are also repudiated and this belongs to that species of negation. (3) The Śruti also negates misconceptions that might result from a misunderstanding of its import and this statement, 'That thou art not' is just a negation of a possible misunderstanding of other Śruti texts like 'I am Brahman.'

२२९. दर्शितं चैकात्म्यं नाम यदिदं केचिद्ब्रूयुरनैपुणा इति ॥

229. The position negated is actually presented and denied in the mokṣa-dharma passage to the effect, 'Those dull persons who propound this unity of ātman....'

२३०. तद्वशत्वज्ञापनार्थं च सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीदित्यादि सृष्टि-कथनम् ॥

230. The account of creation is given in the text commencing with the sentence, 'My dear, all this was only Being in the beginning' with a view to intimate the dependence of every entity on Viṣṇu.

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२३१. एकविज्ञानेन सर्वविज्ञानं च प्राधान्यात् किंचित्सादृश्यात्कार-णत्वाच्च ॥

231. By the knowledge of the 'one' the knowledge of 'all' is attained because the 'one' is dominant, because there is some similarity beween it and all and also because it is the cause of all.

२३२. न तु तदन्यस्य मिथ्यात्वात् ॥

232. By knowing the 'one', all can be known not because everything other than the one is false.

२३३. न हि सत्यज्ञानेन मिथ्याज्ञानं भवति ॥

233. By the knowledge of the real, the knowledge of the unreal is not gained.

२३४. न हि शुक्तिज्ञे रजतज्ञो इत्युच्यते ॥

234. One who knows the mother-of-pearl (which is) does not (by virtue of that knowledge) know silver (which is not).

२३५. विरोधात्तयोर्ज्ञानयोः ॥

235. For the two units of knowledge are contradictory of each other.

२३६. नेदं रजतमित्यरजतज्ञो हि शुक्तिज्ञो भवति ॥

236. As a matter of fact, one who knows, 'This is not silver', and thus is a knower of non-silver is precisely the person who knows the mother-of-pearl.

२३७. रजतज्ञश्चेन्न शुक्तिज्ञः ॥

237. Thus if he knows silver (*i.e.*, knows that there is silver before him) he does not know the mother-of-pearl (which is the object before him).

२३८. न हि तज्ज्ञस्तदभावज्ञो भवति ॥

238. The person who knows something is not one who knows its non-existence.

२३९. तदभावस्य तज्ज्ञानपूर्वकत्वं चान्यत्र तस्य सत्त्वादेव दृष्टम् ॥

239. The negation of something presupposes the knowledge of it; and that knowledge is rendered possible by its existence elsewhere or at a different point of time.

२४०. तदनङ्गीकारे तदेव न युज्यते ॥

240. If the presupposed knowledge of its existence in a different context is not admitted (*i. e.*, its existence in the immediate context is the object of knowledge) the negation in question is impossible.

२४१. प्रधानज्ञानादप्रधानस्य ज्ञातवद्व्यपदेशोऽस्त्येव ॥

241. When the dominant principle is known, the subordinate principles are treated as practically known.

२४२. यथा प्रधानपुरुषाणां ज्ञानाह्वाननाशनैर्ग्रामो ज्ञात आहूतो नाशित इति व्यपदेशः ॥

242. We speak of the village as known, invited or destroyed when the principal personages of the village, are known, invited or destroyed.

२४३. कारणे च पितरि ज्ञाते पुत्रो ज्ञात इति जानाम्येनमस्य पुत्रोऽयमिति व्यपदेश इति ॥

243. And when the cause, namely the father is known, we take it that the son is known and we say, 'I know him; he is the son of so and so'.

२४४. एवमत्राप्येतत्सृष्टं सर्वमित्यादि ॥

244. The same applies to the present instance. We know the world when we know it is the creation of Brahman.

२४५. सादृश्याच्चैकस्त्रीज्ञानादन्यस्त्रीज्ञानमिति ॥

245. By similarity also the position is explicable. Knowledge of one woman is treated as giving us the knowledge of other women.

२४६. तदेव सादृश्यमत्रापि विवक्षितं यथा सोम्यैकेन मृत्पिण्डेन सर्वं मृन्मयं विज्ञातं स्यादित्यादिना ॥

246. It is such similarity that is meant in the present text also which starts with the sentence, 'Just as, my dear, through one lump of clay, all that is made up of clay is known'.

२४७. अन्यथैकशब्दः पिण्डशब्दश्च व्यर्थस्स्यात् ॥

247. Otherwise the words 'one' (in one lump of clay) and 'lump' (in lump of clay) would be useless.

२४८. मृदा विज्ञातयेत्येतावता पूर्णत्वात् ॥

248. (When similarity is not the basic principle) the import would stand completely expressed if it were said merely, 'If clay is known all products of clay are known'.

२४९. न ह्येकमृत्पिण्डात्मकान्यन्यमृन्मयानि ॥

249. Not all products of clay are produced out of a single lump of clay.

२५०. सादृश्यमेव हि तेषाम् ॥

250. There is only similarity between the one lump and all clay-products.

२५१. यथा सोम्यैकेन लोहमणिना सर्वं लोहमयं विज्ञातं स्यात् यथा सोम्यैकेन नखनिकृंतनेन सर्वं काष्णायसं विज्ञातं स्यादित्यादिकमपि व्यर्थं स्यात् ॥

251. Otherwise, the two other illustrations enumerated viz., 'Just as, my dear, by one nugget of gold everything made of gold may be known' and 'just as, my dear, by one nail-cutter everything made of iron my be known', would be useless.

२५२. न ह्येकमण्यात्मकन्यल्लोहमयम् । न चैकनखकृंतनात्मकं सर्वं काष्णायसम् ॥

252. The other gold articles are not the products of a single nugget of gold and not all iron-products are made of a single nail-cutter.

२५३. वाचारंभणं विकारो नामधेयं मृत्तिकेत्येव सत्यमित्यत्र च वाच नाम्नामारंभणं बिकारः अविकृतं नित्यं नामधेयं मृत्तिकेत्येवेत्येतद्वचनं सत्यमिति श्रुत्यर्थः ॥

253. The text '*Vācārambhaṇam vikāro nāmadheyam, mṛttiketyeva satyam*' means as follows: The names that are produced (not manifested) by our speech (*i.e.*, non-Sanskrit names) are modifications (*i.e.*, are changeable and not eternal). But the unchanging and eternal name is only *mṛttikā* (which is Sanskritic and is not produced but only manifested by our utterance). This statement is true.[1]

२५४. न च वाचारम्भणशब्दोऽपि मिथ्यात्वे प्रसिद्धः ॥

254. The term 'production by speech' is not familiar as standing for falsity.

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[1] Brahman is the pre-eminent reality and by knowing it, we also know the universe which is a subordinate reality. This is analogically justified by the consideration that Sanskrit is an eternal and unchanging language, while all others are human inventions and liable to mutations and extinction. Knowledge of Sanskrit serves every utility that all other languages can serve and thus to know it is to know all.

२५५. वाचारम्भणमात्रमिति चाश्रुतकल्पनम् ॥

255. To take it as meaning 'production by speech merely' is to import into the text what is not there.

२५६. तस्मिन्पक्षे नामधेयशब्द इतिशब्दश्च व्यर्थस्स्यात् ॥

256. On the interpretation being discussed both the words '*nāmadheya*' and '*iti*' would be useless. (Because these two indicate that the statement means to extoll the Sanskrit name of clay)[1]

२५७. अतो न कुत्रापि जगतो मिथ्यात्वमुच्यते ॥

257. Therefore, nowhere in the sacred texts the unreality of the world is proclaimed.

२५८. कविर्मनीषी परिभूः स्वयंभूर्याथातथ्यतोऽर्थान् व्यदधाच्छाश्वतीभ्यः समाभ्यः ॥

258. (On the other hand all of them are to the following effect:) 'The supreme God, omniscient, ruling over all minds, superior to all else, and independent, created *real* entities running through all times.'

२५९. यच्चिकेत सत्यमित्तन्न मोघं वसु स्पार्हमुत जेतोत दाता । विश्वं सत्यं मघवाना युवोरिदापश्च न प्रमिनन्ति व्रतं वाम् । प्रघान्वस्य महतो महानि सत्या सत्यस्य करणानि वोचम् ॥

259. 'The supreme God, who also receives desirable offerings from devotees and also grants to them desirable boons, created the universe and that universe created by him is *real.* It is not futile. O wealthy Indra and Bṛhaspati, the universe that is under your control is real. Your work in the matter of protecting the real universe and the waters, are not comprehended by any other gods (not to speak of my

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[1] The passage to bear the Advaitic meaning ought to have been वाचारम्भणमात्रं विकारः मृत्तिकैवसत्यं involving both an addition and two subtractions

not comprehending). The great and real deeds of this great and real god are expounded now alone.'

२६०. अनाद्यनन्तं जगदेतदीदृक्प्रवर्तते नात्र विचार्यमस्ति । न चान्यथा क्वापि च कस्य चेदमभूत्पुरा नापि तथा भविष्यत् । असत्यमाहुर्जगदेतदज्ञाः शक्तिं हरेर्यें न विदुः परां हि । यस्सत्यरूपं जगदेतदीदृक्सृष्ट्वा त्वभूत्सत्यकर्मा महात्मा ॥

260. The world runs in this fashion, without beginning and end. There is no question about that. It was never otherwise to anyone anywhere in the past and it will be never othewise to anyone anywhere in the future. Those who are ignorant of the great power of Hari say that this world is unreal; that infinite spirit created this real world in this form and hence is known as Satyakarmā (doer of real deeds and creator of real entities).'

२६१. असत्यमप्रतिष्ठं ते जगदाहुरनीश्वरम् । अपरस्परसंभूतं किमन्यत्कामहैतुकम् । एतां दृष्टिमवष्टभ्य नष्टात्मानोऽपबुद्धयः । प्रभवंत्युग्रकर्माणः क्षयाय जगतोऽहिता इत्यादेश्च ।

261. 'They, the demoniac ones, maintain that the world is unreal and unstable (because it is subject to sublation). They do not admit that the world proceeds from God in a regular way, one form arising out of another in orderly progression. On the contrary, they say that it is neither existent nor non-existent. They attribute its being to nescience from which arises desire. They, with their intellects destroyed and with little knowledge, adopt this point of view and flourish in the beginning of the Kali age, and those enemies of the world indulge in cruel deeds and promote its decline and fall.' Such are the sacred texts.

२६२. अनित्यत्वविकारित्वपारतन्त्र्यादिरूपतः । स्वप्नादिसाम्यं जगतो न तु बोधनिवर्त्यता । सर्वज्ञस्य यतो विष्णोः सर्वदैतत्प्रतीयते । बोधासहं ततो नैतत् किंत्वाज्ञावशमस्य हीति परमोपनिषदि ॥

262. The *Paramopaniṣad* says: 'The world resembles dreams etc., in respect of its transitoriness, mutability and dependence and not because it is dispelled by enlightenment. That such only are the points of resemblance follows from the fact that the world is always present to the consciousness of the omniscient Viṣṇu. Therefore it is not something that disappears when understanding dawns. It is under the sovereignty of Viṣṇu.'

२६३. प्रज्ञाविनिर्मितं यस्मादतो मायामयं जगत् । अनेनानुगतं यस्मादनृतं तेन कथ्यते । बोधानिवर्त्यमपि तु नित्यमेव प्रवाहतः । अ इत्युक्तः परो देवः तेन सत्यमिदं जगत् । तदधीनस्वरूपत्वादसत्यं तेन कथ्यते । सत्यस्य सत्यः स विभुरिन्द्रचापस्य सूर्यवदिति च । तस्योपनिषत्सत्यस्य सत्यमिति प्राणा वै सत्यं तेषामेष सत्यमिति च ॥

263. The world is said to be 'māyāmaya', because it is a product of intelligence. It is called 'anṛta', because it is pervaded by him, who is the activating force. It is called māyāmaya and anṛta even though it is not removable by knowledge and is eternal as a process. 'A' is the name of the supreme Deity. By him is the world made real (satya) and its nature is maintained by him. Therefore, it is described as 'asatya'. That all pervading Lord is the Reality of realities. He is to the world what the sun is to the rainbow.[1] The Upaniṣad passage concerning him is, 'He is the Real of reals; life-principles are real and of them he is Real'.[2]

२६४. महामायेत्यविद्येति नियतिर्मोहिनीति च । प्रकृतिर्वासनेत्येवं तवेच्छानन्त कथ्यते । प्रकृतिः प्रकृष्टकरणाद्वासना वासयेद्यतः । अ इत्युक्तो हरिस्तस्य विद्याऽविद्येति संज्ञिता । मायेत्युक्ता प्रकृष्टत्वात् प्रकृष्टं हि मया-

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[1] Carlyle: *Sartor Resartus*, page 58: 'Creation lies before us like a glorious rainbow; but the sun that made it lies behind us hidden from us.'

[2] Real of reals signifies that he is the source and controller of the reality of all reals.

भिधम् । विष्णोः प्रज्ञप्तिरेवैका शब्दैरेतैरुदीर्यते । प्रज्ञप्तिरूपो हि हरिः सा च स्वानन्दलक्षणेति च ॥

264. 'O infinite One, your desire is called mahāmāyā avidyā, niyati, mohinī, prakṛti and vāsanā. It is prakṛti. because what it does is great. It is vāsanā, because it produces impressions in sentient beings. 'A' signifies Hari. Knowledge belonging to him is avidyā. Maya means great and it is called māyā because of its greatness. The consciousness of Viṣṇu itself is named by these terms. Hari is of the nature of consciousness and that consciousness consists in self-delight.' Thus also the truth about the world is laid down.

२६५. सर्वे वेदा हरेर्भेदं सर्वस्मात् ज्ञापयन्ति हि । भेदः स्वातन्त्र्यसार्वज्ञ्यसर्वैश्वर्यादिकश्च सः । स्वरूपमेव भेदोऽयं व्यावृत्तिश्च स्वरूपता । सर्वव्यावृत्तये यस्मात् स्वशब्दोऽयं प्रयुज्यते । सर्वव्यावृत्ततामेव नेति नेत्यादिका श्रुतिः । विष्णोरतो वदेदन्या अपि सर्वा न संशय इति नारायणश्रुतिः ॥

265. The *Nārāyaṇa-śruti* says: 'All the Vedas teach the difference of Hari from all else. That difference lies in his independence, omniscience and overlordship over all etc. His essential nature (svarūpa—own form) itself constitutes his difference from all. Essential nature is what distinguishes an entity from others. The word sva in svarūpa meaning essential nature is used in order to distinguish an entity from all others. The Śruti starting from not so, not so, points to the difference of Viṣṇu from all else. All other Śruti texts also present the same truth. There is no doubt on this point.'[1]

२६६. अहं ब्रह्मास्मि तद्योऽहं सोऽसौ योऽसौ सोऽहं योऽसावादित्ये पुरुषः सोऽहमस्मि स एवाहमस्मीत्यादि त्वंतर्याम्यपेक्षया ॥

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[1] Śrī Jaytīrtha says: वस्तुनो याऽन्यस्मात् व्यावृत्तिर्या च स्वस्वरूपता तदुभयं तावदेकमेवेत्यर्थः (What negatively marks off an entity from others and what constitutes its essential nature positively are one and the same).

266. The texts like, 'I am Brahman', 'What I am, that he is'; 'What he is, that I am'; 'That puruṣa who is in the sun, is myself' and 'I am only he', have significance from the standpoint of the Inner Ruler of all (antaryāmin).

२६७. स यश्चायं पुरुषे यश्चासावादित्ये स एकः । अ इति ब्रह्म तत्रागतमहमिति तस्योपनिषदहमिति । अहंनामा हरिर्नित्यं अहेयत्वात्प्रकीर्तितः । त्वं चासौ प्रतियोगित्वात्परोक्षत्वात्स इत्यपि ॥

267. 'He who is in the man and he who is in the sun are one and the same.' '"A" means Brahman.' 'The word that comes to Brahman (*i.e.*, that signifies Brahman) is aham. Aham is an occult name of Brahman.' 'Hari is eternally named aham because he is free from evil. He is also called tvam because he is the principle encountered. He is also known as saha because he is not immediately perceived.'

२६८. सर्वान्तर्यामिणि हरावस्मच्छब्दविभक्तयः । युष्मच्छब्दगताश्चैव सर्वास्तच्छब्दगा अपि । सर्वशब्दगताश्चैव वचनान्यखिलान्यपि । स्वतन्त्रत्वात्प्रवर्तन्ते व्यावृत्तेऽप्यखिलात्सदा । तत्सम्बन्धात्तु जीवेषु तत्सम्बन्धादचित्स्वपि । वर्तन्त उपचारेण तिङ्पदान्यखिलान्यपि । तस्मात्सर्वगतो विष्णुरेको भिच्च ततो बहुरिति नारायणश्रुतिः ॥

268. The *Nārāyaṇa-śruti* says: 'The pronoun "I" in all its cases refers to Hari, who is the inner ruler of all. Similarly all the case-terminations of Thou and He also refer to Him. All the case-terminations of all words point to him. Similarly all grammatical numbers point to him. Though he is distinguished always from all else, he is the import of all this, because he is independent. (It is owing to relation to him that all personal terminations also refer to jīvas and inanimate objects) It is owing to the relation of the jīvas and inanimate objects to him that all personal terminations refer to them in a secondary signification. Therefore Viṣṇu is omnipresent, he is one, he is different, and he is abundant.'

२६९. सर्वभूतेषु येनैकं भावमव्ययमीक्षते । अविभक्तं विभक्तेषु तज्ज्ञानं विद्धि सात्विकमिति भगवद्वचनम् ॥

269. The Lord's words are: 'Know that knowledge to be sāttvika, by which one cognizes the one imperishable and undivided reality in all perishable and divided beings.'

२७०. न चासत्यो भेदः ॥

270. And difference is not unreal.

२७१. सत्यमेनमनु विश्वे मदन्ति रातिं देवस्य गृणतो मघोनः ॥

271. 'That all creatures become happy through the grace of this Viṣṇu, who is the friend of god Indra given to praise (Viṣṇu) is a fact.'

२७२. सत्यः सो अस्य महिमा गृणे शवो यज्ञेषु विप्रराज्ये ॥

272. 'That glory of this Viṣṇu (*i.e.*, his transcendent majesty) is a fact. I glorify him in sacrifices, which are the kingdoms of vipras, with a view to become happy.'

२७३. सत्य आत्मा सत्यो जीवः सत्यं भिदा सत्यं भिदा सत्यं भिदा ॥

273. 'The supreme Self is real. The individual self is real. Difference is real, difference is real, difference is real.'

२७४. मैवारुवण्यो मैवारुवण्यो मैवारुवण्यः ॥

274. 'The supreme Being is not such that he can be worshipped by sinners. The supreme Being is not such that he can be worshipped by sinners. The supreme Being is not such that he can be worshipped by sinners.'

२७५. आत्मा हि परमस्वतन्त्रः सर्ववित् सर्वशक्तिः परमसुखः परमो जीवस्तु तद्वशः अल्पज्ञः अल्पशक्तिः आर्तः अल्पकः इत्यादिश्रुतिभ्यः ॥

275. 'The supreme Self is absolutely independent, all knowing, all powerful, supremely blissfull and ultimate But the individual self is dependent on him, knows a little, has limited power, is miserable and is finite'. Such texts prove that difference is real.

२७६. न चावान्तरसत्यत्वमिदम् ॥

276. This reality (ascribed to difference) is no lower degree of reality.

२७७. यो वेदनिहितं गुहायां परमे व्योमन् । सोऽश्नुते सर्वान् कामान् सह ब्रह्मण विपश्चिता । एतमानन्दमयमात्माननुपसंक्रम्य इमान् लोकान् कामान्नी कामरूप्यनुसञ्चरन् । एतत्साम गायन्नास्ते ॥

277. 'He who knows what is residing in the heart, and in the highest of heavens attains all objects of all desires along with the all-knowing Brahman. Having approached near the blissful One, he, shaped according to his desire, wanders (in delight) through these worlds, eating the food of his desires; he abides singing these *Sāman* chants.'

२७८. ऋचां त्वः पोषमास्ते पुपुष्वान् गायत्रं त्वो गायति शक्वरीषु । ब्रह्मा त्वो वदति जातविद्यां यज्ञस्य मात्रां विमिमीत उ त्वः ॥

278. 'One Brahmā being full in himself engages in abundant recitation of *Ṛks*. Another Brahmā sings the *Sāman* hymns among the *Ṛks*. Another Brahmā expounds the science of (supreme) puruṣa. Another Brahmā contemplates some aspect of Viṣṇu.

२७९. परंज्योतिरुपसम्पद्य स्वेन रूपेणाभिनिष्पद्यते । स तत्र पर्येति जक्षन् क्रीडन् रममाणः स्त्रीभिर्वा यानैर्वा ज्ञातिभिर्वाऽज्ञातिभिर्वा ॥

279. 'Having come to the supreme Light he stands revealed in is own natural form. There he moves about eating, playing and rejoicing with either women or chariots or with selves liberated along with him or those liberated in earlier epochs.'

२८०. यत्र त्वस्य सर्वमात्मैवाभूत् तत्केन कं पश्येत् तत्केन कं जिघ्रेते तत्केन कं विजानीयात् येनेदं सर्वं विजानाति तं च केन विजानीयात् विज्ञातारमरे केन विजानीयात् ॥

280. 'In that state in which all entities (are supposed to) become his own self, what can he see and through what? What can he smell and through what? What can he comprehend and through what? That through which he comprehends all this, through what can he comprehend it? Through what can he know the knower?'

२८१. यथोदकं शुद्धे शुद्धमासिक्त तादृगेव भवति । तदा विद्वान् पुण्यपापे विधूय निरञ्जनः परमं साम्यमुपैति । अमृतस्यैष सेतुः ॥

281. 'Just as pure water poured into pure water acquires community of nature with it, even so the man of wisdom shakes off merits and demerits and as a pure soul attains to the highest similarity. The Lord is the support for the immortals (*i. e.*, liberated souls).

२८२. अक्षण्वन्तः कर्णवन्तः सखायो मनोजवेष्वसमा बभूवुः । आदघ्नास उपकक्षा स उत्वे ह्रदा इव स्नात्वा उत्वे ददृश्रे ॥

282. 'The liberated souls having found their eyes and ears, loving one another, become hierarchically different in qualities like intelligence. Some among them play in the huge ocean of milk. Some play near and in the gardens. They take bath and themselves look deep like fine lakes fit to bathe in. They behold the supreme Lord himself.'

२८३. ईशमाश्रित्य तिष्ठन्ति मुक्ताः संसारसागरात् । यथेष्टभोगभोक्तारो ब्रह्मान्ता उत्तरोत्तरमिति मोक्षानन्तरं भेदश्रुतिभ्यः ॥

283. 'Those who have been rescued from the ocean of transmigration and are emancipated remain resting on the Lord. All of them upto Brahmā enjoy the objects of their desires in appropriate gradation.' In all these Śruti texts persistence of difference after emancipation is affirmed and so difierence does not have, as alleged, a lower degree of reality.

२८४. इदं ज्ञानमुपाश्रित्य मम साधर्म्यमागताः । सर्गेऽपि नोपजायन्ते प्रलये न व्यथन्ति च इति भगवद्वचनम् ॥

284. The words of the Lord are: 'Those who resting in this knowledge attain similarity unto me, do not get created at creation and do not suffer at dissolution.'

२८५. ओं जगद्व्यापारवर्जम् । ओं प्रकरणादसन्निहितत्वाच्चेत्यादि च ॥

285. The aphorisms like the following also testify to this truth: 'The liberated jīva has no cosmic functions' (IV. iv 17) and 'For, the section deals with the Lord and the thoughts of the jīva are far from it' (IV, iv, 18).

२८६. अविनाशी वा अरेऽयमात्मानुच्छित्तिधर्मेति तद्धर्माणामप्यनुच्छित्तेः प्रस्तुतत्वात् ॥

286. 'This ātman, my dear, is imperishable and his attributes are inextinguishable.' In this passage, the indestructibility of his attributes also is introduced.

२८७. अत्रैव मा भगवान् मोहान्तमापिपन्न प्रेत्य संज्ञास्तीति संज्ञानाशस्य दोषत्वेनोक्तत्वात् ॥

287. 'In this important matter, O Lord, by saying "The liberated one has no consciousness", you are leading me to destruction of the form of confusion.' It is here said that destruction of consciousness is an evil.

२८८. यत्र त्वस्य सर्वमात्मैवाभूत् तत्केन कं पश्येदिति ह्याक्षेप एव ॥

288. Therefore the passage, 'In that state in which all entities become his own self'. is definitely an objection (by way of *reductio ad absurdum* and not the affirmation of truth as alleged).

२८९. न हि भोगाभावो विज्ञातारमरे केन विजानीयादिति विज्ञातुरविज्ञानं चापेक्षितम् ॥

289. Surely the extinction of enjoyment and the extinction of the consciousness of the conscious spirit as implied in the text, 'By what can one know the knower', are not conditions to be desired.

२९०. अहमित्येव यो वेद्यः स जीव इति कीर्तितः । स दुःखी स सुखी चैव स पात्रं बन्धमोक्षयोः इति परमश्रुतिः ॥

290. The *Parama-śruti* says: 'He who is only cognizable as "I" is called the jīva. It is he that suffers and enjoys. It is he that is bound and that gets liberated.'

२९१. मग्नस्य हि परेऽज्ञाने किं न दुःखतरं भवेदिति मोक्षधर्मे ॥

291. The *Mokṣadharma* says: 'Do not greater evils befall one who is sunk in the deepest ignorance?'

२९२. न तु तद्द्वितीयमस्तीति च । यत्तद्ब्रह्म द्वैतत्वेन न पश्यति तदेव द्वितीयं नेत्याह । यत्ततोऽन्यद्विभक्तत्वेनैव पश्येदिति वाक्यशेषात् । न हि द्रष्टुर्दृष्टेर्विपरिलोपो विद्यत इति हेतोश्च ॥

292. The text, 'But there is no second entity', just states that what Brahman does not see as different from itself, does not exist as different from it. The rest of the text says that what Brahman sees as different from itself, exists as different. This meaning follows from the reason also adduced in the text, 'The vision of this absolute seer never fails'.

२९३. कर्माणि विज्ञानमयश्च आत्मा परेऽव्यये सर्व एकीभवन्तीत्यत्रापि एकीभावो मत्यैंक्यं क्षीराब्ध्यादिस्थिततद्रूपापेक्षया स्थानैक्यं वा ॥

293. The text, 'All the karma and the ātman constituted of consciousness become one in the supreme imperishable ātman', also propounds unity of thought or unity of location in relation to some special form of the Deity existing in places like the milky ocean.

२९४. कामेन मे काम आगात् हृदयाद्धृदयं मृत्योः । यदमीषामदः प्रियं तदैतूपमामभि । ब्रह्ममत्यनुकूला मे मतिर्मुक्तौ भविष्यति । अतः प्रायोनुकूलत्वमिदानीमपि मे स्थितम् ॥

294. 'In release, may such desire arise in me which would be in conformity with the desire of the Lord, who causes destruction, may such will arise in me, which would be in conformity with his will and may what is dear to him become

dear to me. In release my mind will be in tune with the mind of Brahman. Therefore, even now, my mind is mostly in tune with it.'

२९५. येनाक्रमन्त्यृषयो ह्याप्तकामा यत्र तत्सत्यस्य परमं निधानम् । एतमानन्दमयमात्मानमुपसंक्रामतीत्यादिश्रुतिभ्यः ॥

295. 'To that world in which the presence of the ultimate Reality is fully revealed, the blessed sages who have attained what has to be attained travel through this path.' 'He approaches this ātman who abounds in bliss.' These Śruti texts determine the nature of the unity said to be attained in liberation.

२९६. स्वरूपैक्याभिप्राये कर्माणि विज्ञानमयश्चेति न युज्यते । न हि तत्पक्षेऽपि कर्मणां ब्रह्मैक्यं मुक्तावस्ति ॥

296. If the unity meant was unity in essential nature it would be wrong to speak of both karma and the self constituted of consciousness as attaining unity. Even on the opposed view karma does not become one with Brahman in liberation.

२९७. निवृत्त्यभिप्राये च पञ्चदशकलानामपि समत्वात् । गताः कलाः पञ्चदश प्रतिष्ठा देवाश्च सर्वे प्रतिदेवतास्वित्यन्यासां कलानां गमनमुक्त्वा कर्मणां विज्ञानात्मनश्चैकीभावकथनं व्यर्थं स्यात् विशेषाभावात् ॥

297. If by unity mere cessation of karma is meant, as that would hold good of the fifteen vital factors (kalā) also, it would be superfluous to speak of the exit of the other vital factors and the integration of karma and the individual self with Brahman as the passage does: 'The fifteen vital factors have gone back to their causes, all the deities (presiding over the senses) have gone back to their respective original forms. And karma and the ātman constituted of consciousness become one in the supreme imperishable ātman.' There is no reason for such difference in treatment in that case.

२९८. न च ज्ञाननिवृत्तस्य रजतस्य शुक्त्यैकीभावव्यवहारोऽस्ति ॥

298. The silver that is sublated by correct knowledge is not said to become one with the shell (on which it was illusorily superimposed).

२९९. परेऽव्यय इत्यधिकरणत्वकथनं च भेदज्ञापकम् ॥

299. The words of the text, 'become one in the supreme imperishable ātman', enunciating that Brahman is the seat of the process of becoming one, intimate difference.

३००. अन्यथा पर एव भवन्तीति निर्देशस्स्यात् ॥

300. Otherwise, the statement ought to have been that they become the supreme ātman itself.

३०१. जीवस्य परमैक्यं तु बुद्धिसारूप्यमेव तु । एकस्थाननिवासो वा व्यक्तिस्थानमपेक्ष्य सः । न स्वरूपैकता तस्य मुक्तस्यापि विरूपतः । स्वातन्त्र्य-पूर्णतेऽल्पत्वपारतन्त्र्ये विरूपते इति परमश्रुतिः ॥

301. 'The unity of jīva with the Lord consists of sameness of thought or it may mean dwelling in the same place. Such sameness of habitation is relative to some particular manifestation of the Lord. It is not unity of essential being. For even the released individual is different from him. The difference between the two lies in the Lord being independent and infinite and the individual being finite and dependent'. Such are the words of *Parama-śruti*.

३०२. ब्रह्म वेद ब्रह्मैव भवतीत्यादि च सम्पूज्य ब्राह्मणं भक्त्या शूद्रोऽपि ब्राह्मणो भवेदितिवत् बृंहितो भवतीत्यर्थः ॥

302. The proposition of the Śruti, 'He who knows Brahman becomes Brahman', is similar to the saying, 'Even a śūdra, by worshipping a brāhmaṇa with devotion, becomes a brāhmaṇa'; it means that a knower of Brahman becomes developed.

३०३. न हि ब्राह्मणपूजकः स एव ब्राह्मणो भवति ॥

303. Certainly the worshipper of a brāhmaṇa does not become that brāhmaṇa himself.

३०४. ब्रह्माणि जीवाः सर्वेऽपि परब्रह्माणि मुक्तिगाः । प्रकृतिः परमं ब्रह्म परमं महदच्युतः । तस्मान्न मुक्ता न च सा न क्वचिद्विष्णुवैभवम् प्राप्नुवन्ति । स एवैकः स्वतन्त्रः पूर्णषड्गुण इति परमश्रुतिः ॥

304. The *Parama-śruti* says: 'All the jīvas are Brahmans; the jīvas that attain release are superior Brahmans; prakṛti (Lakṣmi) is a still higher Brahman. Lord Acyuta is the greatest and highest Brahman. Therefore, neither the liberated souls nor she ever attain the splendour of Viṣṇu anywhere. He alone is independent and has the six attributes to perfection.'

३०५. परो मात्रया तन्वा वृधान न ते महित्वमन्वश्नुवन्ति ॥

305. 'O Viṣṇu, you transcend all measure and limitation. You are boundless and full in your actual being and not merely by repute. No one can attain such greatness as yours.'

३०६. ब्रह्मेशानादिभिर्देवैः यत्प्राप्तुं नैव शक्यते । तद्यत्स्वभावः कैवल्यं स भवान्केवलो हरे इति च ॥

306. 'That nature, which is unattainable even by the gods like Brahmā and Īśa, is what is called perfection (kaivalya); only you, O Hari, are all-surpassingly perfect (kēvala).' These texts also confirm the principle stated.

३०७. यथापियन्ति तेजांसि महातेजसि भास्करे । पृथक्पृथक् स्थितान्यह्नि स्वरूपैरपि सर्वशः । परे ब्रह्मणि जीवाख्यब्रह्माण्यप्यपियन्ति हि । मुक्तौ पृथक् स्थितान्येव तदन्येषामदर्शनम् । अप्ययोऽयं समुद्दिष्टो न स्वरूपैकता क्वचिदिति नारायणश्रुतिः ॥

307. 'Just as all minor lights existing separately in their own forms,enter everywhere into the over-poweringly effulgent sun at day, even so all the Brahmans called the jīvas enter into the supreme Brahman in the state of liberation, even

though they have their own distinctive essences. This entry is merely the non-perception of these jīvas by the unenlightened perceivers and never identity of essential being.' This is the explanation offered by the *Nārāyaṇa-śruti.*

३०८. अतः सर्वागमविरुद्धमेव जीवेश्वरैक्यम् ॥

308. Therefore it stands that the doctrine of the identity of individual self and the supreme Being is contradicted by all the the scriptures.

३०९. तथैव सर्वयुक्तिविरुद्धं च ॥

309. Similarly it is contradicted by all reasoning.

३१०. न तावदेकजीववादो युज्यते ॥

310. In the first place, the view that there is only one jīva (individual self) is untenable.

३११. एकाज्ञानपरिकल्पितत्वे च सर्वस्य सर्वमिदं परिकल्पितमिति जानतः पुनः शिष्यादिबोधनं न युज्यते ॥

311. If everything is the figment of one jīva's imagination, he who understands that all this is his own imagination, cannot engage himself in the task of enlightening any disciple.

३१२. न हि स्वप्नोऽयमिति निश्चित्य स्वाप्नपुत्रदायार्थं यतते ॥

312. A person who recognises his dream as dream does not proceed to apportion inheritance to his dream-son.

३१३. स्वप्ने तु स्वाप्नत्वाज्ञानादेव यतते ॥

313. But in the dream itself, since he is not aware that he is dreaming, he may do so.

३१४. न च बहूनां दृश्यमानत्वादस्याज्ञानपरिकल्पितमिदमिति निश्चयो युज्यते ॥

314. Further, since many individuals are seen in the world, it is impossible to determine whose imagination the entire empirical world is.

३१५. स्वप्ने तु प्रबोधानन्तरमेकस्यावशिष्टत्वान्निश्चयः । न चात्र तथास्ति ॥

315. But in the case of the dream, such identification of the dreamer is possible, for, only one person of the dream-world (*i. e.*, dreamer) survives in the waking state. But here with regard to all experience such identification of the world-imagining jīva is impossible.

३१६. तस्य तस्य तथा तथा प्रतिपत्तव्यमित्यङ्गीकारे वस्तुनि विकल्पासम्भवात् अकल्पितमित्येव स्यात् ॥

316. It is suggested that each one should consider himself the only jīva in question; but such alternative points of view cannot all be true of reality; the only conclusion would be that the world is not a product of any false imagination whatever.

३१७. न च तथा प्रतिपत्तव्यमित्यत्र प्रमाणमस्ति ॥

317. Further, there is no valid proof for the necessity that each jīva should look upon the universe as his own imagination.

३१८. शिष्याज्ञानपरिकल्पितमित्यङ्गीकारे तस्यैवाचार्यभावे स्वयमेव कल्पितो भवतीति सम्यग्ग्रन्थाधिगमस्यैवानर्थहेतुत्वं स्यात् ॥

318. If the teacher is merely a product of the disciple's imagination, when the disciple becomes a teacher in his turn, he himself becomes a product of his own disciple's imagination. Thus sound comprehension of (sacred) texts itself becomes a source of evil, (because his liberation would not follow from his own enlightenment).

३१९. न च कस्यचिन्मुक्तिः । ग्रंथाधिगमे तस्यैव शिष्याज्ञानपरिकल्पितत्वप्राप्तेः ॥

319. No one would be emancipated in that case, for no sooner a man comprehends the liberating texts and becomes a preceptor than he becomes a figment of his pupils' illusory imagination.

३२०. स चैकजीवो यदि भेदवादी भवति तस्य तत्रैव दाढर्यात् न कदाचित् भेदनिवृत्तिरिति न कस्यापि मुक्तिः स्यात् ॥

320. If the one jīva postulated were to be a dualist, he becomes established in dualism. So never would there be an elimination of difference and hence no one would attain liberation.[1]

३२१. तेन यथा कल्पितं तथैव भवतीति तेनैकजीववादिनां नित्यनिरय-कल्पने स एव स्यात् ॥

321. As it is supposed that things are what that one individual self imagines them to be, if he were to imagine that the advocates of the doctrine of a single jīva go to eternal damnation, it would happen literally so.

३२२. न चैकजीवाज्ञानपरिकल्पितं समस्तमित्यत्र किंचिन्मानम् ॥

322. There is no shred of evidence in support of the thesis that the entire world is the figment of the imagination of a single jīva.

३२३. प्रपञ्चो यदि विद्येत निवर्तेत न संशयः । मायामात्रमिदं द्वैतं अद्वैतं परमार्थत इत्यस्य चायमर्थः ॥

323. The meaning of text, 'If the prapañca were to exist it would undoubtedely cease. This duality is māyāmātra (only illusory) and from the standpoint of paramārtha (the Absolute) there is non-duality', is as follows:

३२४. प्रपञ्चो यदि विद्येत भवेत उत्पद्येत तर्हि निवर्तेत न च निवर्तते तस्मादनादिरेवायम् ॥

324. If the prapañca were to be something that originates, then it is something that would terminate. But it does not terminate. Therefore it must be unoriginated.

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[1] This means that the solitary jīva, if ignorant and strongly entrenched in ignorance, has no chance of being redeemed, as there is no one else to rescue him in the whole universe.

३२५. प्रकृष्टः पञ्चविधो भेदः प्रपञ्चः ॥

325. That which consists of the great (pra) five kinds of differences (pañca) is prapañca.

३२६. न च अविद्यमानोऽयं मायामात्रत्वात् ॥

326. It is not non-existent on the ground that it is māyāmātra.

३२७. मायेति भगवत्प्रज्ञा सैव मानत्राणकर्तृ यस्य तन्मायामात्रम् ॥

327. Māyā means the Lord's consciousness. That which the Lord's consciousness comprehends and protects is māyāmātra.

३२८. परमेश्वरेण ज्ञातत्वाद्रक्षितत्वाच्च न द्वैतं भ्रान्तिकल्पितमित्यर्थः ॥

328. The world of duality is comprehended by the supreme Lord and is protected by him and hence it is not a product of illusory imagination.

३२९. न हीश्वरस्य भ्रान्तिः ॥

329. Surely the Lord cannot be liable to illusions.

३३०. तर्ह्यद्वैतः सर्वभावानामिति व्यपदेशः कथमित्यत आह् अद्वैतं परमार्थत इति ॥

330. Then what is the significance of the statement, 'Of all forms of being he is non-dual?' To that question the answer is given by the sentence, 'Advaita is from the standpoint of paramārtha'.

३३१. परमार्थापेक्षया ह्यद्वैतं सर्वस्मादुत्तमोऽर्थः स एक एवेत्यर्थः ॥

331. There is Advaita in respect of highest Reality. He alone is the supreme Reality over all.

३३२. अन्यथा ह्यद्वैतः सर्वभावानामिति व्यर्थं स्यात् ॥

332. Otherwise the statement, 'He is non-dual of all forms of being', would be useless. (It would have been enough if it was said, 'He is non-dual'.)

३३३. सर्वभावानां मध्ये तस्यैकस्यैवाद्वैतत्वमित्युक्ते समाधिकराहित्यमेवोक्तं स्यात् । अन्येषां सर्वभावानां च समाधिकभावः ॥

333. When it is said that of all forms of being, he alone has non-duality, it only signifies that he has no equal and superior. All the other forms of being have both equals and superiors.

३३४. विकल्पो विनिवर्तेत कल्पितो यदि केनचिदिति वाक्यशेषाच्च न कल्पितत्वमस्येति ज्ञायते ॥

334. By the rest of the text which says, 'The differences would disappear if they were merely imagined to exist by some one', it is made evident that the world of difference is not a fancied world.

३३५. निवर्तत इत्यङ्गीकारे निवर्तेत विद्येतेति च प्रसङ्गरूपेण कथनं यदिशब्दौ च न युज्यन्ते ॥

335. If the statement is interpreted as asserting that the world 'does cease to be' (निवर्तते), then the shape of the proposition as working out the inevitable consequences of a certain assumption as indicated by the words निवर्तेत (would terminate), विद्येत (were to exist) and the word यदि (if) would be meaningless.

३३६. विद्येतेत्यस्य चोत्पत्त्यर्थानङ्गीकारे यद्यदस्ति तत्तन्निवर्तत इति व्याप्त्यभावात् निवर्तेतेति न युज्यते ॥

336. If the words, 'If it were to exist', are not interpreted as meaning, 'If it were to originate', then, as there is no universal and necessary law that all that exists must cease to exist, the consequence drawn 'would terminate' would be absurd.

३३७. अतः प्रपञ्चस्यानादिसत्यत्वपरमिदं वाक्यम् ॥

337. Therefore, this text aims at asserting the unoriginated reality of the world of fivefold differences.

३३८. अतः उपदेशादयं वादोऽज्ञाते द्वैतं न विद्यत इत्याह । अज्ञात एव द्वैतं न विद्यते ॥

338. For this reason, the text further says, 'This theory proceeds from (sacred) instruction. If not enlightened there is no duality'. There is no duality only under the condition of ignorance.

३३९. अज्ञानिनां पक्ष एव द्वैतं न विद्यत इत्यर्थः ॥

339. The import is that only according to the theory of the unenlightened there is no duality.

३४०. जीवेश्वरभिदा चैव जडेश्वरभिदा तथा । जीवभेदो मिथश्चैव जडजीवभिदा तथा । मिथश्च जडभेदोऽयं प्रपञ्चो भेदपञ्चकः । सोऽयं सत्यो ह्यनादिश्च सादिश्चेन्नाशमाप्नुयात् । न च नाशं प्रयात्येष न चासौ भ्रान्तिकल्पितः । कल्पितश्चेन्निवर्तेत न चासौ विनिवर्तते । द्वैतं न विद्यत इति तस्मादज्ञानिनां मतम् । मतं हि ज्ञानिनामेतन्मितं त्रातं च विष्णुना । तस्मात्सत्यमिति प्रोक्तं परमो हरिरेव तु इति परमश्रुतिः ॥

340. The *Parama-śruti* says: 'The universe consists of five differences. They are the difference between God and the individual self, that between God and insentient matter, that among individual selves, that between insentient matter and individual self and that among the material entities themselves. This is real and unoriginated. If it were originated, it would perish. But it does not perish. Nor is it a fabrication of illusion. If it were so, it would have disappeared. But it does not disappear. Therefore, the view that there is no duality is the view of the ignorant. The view of the enlightened is that this world is comprehended and protected by Viṣṇu. Therefore it is proclaimed to be real. But Hari alone is supreme'.

३४१. मैत्रेयीशाखायां च अथ ज्ञानोपसर्गा इत्युक्त्वा अथ ये चान्ये मिथ्यातर्कैः दृष्टान्तैः कुहकेन्द्रजालैः वैदिकेषु परिस्थातुमिच्छन्ति तैः सह न

संवसेत् प्राकाश्या ह्येते तस्करा अस्वर्ग्या इत्याह । नैरात्म्यवादकुहकैर्मिथ्या-दृष्टान्तहेतुभिः । भ्राम्यँल्लोको न जानाति वेदविद्यान्तरं तु यदिति ॥

341. In the *Maitreyī-śākhā* we have the following after the announcement, 'Then to consider the obstacles to knowledge': 'Then one should not live with those who, by false arguments and deceptive and magical illustrations, wish to establish themselves in the fold of the followers of the Vedas. They should be exposed as thieves and as unfit for any heavenly destiny. The people who wander deluded by the deceptive arguments of *nairātmya-vāda* and false reasons and illustrations do not understand that which is the inner meaning of the Vedas'.

३४२. आत्मसम्बन्धि किमपि नास्तीति वादो नैरात्म्यवादः ॥

342. *Nairātmya-vāda* is the view according to which there is nothing belonging to the ātman.[1]

३४३. भ्रांतिकल्पितत्वे च जगतः सत्यं जगद्द्वयमपेक्षितम् ॥

343. If the world is a product of illusion, then it would presuppose two real worlds.

३४४. न हि सत्यशुक्तेः सत्यरजतस्य तयोस्सादृश्यस्य चाभावे भ्रांतिर्भवति ॥

344. There can be no mistaking of a piece of shell for silver, unless there is a real piece of shell, real silver and similarity between the two.

३४५. स्वप्नेऽपि वासनारूपं सत्यमेव जगन्मनसि स्थितं बहिष्ठत्वेन दृश्यते ॥

345. Even in dreams a real world subsisting in the mind in the form of impressions (vāsanā) is seen as externally existing.

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[1] To deny the reality of the world is to deny in entirety what belongs to God.

३४६. देहात्मनोरपि एकदेशस्थत्वादिसादृश्यमस्त्येव ॥

346. In the case of the body and self there is similarity in points like co-existence in the same area of space.

३४७. शङ्खः पीतो नभो नीलमित्यादिष्वपि पीतादयोऽन्यत्र विद्यन्त एव ॥

347. In illusions like the perception of conch as yellow and sky as blue, features like yellowness are surely existing elsewhere.

३४८. तत्सादृश्यं च द्रव्यत्वादिकं किंचित् शङ्खादीनां चास्त्येव । अतो न कुत्रापि सदृशसत्यवस्तुद्वयं विना भ्रमः ॥

348. Objects like the conch have some similarity with real yellow objects etc. in being substances etc. Therefore, nowhere do we have an illusion without two similar real entities.

३४९. न चात्मन्यनात्मभ्रमः क्वापि दृष्टः ॥

349. Nowhere do we have the illusory superimposition of the non-self on the self.[1]

३५०. न हि कश्चिदहमहं न भवामीति भ्रान्तो दृश्यते ॥

350. We see no one who gets into the illusion 'I am not I'.

३५१. आत्मन्यनात्मभ्रम एवायं प्रपञ्च इति तैरुच्यते ॥

351. But the theorists under discussion hold that the world is the superimposition of the non-self on the self.

३५२. तं विनैवानात्मन्यात्मभ्रमकल्पनेऽनात्मनस्सत्यत्वं स्यात् ॥

352. If it is supposed that there is an illusory superimposition of the self on the non-self independent of the superimposition of the non-self on the self, then the non-self must have reality.'

३५३. तदा चाद्वितीयत्वकल्पनेऽनात्मैवास्ति नात्मेति भवति ॥

353. Then if it is supposed that Reality is one without a second, it follows that the non-self alone exists and the self does not.

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[1] No one mistakes in this way: 'I am thou', 'I am he', 'I am it'.

३५४. आत्माज्ञानात्मकत्वे च जगत आत्मनो भिन्नत्वेन न दृश्येत ॥

354. If the world is of the nature of the non-apprehension of the self, it ought not to have been perceived as different from the self (as it is done).

३५५. न हि शुक्तेर्भेदेन रजतं दृश्यते भ्रान्तौ ॥

355. Silver is not perceived as different from the piece of shell (on which it is illusorily superimposed) in the illusion.

३५६. न चैकमेव युगपद्बहुधा दृश्यते भ्रान्तौ ॥

356. One and the same entity is not seen as consisting of a manifold simultaneously in any illusion.[1]

३५७. न चात्मनि भेदभ्रमः क्वापि दृष्टः ॥

357. Nowhere do we come across the illusory perception of oneself as forming a manifold.

३५८. न च कुत्रापि मिथ्योपाधिकृतो भेदो दृष्टः ॥

358. Nowhere, again, do we know of an illusory manifold engendered by a limiting adjunct which is itself unreal.

३५९. न च ज्ञानाज्ञानयोरपि मिथ्याकल्पितत्वं दृष्टम् ॥

359. And we do not also know of knowledge as well as error being products of illusory imagination.[2]

३६०. तद्विषयस्यैवान्यथात्वं भ्रान्तौ ॥

360. Only the objects of knowledge are other than what they are taken to be in illusion.

३६१. एवमाद्यनन्तयुक्तिविरुद्धोऽयं पक्षः ॥

361. The theory under examination stands condemned by countless arguments like the ones urged thus far.

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[1] Never do we mistake the same shell at once as silver, gold, copper and tin.

[2] Objects of cognition may be unreal but the cognition itself is real.

३६२. ग्रन्थबहुत्वं स्यादित्येवोपरम्यते ॥

362. Only because the treatise would swell to excess if we pursue the discussion, it is being concluded.

३६३. न च सत्यत्वाङ्गीकारे कश्चिद्दोषः ॥

363. And there is absolutely no philosophical difficulty in the way of affirming the reality of the world of difference.

३६४. बहुजीववादिपक्षेऽपि भेदस्य मिथ्यात्वाङ्गीकारे एते दोषा भवन्त्येव ॥

364. The school of Advaita which postulates a plurality of individual souls also asserts the unreality of differences. Hence the criticisms urged apply to it also.

३६५. मिथ्योपाधिकृतं हि तेषामपि बहुत्वम् ॥

365. Even according to it plurality is produced by unreal adjuncts.

३६६. न च मिथ्योपाधिकृतो भेदः क्वापि दृष्टः ॥

366. Nowhere do we see differences being generated by unreal adjuncts.

३६७. आत्मन्यनात्मकल्पनारूपत्वान्मिथ्योपाधिरेव न युज्यते ॥

367. The very concept of an unreal adjunct is untenable, because it is of the nature of imagining the self as non-self.

३६८. मायामयी सृष्टिरपि तत्सदृशस्यान्यस्य विद्यमानत्व एव दृष्टा । द्रव्यत्वादिसादृश्ययुतं किंचिदधिष्ठानमाश्रित्यैव च ॥

368. Illusory creations occur only when there is another similar entity in reality and only on some substratum which resembles the other entity in being a substance etc.

३६९. अधिष्ठानं च सदृशं तथ्यवस्तुद्वयं विना । न भ्रांतिर्भवति क्वापि स्वप्नमायादिकेष्वपि । मानस्यां वासनायां तु बहिर्वस्तुत्वकल्पनम् । स्वाप्नो भ्रमश्च मायायां कर्तृदेहादिवस्तुषु । चतुरङ्गबलत्वादिकल्पनं भ्रम इष्यते । न भ्रांतिकल्पितं विश्वमतो विष्णुबलाश्रयमिति ब्रह्मवैवर्ते ॥

369. The *Brahmavaivarta-purāṇa* says: 'There is no illusion anywhere without a substratum and two mutually resembling real entities. This is so even in the case of dreams. The dream-illusion is merely the supposition of the external existence of objects which subsist in the mind internally as impressions. In magically produced illusions the error lies in taking the body etc. of the magician as the four limbs of army etc. Therefore the universe is no product of an illusion. It rests on the power of Viṣṇu.'

३७०. न च मायाविना माया दृश्यते विश्वमीश्वरः । सदा पश्यति तेनेदं न मायेत्यवधार्यतामिति च ॥

370. It further says: 'The magician does not see the magic. But the Lord always sees the universe. Therefore it is to be resolved that it is not a magically produced illusion.'

३७१. अपरोक्षदृशो मिथ्यादर्शनं न क्वचिद्भवेत् । सर्वापरोक्षविद्विष्णु-र्विश्वदृक्तन्न तन्मृषेति च ॥

371. It also says further: 'There is no perception of the unreal on the part of one who perceives directly. Viṣṇu is a direct and immediate knower of all. He sees the universe and so it is not unreal.'[1]

३७२. यदि चैकमेव [ब्रह्मोपाधिभेदात्संसरति मुच्यते च तदा संसारिणां सर्वदा विद्यमानत्वात् सर्वदा संसार्येव ब्रह्म ॥

372. If it is maintained (as is done) that the single Brahman is caught up in saṁsāra (as one jīva) and gets mukti (as another jīva) owing to differences in adjuncts, then as the bound selves will always be there, Brahman will always be caught up in saṁsāra.

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[1] It means that all perceptual illusion is due to the cognition not being completely perceptual. For an omniscient and direct perceiver of all there can be no illusion. The argument rules out errors of perception entirely perceptual in character.

३७३. अतस्तद्भावोऽपि न मुक्तिः सर्वदोपाधिसंबन्धत्वात्तस्य ॥

373. Hence even the attainment of identity with Brahman cannot be release, for the Brahman is ever associated with adjuncts.

३७४. न च शुद्धस्य नोपाधिसम्बन्ध इति वाच्यम् । उपाधिसम्बन्धस्योपाधिसम्बन्धकल्पनेऽनवस्थाप्रसङ्गात् ॥

374. It cannot be argued that the pure Brahman is not associated as such with any adjunct; for, to postulate association with another adjunct as a pre-condition of association with the adjunct in question is to perpetrate infinite regress.

३७५. न च तेनैव सम्बन्धेन सम्बद्धस्य आत्माश्रयप्रसङ्गात् ॥

375. Nor can it be maintained that association with the same adjunct provides the requisite contamination for entering into association with it. For that lands the argument in the fallacy of 'atmāśraya.'[1]

३७६. इतश्च मिथ्योपाधिर्न युज्यते ॥

376. There is a further consideration also damaging the idea of an unreal adjunct.

३७७. अज्ञानसिद्धौ मिथ्योपाधिसिद्धिः अज्ञानं विना मिथ्यात्वासिद्धेः ॥

377. The unreal adjunct is possible only if there is ignorance. What presents itself to consciousness in the absence of ignorance can never be proved unreal.

३७८. न च मिथ्योपाधिं विनाऽज्ञानसिद्धिः मिथ्योपाधिभिन्नस्यैव अज्ञत्वात् ॥

378. And there can be no ignorance without an unreal adjunct, for only Brahman as conditioned and differentiated by the unreal adjunct, can be ignorant.

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[1] It is to account for a factor on the basis of itself, when it needs to be accounted for and is not self-explaining.

३७९. शुद्धस्यैवाज्ञत्वे मुक्तस्याप्यज्ञत्वप्रसक्तेः ॥

379. If the pure Brahman (unconditioned by any adjunct) can be the seat of ignorance, then even the released soul must be liable to ignorance.

३८०. स्वाभाविकत्वात् सत्यत्वात् सद्वितीयत्वप्रसक्तेश्च ॥

380. In that case, ignorance being natural would be real, and being real would constitute a principle besides Brahman itself, the latter cannot be regarded as the sole reality without a second.

३८१. स्वाभाविकस्य चानिवृत्त्यङ्गीकारादनिवृत्तिप्रसक्तेश्च । सत्यस्य च अनिवृत्तिरिति हि तत्पक्षः ॥

381. As it is admitted (by the opponent) that what is natural can never cease to be, ignorance would remain an irremovable entity. 'The real can never be terminated.' Such is the view in the theory.

३८२. अतश्चान्योन्याश्रयता ॥

382. Thus the fallacy of reciprocal dependence results.

३८३. अज्ञानसिद्धौ मिथ्योपाधिसिद्धिः मिथ्योपाधिसिद्धौ जीवसिद्धिः जीवसिद्धौ तदाश्रयाज्ञानसिद्धिरिति चक्रकं वा ॥

383. Or the fallacy of *cakraka* (circular explanation) arises, because the position is that if there is ignorance there will be the unreal adjunct, if there is the unreal adjunct there will be the individual self, and if there is the individual self, there can be ignorance in it.

३८४. न च शुद्धमेव भ्रांत्याऽज्ञमिति युक्तम् ॥

384. It is not logical to hold that the pure Brahman itself is ignorant by virtue of illusion.

३८५. अज्ञानसिद्धौ भ्रमसिद्धिः तत्सिद्धौ अज्ञानसिद्धिरिति अन्योन्याश्रयत्वात् ॥

385. For, even in that case, the fallacy of reciprocal dependence is inevitable. If there is ignorance, illusion is possible, and if there is illusion, ignorance is possible.[1]

३८६. अनागता अतीताश्च यावन्तः सहिताः क्षणाः । अतीतानागताश्चैव यावन्तः परमाणवः । ततोऽप्यनन्तगुणिता जीवानां राशयः पृथगिति वत्सश्रुतेर्न संसारिणां परिसमाप्तिरस्मत्पक्षे ॥

386. According to our view, there is no exhaustion of the unreleased selves, for the *Vatsa-śruti* says, 'If we compute all the moments of time, past and future, all the atoms past and future, still the separate groups of jīvas do infinitely exceed.'

३८७. परमाणुप्रदेशेऽपि ह्यनन्ताः प्राणिराशयः । सूक्ष्मत्वादीशशक्त्यैव स्थूला अपि हि संस्थिताः । सहस्रयोजनसभां प्रभावाद्विश्वकर्मणः । अनन्ता राशयोऽनन्ताः प्रजानां अधिसंस्थिता इति स्कान्दे ॥

387. 'In fact, in the space that a single atom occupies, an infinite number of groups of jīvas exists, because of their subtlity. They do so even when gross through the power of the Lord.' 'An infinite number of groups of creatures occupy the assembly-hall which stretches to a thousand yojanas through the power of Viśvakarmā.' So says the *Skānda-purāṇa*.

३८८. न च मिथ्यावस्तुनो दुर्घटत्वमेव भूषणम् ॥

388. And it cannot be said that impossibility is itself an excellence in the unreal.

३८९. दृष्टस्य वस्तुनो मिथ्यात्वकल्पनस्य दृष्टिसकाशात् बलवत्प्रमाणयुक्त्यपेक्षत्वात् ॥

389. The supposition of the unreality of anything, which is a fact of observation, requires the support of stronger evidence and reasoning.

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[1] Suppression of truth precedes every illusion. The suppression of truth is itself due to a factor other then the self-luminous Brahman, and all factors other than Brahman are illusory.

३९०. तदभावे सत्यत्वं दृष्टयैव सिद्धयति ॥

390. If such evidence and reasoning are not there, its reality gets established by the very force of that observation.

३९१. न हि अन्नादिकं भोग्यं दृष्ट्वा भोक्तुं सत्यत्वे प्रमाणान्तरमपेक्षते । किंतु नेदमन्नमिति केनचिदुक्ते कथमिदमन्नत्वेन दृश्यमानमन्नं न भवतीति प्रमाणान्तरमपेक्षते ॥

391. If objects of enjoyment like food are observed, one does not seek for further proof of the reality of the objects in order to enjoy them. But if some one were to say that it is not food, then indeed he needs some further evidence to be convinced that what appears as food is not really so.[1]

३९२. न च प्रत्यक्षदृष्टस्य ततो बलवत्प्रत्यक्षमागमं विना अनुमानादिनैव बाधो दृष्टः ॥

392. What is ascertained through perception cannot be dismissed by mere argumentation without the aid of stronger perceptions and scripture.

३९३. दूरस्थवृक्षह्रस्वत्वादौ प्रत्यक्षापटुत्वस्य निश्चितत्वात् युक्त्या तत्र दीर्घत्वनिश्चयः ॥

393. In the matter of the apparent smallness of the length of a tree, distant from the observer, through reason we determine its greater length, because it is a settled principle that the power of the eye is enfeebled in relation to distant objects.

३९४. प्रत्यक्षस्य हि दूरे मन्दग्राहित्वं परिमाणादौ अन्यथात्वं च ततो बलवत्प्रत्यक्षेणैव निश्चितम् ॥

394. That perception is dull with regard to remote objects and that it can be mistaken in the grasp of magnitudes etc., is determined by more powerful perception itself.

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[1] Naive realism when unopposed can afford to be complacent. But a denial of the obvious facts of experience must be founded on invulnerable evidence.

३९५. न च जगत्प्रत्यक्षस्य मिथ्यात्वं केनापि प्रमाणेन निश्चितम् ॥

395. But in the present instance of the world, the falsity of the perception of the world is not established by any mode of (direct) knowledge.

३९६. विशेषतश्च ज्ञानाज्ञानसुखदुःखात्मभेदादिविषयस्यानुभवस्य न मिथ्यात्वं दृष्टम् ॥

396. In particular the direct experience of knowledge and ignorance, pleasure and pain, and the uniqueness of the self, are not falsified by any direct experience.

३९७. अतश्च संसारस्य सत्यत्वात्सत्यस्य चानिवृत्त्यङ्गीकारान्न मोक्षः स्यात् ॥

397. Therefore, as the life of transmigratory existence is real and as what is real cannot be terminated, there can be no emancipation.

३९८. अनुभवसिद्धस्य बलवदनुभवं विना युक्तित एव मिथ्यात्वाङ्गीकारे आत्मनोऽपि मिथ्यात्वं स्यात् ॥

398. If what is established by direct experience is taken to be false independent of any stronger direct experience and on the strength of mere reasoning, then even the ātman will have to be considered unreal.

३९९. युक्तिश्च सर्वस्यान्यस्य मिथ्यात्वाङ्गीकारात् ॥

399. The reasoning would be that as all else is taken to be unreal, the ātman also should be so taken.

४००. द्विधाकल्पने कल्पनागौरवमिति ॥

400. To make two suppositions when one is enough is to err by way of excessive supposition.

४०१. आत्माधिष्ठानभ्रमस्यैवादृष्टेस्तस्याधिष्ठानत्वमपि न युज्यते ॥

401. Since there is no illusion of which the self is the substratum, it is impossible that it ever can be the substratum of illusion.

४०२. दुर्घटत्वस्य च भूषणत्वे दुर्घटमपि आत्ममिथ्यात्वं स्यादेव ॥

402. If impossibility is itself an excellence then the unreality of the self, however impossible it my be, would follow.

४०३. प्रतीतेरप्यविद्याकार्यत्वाङ्गीकारात् । तस्याश्च दुर्घटत्वस्य भूषणत्वात्सत्यस्य च युक्यपेक्षत्वात् घटादीनां द्रष्टृत्वमात्मनश्च जडत्वं द्रष्टुरभावे च प्रतीतिरधिष्ठानं विनैव भ्रम इत्यादि विरुद्धं सर्वमपि स्यात् ॥

403. As ordinary experience is itself a product of ignorance, as the impossibility of it is an excellence, and as the real alone needs reason, everything self-contradictory would have to be entertained. We ought to entertain that 'insentient objects like a jar are conscious', 'the self is insentient', 'even in the absence of an experiencer, experience takes place' and illusion arises without a substratum'.

४०४. उपाधिभेदांगीकारे हस्तपादाद्युपाधिभेदेऽपि तद्गतसुखदुःखादिभोक्तुर्यथा भेदो न प्रतीयते एवमेव शरीरादिभेदेऽपि भोक्तुर्भेदो न दृश्येत । सर्वदेहगतसुखपुःखादिकमेकेनैव भुज्येत ॥

404. If the distinction of adjuncts is brought forward, we urge that the self in a single body does not experience any division within itself inspite of the fact that the body consists of several distinct parts. Similarly inspite of plurality of bodies, there ought to have been no experience of the differentiation of selves (as is the case in life). The same self ought to have been experiencing all the pleasures, pains etc., arising in all the bodies.

४०५. यथा चैकांगुल्याद्यपगमेऽपि न मुक्तिरेवमेकोपाध्यपगमेऽपि तस्यैवानन्तोपाधिसम्बद्धत्वान्न मुक्तिस्स्यात् ॥

405. When one finger etc., is lost, the loser does not get emancipated, even so, even if the self sheds one of its adjuncts, since it is associated with a countless number of other adjuncts, it cannot attain release.

४०६. उद्यतायुधदोर्दण्डाः पतितस्वशिरोऽक्षिभिः । पश्यन्तः पातयन्ति स्म कबन्धा अप्यरीन्युधीति भारतवचनान्न विश्लेषाद्विशेषः ॥

406. It cannot be said that the mutual separation of bodies accounts for the experience of differentiation among selves. The *Mahābhārata* says that in spite of the separation of the various members of the body, the self functions as a unity: 'Even the trunks of soldiers, with arms carrying weapons, seeing with the eyes in their heads, which had been cut off, brought down the enemies in the battle.'

४०७. किं चोपाधिरात्मन एकदेशं ग्रसत्युत सर्वमात्मानम् ॥

407. Further, does the adjunct seize a part of the self ? or does it seize the whole ?

४०८. एकदेशाङ्गीकारे सावयवत्वम् । सावयवस्य चानित्यत्वं तैरङ्गीकृतम् । सर्वग्रासे च नोपाधिर्भेदकः स्यात् । उपाधिकृतांशकल्पने तदुपाधिकृतत्वे आत्माश्रयत्वम् । उपाध्यन्तरकल्पनेऽनवस्था ॥

408. If it is admitted that it seizes a part only, that would imply that the self is composed of parts and according to the theory everything composed of parts is non-eternal. If the adjunct seizes the whole self, then it cannot be the principle of differentiation. If it is supposed that the self has parts owing to an adjunct and that the adjunct is the same as the limiting adjunct whose seizing of the self is being examined, we have the fallacy of self-dependence. If on the contrary, some other adjunct is said to introduce distinctions within the self, and the adjunct under consideration seizes one of the parts differentiated by the other adjunct, we have landed ourselves in infinite regress.

४०९. न चेश्वरस्य सर्वगतत्वादौपाधिकभेदो ब्रह्मणा भवति ॥

409. As Īśvara is omnipresent, he cannot be said to be differentiated from Brahman as a result of the action of some adjunct.

४१०. न हि देशतः कालतश्चापरिच्छिन्नयोरौपाधिकभेदो दृष्टः ॥

410. There is no instance of two entities infinite in space and time being differentiated through the action of an adjunct.

४११. सर्वोपाधिगतत्वाच्चैकस्यैव ईश्वरस्य भेदस्य मिथ्यात्वाद्धस्तपादादिभेदेऽपि भोक्तुरेकत्ववत् सर्वसुखदुःखादिभोक्तृत्वमीश्वरस्यैव स्यात् ॥

411. As the self-same Īśvara dwells in all the bodily adjuncts and as differences are unreal, on the analogy of the unity of the experiencer in a body inspite of the multiplicity of its members, Īśvara himself must be the experiencer of all the pleasures and pains of all.

४१२. देशतः कालतश्चापरिच्छिन्नयोरौपाधिकभेदाभावादेव दुःखिनोऽन्यत् शुद्धं ब्रह्म न सिद्धयति ॥

412. Further, as two principles, infinite in space and time, cannot be differentiated by any adjunct, there can be no pure Brahman other than the all-suffering Īśvara.

४१३. अतः स्वाभाविकस्संसार इत्यनिवृत्तिरेव स्यात् ॥

413. Thus, as the transmigratory life of evil would be natural, no cessation of it would be possible.

४१४. किंच विशिष्टस्य शुद्धस्य वा संसारः ॥

414. Further, who is it that is involved in saṁsāra? Is it the qualified (conditioned) ātman or the pure ātman?

४१५. शुद्धस्य संसार इत्युक्ते स्वव्याहतिः ॥

415. To say that the pure ātman suffers saṁsāra would be a self-contradictory proposition.

४१६. विशिष्टस्येत्युक्ते विशिष्टोऽन्यः स एव वा ॥

416. If it be said that it is the qualified ātman that suffers saṁsāra we ask whether that ātman is the same as the pure ātman or different.

४१७. स एव चेदुक्तो दोषः ॥

417. If it be answered that he is the same as the pure one, the criticism urged before applies to that position also (*i.e.*, self-contradiction).

४१८. अन्यश्चेन्नित्योऽनित्यो वा ॥

418. If he is different, we ask, whether he is enternal or non-eternal.

४१९. अनित्यश्चेन्नाश एव तस्य न मोक्षः ॥

419. If he is non-eternal, he can have only annihilation and no emancipation.

४२०. नित्यत्वे च भेदस्य सत्यत्वं मोक्षेऽपि तस्य भावात् ॥

420. If he is eternal, difference would be real, for it persists in emancipation also.

४२१. स्वरूपमात्रस्याभेद उपाधिभिन्न एवेत्यङ्गीकारे स्वरूपमेवोपाधि-सम्बद्धमिति न तस्य शुद्धत्वम् ॥

421. If it is held that the pure nature of the ātman is differenceless but conditioned by adjuncts it gets differentiated, as that nature of the ātman itself must be associated with the adjunct, it cannot be pure.

४२२. अशुद्धस्वभावस्य न कदाचिच्छुद्धत्वमिति च तत्पक्षः ॥

422. The theory under discussion lays down that what is impure by nature can never become pure.

४२३. उपाधिमिथ्यात्वाङ्गीकारे चान्योन्याश्रयत्वादिदोषा उक्ताः ॥

423. The proposition that the limiting adjunct is unreal, involves fallacies like reciprocal dependence as already demonstrated.

४२४. न चानादिकर्मभेदाद्भेदः ॥

424. It cannot also be maintained that differences are due to beginningless differences of karma (merit and demerit).

४२५. औपाधिकभेदसिद्धौ कर्मभेदसिद्धिः तत्सिद्धौ च तत्सिद्धिरित्यन्योन्याश्रयत्वात् ॥

425. If differences owing to the action of adjuncts are there, there will be difference of karma. Again if differences of karma are there, there will be differences due to adjuncts. Thus reciprocal dependence arises again.

४२६. अतोऽनन्तदोषदुष्टत्वाद्ग्रन्थबहुत्वं स्यादित्येवोपरम्यते ॥

426. Thus, as the school is infected with countless fallacies, only with a view to avoid excess of volume, the discussion is being closed.

४२७. अतस्सर्वप्रमाणविरुद्धत्वान्नाभेदे श्रुतितात्पर्यम् ॥

427. Thus the purport of the Śruti is not non-difference, for that would stand contradicted by all the pramāṇas.

४२८. सर्वशब्दावाच्यस्य लक्षणापि न दृष्टेति न तस्य शास्त्रगम्यत्वम् ॥

428. As what is not expressible by words cannot be even figuratively indicated, it cannot be the theme of the scriptures.

४२९. अतोऽवाच्यत्वादज्ञेयत्वाच्छून्यमेव तदिति प्राप्तम् ॥

429. Hence, as it is non-describable in words and unknowable, it follows that it is only 'śūnya'.

४३०. न च स्वेनापि ज्ञेयत्वं तैरुच्यते ॥

430. The theorists under dicussion do not even admit that it is knowable to itself.

४३१. कर्तृकर्मविरोध इति हि ते वदन्ति ॥

431. They, in fact, contend that the self's knowledge of itself by itself involves the contradiction of the same principle being agent and object.

४३२. न च स्वरूपमन्यद्वा ज्ञेयं ज्ञातारं च विना ज्ञानं दृष्टम् ॥

432. We know of no knowledge independent of an object to be known, be it itself or some other principle, and the knower.

४३३. अतो ज्ञातृज्ञेयाभावाज्ज्ञानस्यापि शून्यतैव ॥

433. As there is no knower and no object of knowledge, even knowledge would be merely 'śūnya'.

४३४. अतः शून्यवादान्न कश्चिद्विशेषः ॥

434. Therefore there is nothing to differentiate the theory from śūnya-vāda.

४३५. न च ज्ञातृज्ञेयरहितं ज्ञानं क्वापि दृष्टम् ॥

435. There is no instance of knowledge without a knower and an object to be known.

४३६. अप्राप्तत्वाच्चेश्वरभेदस्य नाभेदे श्रुतितात्पर्यं युज्यते ॥

436. And (as argued out before), the difference between the jīva and Īśvara is not a matter established otherwise than through scriptures. Therefore the scripture cannot aim at the teaching of identity between jīva and Īśvara.

४३७. सर्वोत्तमं सर्वदोषव्यपेतं गुणैरशेषैः पूर्णमन्यं समस्तात् । वैलक्षण्याज्ज्ञापयितुं प्रवृत्ताः सर्वे वेदा मुख्यतो नैव चान्यदिति महोपनिषदि ॥

437. The *Mahopaniṣad* says: 'All the Vedas aim at revealing Nārāyaṇa who is all-surpassing, free from all evil, abounding in all excellences and different from all else by reason of his uniqueness. This they do in their direct signification and they teach nothing else.'

४३८. अतः सदागमैरेव सर्वस्माद्भिन्नत्वेन सर्वस्माद्विशिष्टत्वेन च विज्ञेयो भगवान्नारायण इति सिद्धम् ॥ इति प्रथमः परिच्छेदः ॥

438. Thus it is established that Bhagavān Nārāyaṇa is known only through the right scriptures as different from all, and as surpassing all.

द्वितीयः परिच्छेदः

४३९. ॐ ॥ ब्रह्मा शिवः सुराद्याश्च शरीरक्षरणात्क्षराः । लक्ष्मीरक्षरदेहत्वात् अक्षरा तत्परो हरिः । स्वातन्त्र्यशक्तिविज्ञानसुखाद्यैरखिलैर्गुणैः । निस्सीमत्वेन ते सर्वे तद्वशाः सर्वदैव च । सर्गस्थितिक्षययतिप्रकाशावृतिबन्धनम् । सर्वक्षराणामेकः स कुर्यात् सात्विकमोक्षणम् । सर्गस्थितियतिज्योतिर्नित्यानन्दप्रदोऽक्षरे । चेष्टाप्रदश्च सर्वेषामेक एव परो हरिः । तस्य नान्योऽस्ति सर्गादिकर्ता निर्दोषकश्च स इति परमश्रुतिः ॥

439. The *Parama-śruti* has the following: 'Brahmā, Śiva and all others beginning with the gods are kṣaras, because their bodies are perishable, Lakṣmī is akṣara because her body is imperishable. Hari is above both these, because he is infinite in all his glorious attributes like independence, power, knowledge and bliss. They are all under his control. He, all by himself, brings about the creation, subsistence, destruction, regulation, illumination, ignorance and bondage of all the kṣaras and the liberation of the sāttvika jīvas. To the akṣara he grants manifestation, subsistence, regulation, illumination and eternal bliss. The supreme Hari alone is the source of the activities of all these. There is no one else who brings about his creation etc. He is free from all imperfection.'

४४०. ब्रह्मशेषसुपर्णेशशक्रसूर्यगुहादयः । सर्वे क्षरा अक्षरा तु श्रीरेका तत्परो हरिरिति स्कान्दे ॥

440. The *Skānda-purāṇā* says: 'Brahmā, Śeṣa, Suparṇa, Īśa, Śakra, Sūrya, Guha and others are all kṣaras. Only Śrī is akṣara. Hari is beyond both.

४४१. यं कामये तं तमुग्रं कृणोमि तं ब्रह्माणं तमृषिं तं सुमेधाम् । अहं रुद्राय धनुरातनोमि ब्रह्मद्विषे शरवे हन्त वा उ । अहं जनाय समदं कृणोम्यहं द्यावापृथिवी आविवेश । अहं सुवे पितरमस्य मूर्धन्मम योनिरप्स्वंतस्समुद्रे ॥

441. (These are the words of Lakṣmī:) 'I make him Rudra, whom I want to make Rudra. Similarly, I make whomsoever I please Brahmā and a ṛṣi with fine intelligence. Against the violent Brahmā-hater Rudra, I spread my bow with a view to kill him. I bring about the happiness of people. I enter into the upper and lower worlds. I give birth to Brahmā in a way that makes him the best of all. But my source, the Lord, abides within the waters of the ocean.'

४४२. यमन्तस्समुद्रे कवयो वयन्ति यदक्षरे परमे प्रजाः । यतः प्रसूता जगतः प्रसूती तोयेन जीवान्व्यससर्ज भूम्याम् । यदोषधीभिः पुरुषान् पशूंश्च विवेश भूतानि चराचराणि । अतः परं नान्यदणीयसं हि परात् परं यन्महतो महान्तम् । यदेकमव्यक्तमनन्तरूपं विश्वं पुराणं तमसः परस्तात् । तदेवर्तं तद्ध सत्यमाहुस्तदेव ब्रह्म परमं कवीनाम् ॥

442. 'What is intuited in parts within the ocean by wise men, on what imperishable one all the creatures subsist, in what the mother of the universe takes birth, what through waters created living beings on earth, what entered into man and animals, into all beings moving and non-moving as into all vegetation, than which there is no other subtler entity, what is greater than the great, bigger than all that is big, what is one, unmanifest, infinite in form, perfect, ancient and what transcends all ignorance and matter, that alone is true knowledge and has action following from true knowledge and that is the supreme Brahman of the wisest.'

४४३. अस्य देवस्य मीळ्हुषो वया विष्णोरेषस्य प्रभृते हविर्भिः । विदे हि रुद्रो रुद्रियं महित्वं यासिष्टं वर्तिरश्विनाविरावत् ॥

443. 'Rudra who is the binder of all creatures, attained as is well known, the status of a Rudra by worshipping with offerings this Viṣṇu, a god who rains the desired objects on his devotees and whose purpose is always fulfilled. Even you, O Aśvins, owe your wealthy status to the grace of Viṣṇu.'

४४४. चन्द्रमा मनसो जातश्चक्षोः सूर्यो अजायत । मुखादिन्द्रश्चाग्निश्च प्राणाद्वायुरजायत ॥

444. 'Moon took birth in his mind. Sun took his birth in his eye, Indra took birth in his face and also Agni. In his breath the wind-god took his birth.'

४४५. एको नारायण आसीन्न ब्रह्मा नेशानो नाग्नीषोमौ नेमे द्यावापृथिवी । एको नारायण आसीन्न ब्रह्मा न च शङ्करः । स मुनिर्भूत्वा समचिन्तयत्तत एते व्यजायन्त । विश्वो हिरण्यगर्भोऽग्निर्यमो वरुणरुद्रेन्द्रा इति ॥

445. 'Nārāyaṇa alone was there then, neither Brahmā, nor Īśvāra, nor Agni and Soma, nor heaven and earth. Only Nārāyaṇa was and there was neither Brahmā nor Śaṅkara. He became thoughtful and through his thought were born Vāyu, Hiraṇyagarbha, Agni, Yama, Varuṇa, Rudra and Indra.

४४६. वासुदेवो वा इदमग्र आसीन्न ब्रह्मा न च शङ्करः । नेन्द्रसूर्यौ न च गुहो न सोमो न विनायक इत्यादिश्रुतिभ्यश्च ॥

446. 'Before the universe was created Vāsudeva alone was, neither Brahmā nor Śaṅkara. There was no Indra or Sūrya or Guha or Soma or Vīnāyaka.' By Śruti texts like these the position is substantiated·

४४७. यस्मात्परं नापरमस्ति किंचिदित्यत्राप्यपरमस्तीत्येवार्थः ॥

447. In the statement, 'To whom there is nothing superior and something inferior is there' it is definitely indicated that something inferior to the Lord is there.

४४८. अन्यथा तेनेदं पूर्णं ततो यदुत्तरतरं तदरूपमनामयमितिवाक्यशेषविरोधात् ॥

448. Otherwise the rest of the text which says, 'By him is this filled and that which surpasses that is formless and faultless' would be contradictory.

४४९. तेनेदमित्युक्तमेव तत इति परामृश्यते ॥

449. The word *tataḥ* (that whose superior is spoken of) just refers to what was referred to as 'this' in 'By him this is filled'.[1]

४५०. अन्यथा यस्मात्परं नेत्युक्तिविरोधात् ॥

450. Otherwise, the words, 'To whom there is nothing superior' would be nullified.

४५१. नामानि सर्वाणि यमाविशन्ति तं वै विष्णुं परममुदाहरन्ति । अस्यैव सर्वनामानि व्यतिरिक्तस्य सर्वतः । यः स्वतन्त्रः सदैवैकः स विष्णुः परमो मत इत्यादिश्रुतिभ्योऽन्यनामान्यस्यैवेति नान्येषां सर्वेश्वरत्वादिकमुच्यते ॥

451. Viṣṇu whom all names enter, is said to be supreme. All names refer to him who is different from all. He who is independent and eternally same, is the highest Viṣṇu. In such texts, as all other names signify only him, it is pointed out that no other being can be the Lord of all.

४५२. सर्ववेदेष्वप्यस्यादोषवचनादादावभावावचनाच्च तद्वचनाच्चान्येषां सर्वेषां वेदेषु सर्वेषु । तेषां सर्वनामत्वानुक्तेश्च ॥

452. All this follows from the fact that in all the Vedas there is the assertion that Viṣṇu is free from imperfections, that in all of them there is the non-existence of the statement that he was non-existenct before creation, that in all the Vedas the defects and the non-existence before creation of all other entities are asserted and that they are not said to be the significance of all names.

४५३. उत्पत्तिर्वासुदेवस्य प्रादुर्भावो न चापरः । देहोत्पत्तिस्तदन्येषां ब्रह्मादीनां तदीरणात् । देहोऽनादिर्हरेर्नित्यो ब्रह्मादीनामनित्यकाः । मुख्योत्पत्तिस्तदन्येषां प्रादुर्भावो हरेर्जनिरिति परमश्रुतेश्च ॥ इति द्वितीयः परिच्छेदः ॥

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[1] It is not that the Lord fills the world and is surpassed by some other principle, as some pūrvapakṣin seems to have supposed. It simply means that the Lord permeates the world and surpasses it. He is both immanent and transcendent.

453. The *Parama-śruti* says: 'In the case of Vāsudeva origination means just manifestation and nothing else. All others like Brahmā have bodies that come into being through his actuating force. The body of Hari is unoriginated and eternal. The bodies of beings like Brahmā are not eternal. The other beings have birth in a primary sense. But the birth of Hari is just his manifestation.

तृतीयः परिच्छेदः

४५४. ॐ ॥ वर्जितः सर्वदोषैर्यो गुणसर्वस्वमूर्तिमान् । स्वतन्त्रो यद्वशाः सर्वे स विष्णुः परमो मत इति परमोपनिषदि ॥

454. The *Paramopaniṣad* says: 'That Viṣṇu who is free from all imperfection, who is an embodiment of all auspicious attributes, who is independent and under whose control everything else is, is the supreme Godhead.'

४५५. नित्यपूर्णाखिलगुणो निर्दोषः सर्वदैव यः । यः स्वतन्त्रः परो विष्णुर्जन्ममृत्यादिवर्जितः ॥

455. 'He has all excellent attributes in all their fullness eternally. He is always free from imperfections. That supreme Viṣṇu is independent and transcends birth and death.'

४५६. नारद उवाच ॥ निर्दोषश्चेत्कथं विष्णुर्मानुषेषूदपद्यत । चिन्ताश्रमव्रणाज्ञानदुःखयुग्दृश्यते कथम् । एष मे संशयो ब्रह्मन् हृदि शल्य इवार्पितः । अनुद्धार्योऽपरैर्मर्त्यैः सूक्तिशक्त्या तमुद्धर ॥ ब्रह्मोवाच ॥ स्त्रीपुंमलाभियोगात्मा देहो विष्णोर्न जायते ॥ किंतु निर्दोषचैतन्यसुखां नित्यां स्वकां तनुम् । प्रकाशयति सैवेयं जनिर्विष्णोर्न चापरा । तथाप्यसुरमोहाय परेषां च क्वचित् क्वचित् । दुःखाज्ञानश्रमादीन्स दर्शयेत् शुद्धसद्गुणः । क्व व्रणादि क्व चाज्ञानं स्वतन्त्रार्चित्यसद्गुणे । दौर्लभ्यायैव मोक्षस्य दर्शयेत्तान्यजो हरिः । मिथ्यादर्शनदोषेण तेन मुक्ति न यांति च । तमो यांति च तेनैव तस्माद्दोषविवर्जितम् । प्रादुर्भावगतं चैव जानीयाद्विष्णुमञ्जसेति ब्रह्मांडे ॥

456. The *Brahmāṇḍa-purāṇa* records the following conversation: Nārada asked, 'If Viṣṇu is free from all imperfections, how is it that he was born among men? How again is it that in his incarnations he seems to suffer anxiety, weariness, wounds, ignorance and sorrow? This doubt O Brāhmaṇa, has lodged itself in my heart like a dart. That cannot be pulled out by other mortals. By the power of your holy speech please pull it out'. Brahmā replied, 'Viṣṇu's body is not born of the union of man and woman. On the contrary, he manifests his own eternal form which is faultless consciousness and bliss. This manifestation alone is his birth and nothing else. Still, for deluding the asuras and others also sometimes, he exhibits sorrow, ignorance and weariness, though he is absolutely perfect. How can there be wounds etc.? How can there be ignorance in that independent and incomprehensibly perfect God? The unborn Hari does exhibit them to render liberation not easily attainable. They (asuras) owing to the defect of their wrong vision, do not attain liberation and go to darkness. Therefore Viṣṇu must be definitely understood as free from imperfections even in his incarnations'.

४५७. गुणक्रियादयो विष्णोः स्वरूपं नान्यदिष्यते । अतो मिथोऽपि भेदो न तेषां कश्चित्कदाचन । स्वरूपेऽपि विशेषोऽस्ति स्वरूपत्ववदेव तु । भेदाभावेऽपि तेनैव व्यवहारश्च सर्वत इति परमोपनिषदि ॥

457. The *Paramopaniṣad* says: 'The attributes and actions etc. of Viṣṇu are his own essential substantive nature.' They are not different. There is no mutual difference what ever among them or between them and the substantive essence. In the substantive nature itself there is viśeṣa,[1] as there is substantiality in the substance. Though there

[1] 'Viśeṣa' may be roughly defined as that ontological principle which accounts for the possibility of conceptual and verbal distinction even when there is no difference.

is no difference, by virtue of viśeṣa the language of difference is rendered possible.

४५८. अभिन्नत्वमभेदश्च यथा भेदविवर्जितम् । व्यवहार्यं पृथक् च स्यादेवं सर्वे गुणा हरेः । अभेदाभिन्नयोर्भेदो यदि वा भेदभिन्नयोः । अनवस्थितिरेव स्यान्न विशेषणतामतिः । मूलसम्बन्धमज्ञात्वा तस्मादेकमनन्तधा । व्यवहार्यं विशेषेण दुस्तर्कबलतो हरेः । विशेषोऽपि स्वरूपं स स्वनिर्वाहकतास्य चेति ब्रह्मतर्के ॥

458. The *Brahmatarka* says: 'Just as being non-different and non-difference are not different, but still can be treated as different in language, even so are all the qualities of Hari. If difference were to be postulated between the non-different and non-differenee and between the different and difference, there results infinite regress. The quality cannot be apprehended as adjectival to an entity, if the fundamental relation between the entity and its quality is not apprehended before. Therefore the single substantive essence lends itself to be spoken of as if it were a manifold consisting of substance, quality, etc., through the principle of viśeṣa. All this is made possible by the power of Viṣṇu which transcends human reason. Viśeṣa itself is the substantive essence and also lends itself to be spoken of as if it were different therefrom. It functions with reference to itself as it does with reference to the rest of the features of the substance.'

४५९. एकमेवाद्वितीयं तन्नेह नानास्ति किञ्चन । मृत्योस्स मृत्युमाप्नोति य इह नानेव पश्यति । यथोदकं दुर्गे वृष्टं पर्वतेषु विधावति । एवं धर्मान् पृथक्पश्यंस्तानेवानुविधावतीत्यादिश्रुतेश्च ॥

459. This is declared in the following texts: 'One only without a second', 'There is no plurality here', 'He goes from death to death who sees plurality here', 'Just as water rained on a hill flows downwards, even so, he who sees the attributes as different, following that view, goes downwards.'

४६०. देशः सर्वत्र पुरुषः स्वतन्त्रः कालनित्यता । इत्यादिषु स्वसम्बन्धाद्यथैव गुणरूपिणः । गुणित्वं गुणभोक्तृत्वं स्याद्विष्णोस्तच्च स स्वयमिति ब्रह्मतर्के ।

460. The *Brahmatarka* says: 'Substances through relations to themselves are spoken as if they are qualities, when we say, "Space is everywhere", "A person is free", "Time is everlasting". Similarly Viṣṇu is the substratum of his qualities and enjoys them also. His very svarūpa constitutes those qualities.'

४६१. विष्णुं सर्वगुणैः पूर्णं ज्ञात्वा संसारवर्जितः । निर्दुःखानन्दभुङ्नित्यं तत्समीपे स मोदते । मुक्तानां चाश्रयो विष्णुरधिकोऽधिपतिस्तथा । तद्वशा एव ते सर्वे सर्वदैव स ईश्वर इति परमश्रुतिः ॥

461. The *Parama-śruti* says: 'He who knows Viṣṇu as full of all excellences, gets rid of saṁsāra and becomes an enjoyer of painless bliss for all eternity. He rejoices in proximity to Viṣṇu. Viṣṇu is the support for the liberated selves. He surpasses them and he is their Lord. All of them are under his control. He is always the supreme ruler.'

४६२. अमृतस्यैष सेतुः । सोऽश्नुते सर्वान्कामान्सह ब्रह्मणा विपश्चितेत्यादि च ॥

462. The texts, 'He is the support of the immortals' and 'He attains all objects of desire along with the all-knowing Brahman' also speak of the same theme.

४६३. नृपाद्याश्शतधृत्यन्ता मुक्तिगा उत्तरोत्तरम् । गुणैः सर्वैः शतगुणा मोदन्त इति हि श्रुतिरिति पाद्मे ॥

463. The *Padma-purāṇa* says: 'Beginning with kings and culminating in Śatadhṛti the souls attain freedom. They have gradation of the qualities, each higher rank possessing qualities a hundredfold in excess over the lower. According to this gradation they rejoice in their freedom, so says the Śruti.'

४६४. अतो निश्शेषदोषवर्जितः पूर्णोऽनन्तगुणो नारायण इति सिद्धम् ॥

464. Thus it is established that Nārāyaṇa is free from every imperfection and that he is perfect and abounds in infinite excellences.

यस्य त्रीण्युदितानि वेदवचने रूपाणि दिव्यान्यलं बट् तद्दृशतमित्थमेव निहितं देवस्य भर्गो महत् । वायो रामवचोनयं प्रथमकं पृक्षो द्वितीयं वपुर्मध्वो यत्तु तृतीयमेतदमुना ग्रन्थः कृतः केशवे ॥

Of the deity Vāyu whose three blessed forms are distinctly spoken of in the words of the Vedas, whose essential form is prowess and wisdom, is the support and activity of the world, is highly worshipful and is ordained to manifest itself as it is (without any diminution of power, wisdom, etc.), of such Vāyu the first avatar is that which carried the message of Rāma (to Sītā), the second which brought about the destruction of the (Kuru) forces, and this third is Madhva by whom this work is composed for proclaiming the supremacy of Lord Keśava.

स्वतन्त्रायाखिलेशाय निर्दोषगुणरूपिणे ।
प्रेयसे मे सुपूर्णाय नमो नारायणाय ते ॥

Obeisance to Nārāyaṇa, the object of my love, who is self-dependent, sovereign over all, flawless and of the essence of sublime qualities and infinite in every way.

AKSHARA GRANTHALAYA
ACC.NO. S032371

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